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Abstract 
This thesis provides a sociological exploration of the politics of new agricultural 
technologies in the United Kingdom. It addresses some of the key issues involved in 
these politics, as well as how they are discussed and fought over. Conceptually it 
addresses these questions by focussing on issues of risk, science and governance. In 
doing so, this thesis situates the politics of GM crops and foods in relation to wider 
normative concerns about the cultural values, relationships and institutions shaping 
agriculture, and British society more generally. Empirically, this thesis applies a 
qualitative methodology, primarily relying on data generated from a series of in-depth 
interviews. Through these interviews active participants in the debate were able to 
express a variety of opinions about the risks and benefits of agricultural biotechnology. 
The interview data is further supplemented by some documentary evidence, particularly 
as relates to several government led initiatives addressing agricultural debates in terms of 
contestations over risk and knowledge. Key chapters in this thesis look at the way in 
which the debate over GM crops and foods has been shaped by perceptions of the role 
and values of the life-industry, science and the Government in developing and regulating 
biotechnology. Finally, this thesis also addresses how society, and practices of 
governance in particular, are able to accommodate these political issues in managing risk 
and regulating technological change. 
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PART ONE - THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Introduction to the Research Questions 
This thesis addresses the politics involved in scientific and technological 
controversies, particularly those pertaining to the use of genetics in agriculture. It 
investigates the types of arguments and motivations behind the participation of those 
actors who have been actively engaged in the debate over genetically modified (GM) 
crops and foods. Furthennore, this thesis investigates how these debates relate to the 
processes of governance and regulation which will be involved in making the eventual 
decisions concerning the commercial and scientific future of GM agriculture in the 
United Kingdom. 
Most readers in the UK will be very familiar with the often heated disputes 
which have surrounded the innovation and commercialization of new agricultural 
technologies! since the second half of the 1990s. Moreover, for most, the debate over 
GM crops and foods will not have been seen as an isolated moment of political 
controversy, but inextricably tied to a decade of high profile agricultural controversies 
in Britain. Foremost, these include mad-cow disease, or bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE), and more recently, foot and mouth disease (FMD). Together 
these events have created an impression of an agricultural industry which is dangerously 
Although this thesis is specifically interested in controversies involving the application of biotechnology 
to agriculture, the changes in technology and fanning practice facing British agriculture go beyond 
biotechnology itself. For example, many of the GM crops being introduced have been developed in 
conjunction with targeted pesticide and herbicide use. Moreover, agricultural biotechnology is seen as 
part of a continuing evolution of fanning in Britain towards large-scale, industrial and global models of 
production. The use of the term "new agricultural technologies" is an attempt to reinforce that 
controversies over agricultural biotechnology take place within this wider context of change. 
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in disarray, and a countryside which is both at risk and itself becoming the source of risk 
to Britons. In the cases ofBSE and FMD, uncomfortable images of diseased animals 
being led to slaughter and disposed of on mass pyres have been witnessed by most of the 
public either directly, or in repeated media coverage of these events. Likewise, in the 
case of GM agriculture there is no shortage of evocative images, or dire warnings, about 
the deleterious consequences of agricultural biotechnology. Take, for example, the two 
following images. The first, a leaflet from an environmental campaign organization 
called the Soil Association, dramatically evokes the image of an environment under 
"'1 UPl OSlVt AU'OlIT I'~ I )t N ~ ,:;-, .... 1(".1) , • .or .... 1 T X At. ,'" h1'.· .... ~ IIr" 'h'" - ~."'w~ 
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ho~ h.I!l,n North ""'u"til I ill "lII~ .... !rn.,' , " • 
Figure 1 - An Environment Under 
Threat (source: Soil Association). 
Figure 2 - A Crop Decontamination. 
threat (ref Figure 1). The second, an image 
from an environmental protest at Watlington in 
1999, displays activists 'decontaminating' the 
countryside by actively destroying a field of GM 
oilseed rape (ref Figure 2). It suggests that not 
only is the countryside under threat, but further 
projects a feeling that GM crops pose 
considerable dangers to human welfare as well. 
As these images suggest, much of the of 
the debate over GM agriculture has been 
focused around issues of risks. This has at 
times led to the polarization of political 
positions within the debate. For example, 
opponents of the use of genetic technologies in 
developing agriculture argue that GM crops 
3 
potentially exacerbate the 
environmental problems of 
pollution and land burdening 
already associated with modem 
agricultural systems. 
Antithetically, pro po nents 0 f the 
technology argue GM cropping 
provides an environmentally 
friendly and 
2 
sustainable alternative to current agricultural practice, for example by decreasing 
pesticide usage. In the same vein, opponents argue that too little is known about the 
consequences of consuming GM foods to allow them to be declared safe and stocked on 
supermarket shelves. In contrast again, proponents of the technology posit that GM 
foods are not only safe, but potentially can provide tremendous benefits to consumers. 
These range from projected improvements to the taste and texture of fruit, to increases 
in nutritional and health values of products. 
However, the debate over the risks of agricultural biotechnology has not been 
limited to the polarized campaigns of environmental activists and the public relations 
exercises of industry spokespersons and scientists at the heart of these perceptions. 
Before any final decision about the future of GM crops and foods in the UK can be 
made, the Government has been forced to take into consideration contestations over risk 
at some level. This can, on the one hand, be attributed to the political pressure being 
exerted on Government by public scepticism about biotechnology and the active 
lobbying of activists from both sides of the debate. At the same time, the Government 
has been pressured to rethink its strategy on risk and scientific innovation, following a 
series of failures made by scientists and ministers in recognizing and contending with 
the dangers ofBSE2. In this light, ideas of risk and the potential hazards of agricultural 
biotechnology are now routinely debated in boardrooms and hotel conference centres 
across London and around the UK. 
In this respect, the sociology of risk, science and technology, can make an 
important contribution to these ongoing debates, proposing an alternative analysis of the 
risks and politics of new agricultural technologies. This approach argues that 
understandings of risk premised solely on debates over hazard and safety are inadequate 
in describing the breadth of the social and political relationships involved in the debate 
over GM agriculture. For example, a cursory examination of the above mentioned risk 
debates may prompt some rather straightforward conclusions about the nature of the 
Partly this pressure has come from sources close to processes of governance, such as Lord Phillips' 
Report from the BSE Inquiry (2000a) and the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology'S report on Science and Society (2001). Pressure has come from the non-governmental 
community as well. For example, please refer to Stirling and Mayer (1999). 
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politics of new agricultural technologies. Firstly, these debates focus political attention 
on the detennination of the potential hazards associated with the development and 
application of agricultural biotechnology. Secondly, a byproduct of this focus on hazard 
is the suggestion that any decision about the future of GM agriculture will reflect 
technical conclusions about whether or not these technologies are safe. Alternatively, 
the sociology of risk, science and technology, places an emphasis on moving beyond a 
discussion of what can be presented as the 'absolute properties' of genetic technologies. 
It is also necessary to question the social relations and cultural contexts in which 
controversies over-risk take place. This does not imply that the concerns about hazard 
should be abandoned, but that they need to be reevaluated by asking how issues of risk 
and acceptability are socially defined and contested. 
Taking these arguments as a starting point for the analysis presented in this 
thesis, the following themes and questions are proposed. They have been further guided 
by the qualitative empirical data collected as part of this research project. Overall, this 
thesis asks, what are the politics of new agricultural technologies, and how are these 
politics discussed and fought over? In giving depth to this question, three more specific 
avenues of investigation are pursued. Firstly, this thesis investigates the various ways in 
which actors involved in the debate contest the risks of new agricultural technologies. 
Secondly, it questions the ways in which these actors debate risks in relation to broader 
political concerns involving the nature of British society. A final avenue of 
investigation addresses how these broadened notions of risk are being addressed in the 
governance and regulation of GM agriculture. To restate, this thesis thus poses three 
overlapping questions: 
• How do concerns over risk and techno-scientific development 
contribute to the politics of new agricultural technologies? 
• How can the risks of new agricultural technologies be understood 
in relation to the wider normative politics of British Society? 
• How can risks, as understood sociologically, be contended with 
in the ongoing processes of governance involving new 
agricultural technologies? 
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The remainder of this chapter will outline these questions in greater detail, first 
through a brief introduction to this thesis's approach to the politics of new agricultural 
technologies in Britain, and then through a chapter by chapter introduction. 
The Politics of New Agricultural Technologies: 
The breadth of the questions posed above reflects the complexity of the 
controversy surrounding new agricultural technologies. It is a debate, which has rapidly 
risen to prominene-e on the British political stage, has at times been volatile and heated, 
and involved a multiplicity of issues, perspectives and actors. The task of this thesis is 
to negotiate the complexity of this debate in developing an understanding of the politics 
of new agricultural technologies. Although Chapter Two will provide an extensive 
overview of how risks and techno-scientific controversies can be understood politically, 
it is helpful in introducing this project to offer a short overview of this approach. The 
purpose is to provide some analytical depth to the research questions. 
A Public / Social Debate 
Although often expressed technically and referring to potentially real 
consequences, the approach to the politics of new agricultural technologies adopted by 
this thesis emphasizes the social nature of contestations over risk. Firstly, the debate 
over the risks of GM agriculture is recognized as both a debate between experts about 
specific issues of hazard and safety, and a debate involving the varied concerns of a 
multifaceted public. Secondly, following research in the social study of science and 
technology, perceptions of risk are not discriminated hierarchically between those based 
on scientific knowledge and those based on non-expert knowledge. Instead, the analysis 
is directed toward an understanding of controversies taking place between various forms 
of knowledge, including those involving competing moral and ethical positions. 
As the considerable public and media attention being paid to the debate over 
agricultural biotechnology bears witness, an engagement with the controversy is not 
limited to scientists, bureaucrats, or members of the biotechnology industry. Instead, 
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the debate includes consumers, activists, farmers and numerous other members of the 
wider British public. The implication of the spread of the controversy into the wider 
social arena is that the political boundaries surrounding GM technologies have been 
expanded. As the debate stands now, it would appear unlikely that the future of 
agricultural biotechnology will be determined in scientific laboratories, by government 
regulators, or by industry interests alone. An analysis of the politics of new agricultural 
biotechnology may therefore need to look beyond these locales. 
Support for these speculative comments comes from the sociology of science, 
technology and risk. This perspective argues that in order to understand and contend 
with the social complexity of risk debates it is necessary to broaden traditional 
conceptions of expertise. Risk research conducted by sociologists, such as Irwin and 
Wynne, underlines the importance of analytical approaches which engage a range of 
attitudes and experiences, alongside traditional sources of expert knowledge (Irwin et 
aI., 1999; Irwin and Wynne, 1996; Wynne, 1996a & 1996b). A growing body of work 
in the UK has thus sought to tap into public attitudes and experiences pertaining to the 
risks of genetic innovations in agriculture (Kitzinger and Davison, 2001; Marris et aI., 
2001; Grove-White et aI., 2000; Grove-White et aI.,1997). This work advocates, or at 
least implies, that the public should, and can, be given greater influence in disputes over 
risk and technological innovation. Thus, in understanding the politics of risk, it is 
necessary to enquire if, and how, debates over GM agriculture involve struggles over 
the types of knowledge and expertise permitted in authoritative evaluations of 
technological hazards. 
One of the difficulties in engaging alternative forms of knowledge is that 
scientific knowledge has often been given precedence over alternative forms of 
lmowledge in determining risks3. This may be attributable to the acceptance of the 
authority often ascribed to scientific pretenses of objectivity and the autonomy of 
An example with immediate pertinence to the debate over GM agriculture comes from the handling of 
the risks of BSE in the 1980s and 1990s. In this case both the Government and the scientific community 
have been heavily criticized for adopting an approach to risk which relied almost exclusively on 
positivistic absolutes in dictating a response to the disease and in communicating the potential hazards of 
BSE to the public (e.g. Frewer and Salter, 2002; Millstone and Zwanenberg, 200 L refer also to Chapter 
Seven). 
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knowledge. For example, where other knowledge is seen to be tainted by cultural 
values and social politics, science has been able to speak about natural facts. 
Challenging these perceptions, research in the area of Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) has thus sought to demonstrate that even facts are inherently political and open 
to social and normative political influences (e.g., Latour 1987, 1993). The STS 
approach implies that any political analysis of GM agriculture needs to come to terms 
with the social politics involved in the construction of factual claims about risk. In 
other words, addressing the ways in which authoritative accounts of risks are presented, 
and potentially contested, is deemed essential to an understanding the political debates 
surrounding new agricultural technologies. 
A Politics of Convergent Uncertainties 
With the public and social nature of the debate in mind, this thesis proposes an 
analytical approach to the politics of new agricultural technologies which focuses on the 
convergence of uncertainty. Firstly, as suggested above, the politics of new agricultural 
technologies can be investigated in relation to contested uncertainties in the scientific 
knowledge of GM agriculture and its potentially deleterious consequences. Secondly, 
this approach addresses the ways in which uncertainties about the risks and benefits of 
agricultural biotechnology are contested in relation to uncertainties pertaining to the 
nature of British Society. As Douglas (1992, 1986a; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) has 
argued, what is delineated as risky and what risks are ignored in environmental debates 
are inherently tied to struggles over social values and cultural ideals. These values and 
ideals include descriptions of appropriate forms of social relations within society, or 
between society and the environment. Consequently, this perspective directs the 
analysis of the politics of new agricultural technologies toward an examination of the 
contested social visions associated with risk perceptions. 
Importantly, this approach can be defined as convergent in that it does not seek 
to prioritize either uncertainties of knowledge, or uncertainties in the social values 
attached to GM foods. In other words, neither aspect can be seen to determine the other 
in contesting risks. Risks generated from perceived uncertainties of knowledge cannot 
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be dismissed as simply reflecting social unease about the nature of G:\I development. 
Nor, can normative concerns about risk be seen as the consequence of insufficient 
knowledge of genetics as applied to agriculture. Instead, it is the process through \vhich 
these uncertainties are related in the arguments of stakeholders which are of greatest 
interest to this research project. A convergent approach to uncertainty thus offers an 
important way of approaching political debates over risk by addressing how 
contestations involving techno-scientific discourses of risk relate to the normative 
politics of an uncertain society. 
A Politics of Contingency 
Finally, in outlining how the research questions can be analyzed politically, this 
thesis adopts a political view of the contingency of techno-scientific development and 
social relations. Again, building on research in STS, a political account emphasizing 
contingency suggests that techno-scientific controversies cannot be settled by simply 
accnling more scientific knowledge, or by better communicating this knowledge to the 
public. Social constructionists argue, for example, that technologies are only ever 
granted certainty, for example being demarcated as safe or dangerous, through processes 
of social negotiation (ie. Latour, 1987; Bijker and Law, 1992). This offers the basic 
insight that if certainties about the nature of technologies are socially constructed, then 
the definitions and uses ascribed to new agricultural technologies remain malleable and 
potentially open to change (Bijker, 1995: p.28). This perspective, thus advances the 
need to interrogate how stakeholders, in contesting the risks of agricultural 
biotechnology, contest the shape and uses of that technology. 
Moreover, by addressing the politics of new agricultural technologies with an 
awareness of the normative uncertainty tied up in these debates, these contingent 
potentials are extended to the development and performance of social morals and 
cultural values. As Hilary Rose (1998, 2000) points out, by affixing questions about 
norms to debates over technological risk, sociology is able to conceive of new spaces 
where a democratic engagement with the ways in which technologies fit into the social 
world can be fostered. If the types of technologies brought forward by science and 
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industry are to be opened up to a politics of contingency, so too must the social and 
cultural contexts (pertaining specifically in this case to agricultural development) in 
which these technologies are embedded. 
Summary 
In summary, this approach to the politics of new agricultural technologies helps 
gives some analytical focus to the research questions put forward in this thesis. Firstly, 
it focuses attention: on the importance of contestations over the types of knowledge, and 
the authority they are granted, expressed in arguments about the risks of agricultural 
biotechnology. Secondly, it underlines the need to address the ways in which debates 
over health and environmental safety relate to contrasting sets of values describing 
appropriate forms of social and environmental relations. Finally, this approach directs 
the research analysis toward the ways in which actors are able to influence social 
conceptions of OM technologies, and their position in British society. 
The Research Pro; ect 
This thesis is divided into three main sections. Part One, introduced here, 
outlines the research project undertaken in response to the above stated questions. 
Including this introduction (Chapter One), this opening series of chapters comprises a 
review of the theoretical position and key literature framing this project, and an outline 
of the research methodology and data set. 
Theoretical Approaches 
In order to address the aims and objectives of this research project, this thesis 
makes use of a variety of theoretical approaches to the study of science, technology and 
risk. These perspectives are drawn together and outlined in detail in Chapter Three. 
The aim of this literature review is to build a theoretical framework in which new 
agricultural technologies, and the debate over its risks, can be analyzed politically. 
-10-
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Primarily, although not exclusively, this thesis draws on three closely related 
sociological fields of study. Firstly, theories of the risk society and of social and 
technological change in modem societies comprise an important body of work framing 
this thesis. Including work by authors such as Beck and Giddens, this research situates 
the emergence of risk in relation to the increasing complexity of modem societies and 
the transformation of public perceptions of risk accompanying these changes. Cultural 
studies of risk and environmental controversies make up a second focus in the literature, 
providing information on how, and why, labels of risk are applied to particular 
situations or technologies. Importantly work by authors in this field, such as Mary 
Douglas, opens up an understanding of the politics of risk and techno-scientific 
controversies to take account of cultural debates over the normative nature of society. 
Social constructionist, or constructivist4, perspectives of techno-scientific development 
make up a final theme in the literature adopted by this thesis. The contribution of this 
perspective stems from its ability to interrogate the social contexts in which science and 
technology are constructed. This involves revealing the ways in which scientific 
knowledge and technological objects are defined and contested. The benefit of the 
constructionist perspective is that it demystifies factual claims by revealing the 
contingent nature of development. 
This literature review attempts to draw on the strengths associated with each of 
these three approaches, while also identifying their limitations. The purpose of which is 
to provide the research project with a theoretical framework from which the data can be 
investigated in response to the research questions. 
Methodology and Data Set 
This thesis adopts a qualitative methodology based on a broadly discursive 
analysis of the risk arguments, including claims of safety, made by active participants in 
the debate over new agricultural technologies. 
Generally speaking, there is no academic agreement as to which term is more acceptable overall, or WIthin 
specific analytical contexts. For no other reason than consistency I have chosen constructionism as the 
term to be applied throughout this thesis. 
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As will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three, this method of analysis was 
chosen for several reasons. To recall, the overall question put forward by this thesis 
asks what the politics of new agricultural technologies involved for those active in the 
debate. A qualitative methodology is of initial benefit in that it is able to engage the 
complexity of the debate. For example, the open-ended interview style adopted in this 
thesis provided access to a wider range of perspectives and arguments about the risks 
and benefits of agricultural biotechnology, than might have been achieved by a more 
structured methodology. Moreover, part of the task of this thesis is to link participants' 
perceptions of the-risks of new agricultural technologies to normative uncertainties 
about the nature of social development. The depth of information offered by a 
qualitative approach is thus essential in assessing the often loosely defined cultural 
values and moral positions of the various actors in the debate. 
Primarily, the research data was derived from a series of semi-structured 
interviews addressing the contributions made by the various different stakeholders 
involved in debating the future of new agricultural technologies. Directed by the 
research literature, the overall aim of this research is to tap into the diversity of 
experience and knowledge participants exhibited in contesting biotechnology and its 
application in agriculture. Thus the voices of environmental activists, consumer 
representatives, and farmers are heard alongside those of scientists, bureaucrats and 
industry representatives5 (ref. Appendix C). 
In examining this data several key analytical issues stand out as requiring 
attention. Although these will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four, it is helpful at this 
point to look ahead at what these issues are. Firstly, although sampling an array of 
perspectives in the GM food and crop debate, this thesis has focused on those who have 
been active participants in the political stnlggles over GM crops and foods. For 
example, the majority of research participants either held a vested interest in the future 
of the technology, or perceived the development ofGM crops in relation to strong 
These labels fail to do justice to the variation and complexity of standpoints and are intended only to give 
the reader a rough characterization of the research sample. They are not exclusive categories. For 
example, in many cases participants can be associated with two or more of these categories. As an 
illustration, research scientists might also be activists, industry representatives or government officials. 
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personal beliefs, or values. Thus, while talking about the various segments of the public 
involved in the debate, any research conclusions cannot be seen to reflect public 
attitudes toward the GM crop technologies in general. 
Secondly, it was remarked earlier that, this thesis adopts a broadly discursive 
approach to analyzing the data. The use of the modifier 'broadly' is important in this 
instance. As this thesis is in part framed by an argument which asserts that alternative 
types of expertise should be valued in debates over risk it is important that the 
methodology allow participants to tell their own story of the controversy. Although 
some level of analysis remains an essential part of this research project, it is essential to 
avoid the temptation to overanalyze participants' statements and speak for the 
participants themselves. Simply stated, the aim of the interviews is to listen to what 
participants have to say about risk and to discuss these in an analytical fashion. The aim 
is not to try and find hidden meanings in their comments. 
A third analytical issue raised in this research project involves the interpretation 
of the data in relation to the subj ect positions of the participants. The questions posed 
by this thesis do not ask what various stakeholders thought about GM, but how they 
debated the technology in relation to issues of risk in particular. Thus, the analysis of 
participant comments is not intended to provide data which could be seen as 
representative of a specific group (e.g., farmers, scientists or activists). Alternatively, 
the analytical focus is on the types of arguments which are made by participants and not 
on attempting to attach specific perspectives to particular groups. 
Finally, although interview data comprises the primary source of data in this 
thesis, it is supplemented by a variety of documentary evidence. This material provides 
an important contribution to this thesis as it enables the analysis to keep pace with the 
rapid evolution of the debate. Where participants were only able to speak about the 
debate up until the date of their interview, Government reports and committee minutes 
are used to keep take account of the ongoing developments in the controversy. 
Furthermore, these documents are invaluable in relating the arguments put forward by 
the participants to the actions taken by Government in contending with risk. 
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Elucidating the Politics of Risk in the Debate Over New Agricultural Technologies 
Part Two of this thesis begins the analysis of the ways in which research 
participants made contrasting claims about risk in debating the dangers and the merits of 
genetic developments in agricultural practice. The section begins with a discussion of 
the history of the controversy over GM crops and foods, and provides a context in 
which the research data can be located. Building on from this history, two repeating 
themes are identified in the research data, with each comprising the basis of a separate 
chapter. Both themes raise questions about the institutional context framing the 
innovation and introduction of agricultural biotechnology in British agriculture. 
Roughly, these themes can be described as relating to the contested positions of 
corporate industry and of science involved in the GM controversy. 
The Controversy 
Chapter Four provides a selected overview of the controversy involving new 
agricultural technologies. It offers a background to the technologies discussed in this 
thesis, the reactions they have prompted in the UK and briefly outlines some of the 
political issues defining these debates. This chapter is not an attempt to provide a 
comprehensive account of the history of the debate over GM. Instead, it highlights 
those aspects of the story which are most relevant to placing the analysis of the research 
data within a political context. Thus, instead of offering a singular account of the 
development of the GM debate, the chapter discusses three concurrent histories. The 
first historical account, put forward in this chapter, discusses the rise of new agricultural 
technologies as a public controversy. Specifically, it highlights the growth of public 
interest in the governance and regulation of the technology. Secondly, the commercial 
growth and subsequent abatement of the agricultural biotechnology sector are discussed. 
This includes a recount of the failure of industry to sustain a commercial market for GM 
foods (e.g., GM tomato paste) in the face of public skepticism about biotechnology. A 
third account of the controversy outlines some of the key scientific cases around which 
the debate over agricultural biotechnology has developed. 
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Contesting the Life-Industry 
Chapter Five addresses the ways in which research participants evoked 
contestations over the role of the agricultural biotechnology industry, also known as the 
life-industry, in debating the potential risks of new agricultural technologies. In general, 
risk debates are addressed in relation to commonly evoked perceptions of industry's 
dominant position and the prevalence of a corporate ethos in dictating agricultural and 
food policy in Britain. More specifically, this chapter questions how participants 
differentiated between the risks and benefits of new agricultural technologies, according 
to competing visions about the role of corporate industry in society. Furthermore, these 
debates are also addressed in relation to contestations over ideals of democracy. In 
particular, the way in which participants valued consumer choice and public consent in 
making decisions about the acceptability of GM technologies and their potential risks 
will be investigated. 
Contesting Science 
Chapter Six addresses how political debates over new agricultural technologies 
involved controversies over the character of science and its role in UK society. This 
includes an examination of the way in which research participants contest perceptions of 
science as a progressive force, not only in the development of agriculture, but in 
directing social change in general. Furthermore, this chapter looks at how valuations of 
the robustness of current scientific practice relate to the ways in which participants 
delineated the risks and benefits of new agricultural technologies. Finally, the manner 
in which stakeholders debated the role of science in society is examined in reference to 
how participants disputed the involvement of scientific authority in the governance of 
agricultural biotechnology. 
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Governing Risk and the Development of New Agricultural Technologies 
Part Three of this thesis moves to a discussion of the ways in which the types of 
political perspectives brought forward in Chapters Five and Six can be seen in relation 
to the governance of risk and GM agriculture. In other words, this section investigates 
how parallel concerns about technological risks and normative concerns about the social 
contexts in which these technologies are being developed, can be involved in the 
regulation of agricultural biotechnology. Although relying partly on interview data, this 
analysis is supplemented significantly by documentary evidence. Partly, as already 
discussed, this is inevitable given the many developments in this area overlapping the 
time span of this research project. However, this information is also crucial in that it 
documents attempts to rethink how governments approach risk and techno-scientific 
controversies in agriculture. 
ESE and the Phillips' Report 
Chapter Seven comprises an analysis of the governance of risk and scientific 
uncertainty involved in the Government's botched attempts to understand and control 
the hazards ofBSE, or 'mad-cow' disease as it is popularly known. Although the 
circumstances leading up the BSE epidemic are not specifically related to developments 
in agricultural genetics, the BSE case is still important to an analysis of the governance 
of agricultural biotechnology. This chapter investigates how the BSE case has 
challenged the ways in which governments are expected to deal with risk issues. In 
particular the analysis is focused on a critical discussion of Lord Phillips' final Report 
from the BSE Inquiry (2000a). Several issues which were key to Phillips' account of 
the BSE story are equally pertinent when discussing the governance of GM agriculture 
and its potential risks. These include issues of trust in scientific-based approaches to 
governance, the relationship between expert and public knowledge, trust in science and 
Government, and apprehensions about the direction of agricultural development in the 
UK. 
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The AEBC and Rethinking Risk 
Partly, as a consequence of the BSE case, and no doubt further attributable to the 
scale and breadth of the public controversy over agricultural biotechnology, the British 
Government has been moved to reconsider its approach to contending with risk issues. 
Central to this project are experiments with more broadly based and less restrictive 
forms of government consultation in the lead up to the eventual decision over the future 
of GM crops and foods. 
Chapter Eight offers an analysis of one of these attempts, the Agriculture and 
Environment Biotechnology Commission (AEBC). Established in June 2000 the AEBC 
was created by the Labour Government as an independent strategic advisory committee 
tasked with assessing the implications of biotechnology on agriculture and the 
environment. What makes the AEBC of significant interest is that it draws on lay 
expertise alongside scientific knowledge, and further seeks to incorporate social and 
ethical concerns into the formal debates about the future of agricultural biotechnology. 
This chapter thus comprises an investigation of the strengths and limitations of the 
AEBC in broadening the risk perspective involved in Government decision making 
processes. Specifically, this evaluation is centred on the AEBC's influential "Crops on 
Trial" (AEBC, 2001) report. 
A Public Debate on GM 
Chapter Nine continues the analysis of the AEBC's role in incorporating 
alternative risk assessments into the decision making practices of governance. In 
particular it addresses the importance the AEBC has placed on the provision of a public 
debate, in bringing these alternatives forward. Although, this debate is ongoing at the 
time this thesis is being written, a preliminary evaluation of the potential successes and 
failures of this strategy is helpful in understanding the way governments can contend 
with risk. Thus, Chapter Nine addresses how a broadened platform of public 
engagement may be successful in integrating the types of risk issues which 
characterized participants arguments about GM agriculture discussed in Chapters Five 
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and Six. Conversely, the chapter also asks how the ABBC's construction of a public 
debate on GM agriculture may limit, or even be detrimental to, the assessment of the 
risk concerns expressed by actors in the debate. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced a programme of research aimed at developing an 
understanding of the politics involved in the controversy over new agricultural 
technologies, and -those pertaining to risk perceptions in particular. In part, the research 
presented in the following chapters offers a greater sociological understanding of the 
ways in which debates over risk involve social and· cultural contestations. This 
introduction has outlined an empirical proj ect which attempts to bridge the gap between 
technical controversies based on techno-scientific uncertainties and contestations over 
the values and institutions shaping agricultural development in the UK. Moreover, the 
importance of this project also lies in its practical contribution to the understanding of 
how governments can approach social risk issues. In other words, this thesis is 
interested not only in how participants debated risks, but also in how decision making 
structures can take account of these politics and the diversity of meaning attributable to 
risk perceptions. 
-18-
CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
Introduction 
In Chapter One, the sociological examination of the 'politics of new agricultural 
technologies' was identified as the research project undertaken by this thesis. 
Demarcated of specific interest were the ways in which the ongoing controversy over 
agricultural biotechnology relates to contestations over risks. Adopting a position from 
the outset which interprets the debate as intrinsically social and involving a breadth of 
issues, actors and subjective positions, a framework of convergent uncertainties was 
advanced as a means of coping with this complexity. This framework, on the one hand, 
sought to understand the politics of agricultural biotechnology in terms of the struggles 
over the technology's potential to be dangerous. For example, it suggested the need to 
address how actors in the controversy debated the risks the technology posed to the 
environment and to human health. On the other hand, it was suggested that these 
debates needed to be understood in relation to the broader context of social and cultural 
contestations over the nature of British society. 
The objective of this chapter is to further elaborate on this approach through the 
development of a theoretical framework from which the politics of new agricultural 
technologies may be approached analytically. No novel theoretical approach is 
proposed. Rather, the purpose of this literature review is to draw on the burgeoning 
body of work in the area of risk and science and technology studies (STS) to develop a 
set of resources with which to explore and further elucidate the research questions 
posed. To this end, the design of the chapter takes the form of a discussion of the 
strengths and weaknesses of various sociological perspectives in developing a political 
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understanding of risk and techno-scientific controversies. It is divided into three main 
sections. A review of theories addressing the social production of risk opens the chapter 
and provides insight into the way in which risks are produced and defined in society. 
Sometimes linked with theories of risk, constructionist theories of science and 
technology, comprise a second key theoretical focus in this thesis. In particular, this 
body of work offers insights about the socially contested nature of scientific knowledge 
and technological development. The final section of this chapter looks at two further 
issues arising out of these theoretical traditions, both of which will comprise repeating 
themes throughout-the remainder of the thesis. The first section investigates 
contestations over knowledge and expertise in debates over risk and technological 
development. The second section looks at the relationship between objective risks, 
understood as real dangers, and normative risks which are perceived as social and 
cultural abstractions. 
The Social Production of Risk 
Research accounting for the social production of risk provides an initial 
theoretical foundation for developing an understanding of the politics of new 
agricultural technologies. Although not a unified body of research, this approach has 
emphasized the possible hazards associated with technological innovation and society'S 
ability, or inability, to contend with these risks. It is a particularly consequential field of 
work for this research project in two respects. Firstly, risk theorists outline a theory of 
uncertainty based on the social consequences of techno-scientific development. Risk 
theories speak of uncertain knowledge, unpredictable hazards and the failures of society 
to offer the means of contending with the potential dangers associated with techno-
scientific development. Secondly, over the last decade, 'risk', and the term's emphasis 
on uncertainty and hazard, have become increasingly popular amongst academics in the 
social sciences, but also in the wider British political arena. Risk has become part of the 
language of the debate over agricultural biotechnology, including in relation to the 
governance and regulation of these technologies. Therefore, theories of risk, provide a 
means to understand how issues of hazards and uncertainty relate to contestations over 
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GM crops and GM foods. Moreover, theories of risk are themselves inextricably linked 
to the discourse of the politics of new agricultural technologies. 
Complexity and the Risk Society Thesis 
One of the most influential approaches to the study of risk and technology stems 
from the "risk society" thesis put forward by German sociologist Ulrich Beck (1992, 
1996) and further reinforced by Anthony Giddens (1990, 1994) in the UK. At the heart 
of their argument -is the assertion that the character of technological change and social 
complexity in contemporary society has transformed the way society perceives risk and 
the ability of social institutions to prevent or control potential hazards. 
In linking risks with technological innovation, Beck and Giddens are building on 
the work of authors, such as Charles Perrow (1984), writing in the early 1980s. In his 
seminal text, Normal Accidents, Perrow identifies the source of risks and the 
vulnerability they presuppose for society as the consequences of living with "high-risk 
technologies." Concerned primarily with nuclear technologies, the author argues 
specifically that risks result from the development of increasingly complex 
technological systems. By complex, Perrow is referring to the interactivity of 
technological processes. Murphy (2001), for example, has shown that society'S reliance 
on electricity in our day-to-day lives, coupled with a dependency on large-scale power 
systems requiring the transmission of electricity across vast networks, has left society 
vulnerable to risk. When during the winter of 1998 Eastern Canada and the United 
States suffered a particularly intense ice storm, an unanticipated buildup of ice on 
electrical wires caused transmission towers to collapse. Although an incident prompted 
by a so-called' act of nature,' Murphy argues that the immediate risks, including the loss 
of heating, and the ability to keep water pipes from freezing, faced by the public 
resulted from the dependency of society on an increasingly complex power system. It is 
these sorts of potentially catastrophic risks, resulting from what Perrow refers to as 
"normal accidents," that society should be concerned with: 
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"If interactive complexity and tight coupling - system characteristics _ 
inevitably will produce an accident, I believe we are justified in calling it 
a normal accident, or a system accident. The odd term normal accident is 
meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multiple and 
unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable. This is an expression of 
an integral characteristic of the system, not a statement of frequency. It is 
normal for us to die, but we only do it once. System accidents are 
uncommon, even rare; yet this is not all that reassuring, ifthey can produce 
catastrophes." (Perrow, 1984: p.5, original emphasis) 
Perrow draws two primary conclusions from the presence of normal accidents. 
Firstly, he argues that the nature of the accidents caused by technological complexity 
suggests the need -for a thick, as opposed to a thin, understanding ofiisk. A thin 
understanding is based around a "quantitative, precise, logically consistent, economical 
and value-free" approach to risks which are "predictable" and "understandable." A thick 
understanding of risk adopts a more socially aware account of the complexity of 
systems, and questions society's ability to anticipate, recognize or prevent catastrophic 
accidents from occurring (Perrow, 1984: p.328). Secondly, the overarching conclusion 
Perrow draws from his theory of risk is that once the limits of humanity's control of 
complex systems and the inevitability of risk are exposed, then society must identify the 
types of risks which would be unacceptable to take. 
Where the work of Beck and Giddens marks a step change in the development of 
a theory of risk is that both authors argue that risks are symptomatic of much more than 
increasingly complex technological systems. Moreover, 'risk' is a catchall term that 
characterizes the rapid and profound changes that society is undergoing as it is 
transformed from one stage of modernity to the next. Thus, where Perrow is content to 
talk about society's reliance on complex technological systems, Beck and Giddens speak 
of risks as the inevitable outcomes of increasingly complex forms of social organization. 
Giddens thus proclaims that modernity - a historically specific "mode of social order or 
organization" (1990: p.l) - is undergoing a radical transformation. Although offering 
potential benefits, social change is perceived to create new risks and dangers for society. 
The rapidity and scope of these transformations are such that Giddens dramatically 
characterizes modernity as a world that has begun to hurtle out of control: "Living in a 
modem world is more like being aboard a careening juggernaut rather than being in a 
carefully controlled and well-driven motor car" (ibid.: p. 53). In other words, both 
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authors articulate an even thicker sociological perception of risk than proposed by 
Perrow. Specifically they posit that globalization and techno-scientific development are 
shifting societies away from the era of industrial modernity towards a new modem era 
characterized by the production of risks 1• In the following statement, Beck refers to this 
epochal shift as the "reflexive modernization of industrial society:" 
"[This approach] is, then, about 'reflexive modernization' of industrial 
society... The intenningling of continuity and discontinuity is discussed 
with the examples of wealth production and risk production. The argument 
is that, while in classical industrial society the 'logic' of wealth production 
dominates ~he 'logic' of risk production, in the risk society this relationship 
is reversed. The productive forces have lost their innocence in the 
reflexivity of modem processes. The gain in power from techno-economic 
'progress' is being increasingly overshadowed by the production of risks. 
In an early stage, these can be legitimated as 'latent side effects'. As they 
become globalized, and subject to public criticism and scientific 
investigation, they come, so to speak, out ofthe closet and achieve a central 
importance in social and political debates." (Beck, 1992: p.13, original 
emphasis) 
As this statement and the grandness of Beck's theory suggests, the production of 
risks has far reaching consequences for how we can understand techno-scientific 
controversies. Foremost, it repositions the role and authority of scientific knowledge 
and expertise in society. Beck thus famously proposes that we (society) no longer fear 
what nature can do to us, but fear what we may have done to nature. As he puts it, "the 
risk society begins where nature ends" (Beck, 1998). The threats which we find in the 
risk society are not external risks which might strike society unexpectedly, but are 
manufactured from within society itself. These risks are considered the products of the 
"very progression of human development, especially by the progression of science and 
technology" (Giddens, 1998: p.28). Economic risks, global social risks, and health risks 
are all seen as the offspring of industrial modernity's failed belief in the ability to 
dominate or manage nature (Beck, 1992: pp. 80-84). Moreover, the thesis of the risk 
society suggests that these failures now penneate people's everyday lives. Commuting 
It is worth noting that Beck's argument is intended to counter suggestions in social theory that society is 
moving from an era of modernity towards post-modernity. The risk society, Beck argues, is not an 
alternative to modernity, but termed "late-modernity" is a redefinition of modernity outside of the 
"classical industrial model" (Beck, 1992: p. 10). 
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to work means contributing to global warming and the environmental risks created by a 
shrinking ozone layer. Living in a nuclear-powered society implies fearing normal 
accidents such as Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. Indeed, the genetic enhancement of 
agriculture and food production means that the public can never be entirely sure if what 
they are eating is good for them. Nor, through their consumption of these products, can 
the public be fully aware of whether they are tacitly contributing to the endangerment of 
the environment. 
This conception of manufactured risks furthermore suggests that not only are 
science and technQlogy responsible for the production of hazards, but society's 
delineation of these hazards as risks is influenced by the inability of science to contend 
with them. Beck's argument that risk begins where nature ends, thus further 
presupposes that risk also, "begins where tradition ends, when in all spheres of life, we 
can no longer take traditional certainties for granted" (Beck, 1998: p. 10). In late-
modernity, science has been placed under considerable pressure to react to the risks for 
which it is itself responsible. The result, Beck (1992: pp. 155-182) suggests, is that 
science has become "demystified." Giddens makes the same point, stating that science 
and scientific authority have begun to lose their "sanctity" (Giddens, 1994: pp. 87-88). 
Thus, along with an awareness of the role of science and technological advancement in 
producing risk, Beck and Giddens further argue that it is impossible to faithfully accept 
that scientists have all the right answers or are in a position to protect us from all the 
potential dangers we face in our everyday lives. More eruditely, Beck states: 
"As a consequence [of the demystification of science] a momentous 
demonopolization of scientific knowledge claims comes about: science 
becomes more and more necessary, but at the same time, less and less 
sufficient for the socially binding definition of truth. This loss of function 
is no accident. Nor is it imposed on the sciences from outside. It arises 
instead as a consequence of the triumph and differentiation of scientific 
validity claims; it is a product of the reflexivity of techno-scientific 
development under conditions of risk society." (Beck, 1992: p. 156, original 
emphasis) 
Within this context of manufactured risk and the demystification of science, 
traditional social institutions are perceived to be unable to cope with the protective tasks 
they have been assigned and upon which society depends (Beck, 1996). Beck argues 
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that these failures point to the wider inadequacy of society's conception of the political. 
Institutions, including governments, are envisioned to be stuck in the industrial modem 
past and unable to adequately grasp or respond to the consequences of the risk society. 
For example, governments have recently struggled to contend with routine uncertainty 
and make clear and responsible decisions when faced with opposing scientific 
evaluations of technological risk2. In order to respond to these failings, Beck demands 
society "reinvent" how governance can be understood and practiced in the risk society 
(Beck, 1997). The key point to emphasize is that the current context in which 
technological controversies are being contested is one characterized -not only by an 
uncertainty in science, but also in social institutions such as government. 
Normative Limitations of Risk Society 
Despite the potential benefits of the risk society approach to understanding the 
politics of technological innovation and social change, it should be approached 
cautiously. Specifically, as a result of its grand pretensions in outlining broad historical 
processes of social change there is a danger in treating the risk society as an external 
reality. Of key importance is the contention that risks are the inevitable outcomes of an 
increasingly complex social and technological world with which society must now come 
to terms. The understanding of social action, or political activity, emphasized by the risk 
society thesis involves contending with risks and not directly challenging the context 
behind their creation. In other words, the risk society hazards going too far in addressing 
the social consequences of science and technology and ignoring the capacity of society 
to shape techno-scientific development. 
Theories of the risk society potentially become preoccupied with providing a 
descriptive account of the consequences of social change and the urgency for social 
institutions to respond to the production of risk. The transformation of modernity is 
something that society must face and grapple with. Consequently little scrutiny is given 
One symptom of the uneasiness felt by governments in making decisions in arenas where scientific risk 
evaluations are contested is to repeatedly call for further scientific research and attempt to reestablish 
certainty as a basis for decision making (Jones, 2000). 
-25-
to modernity as the focus of a contestation in and of itself. To believe that society must 
accept that risks are inevitable creates the perception that little can be done to avoid 
them, other than to take the protective measures to prepare for them, limit their 
occurrence and minimize their consequences. If society is careening out of control. the 
overarching message Giddens advances is that society must become better prepared to 
deal with the eventual consequences and risks this infers. The emphasis is not on 
creating solutions to how the juggernaut might be controlled or eliminated in the first 
instance as Perrow (1984) suggests. David Miller thus provocatively argues that the 
presentation of risks as the "inevitable concomitants of technological and cultural 
developments threatens to leave risks in the grip of political quietism" (Miller, 1999: p. 
1239). Miller, in other words, suggests that the politics of risk outlined by Giddens and 
Beck is largely responsive and does not allow for the imagination of political spaces in 
which the social shaping of technology and society are contested. 
Alternatively, if we envision modernity as a context and not as an absolute, then 
we are able to remember that technologies and their risks are not inevitable but 
contingent. What types of knowledge and technology society chooses to pursue, how 
we apply and organize them, and the types of risks they create are not determined, but 
can be understood as the outcome of various cultural, political and economic relations 
and decisions. To believe that risks are socially constructed enables social actors to 
challenge the circumstances leading to their appearance, to interrogate the type of 
society they wish to inhabit, and most importantly to seek out alternatives (Miller, 1999: 
pp. 1250-1253). 
The Cultural Production of Risk 
Central to overcoming these barriers and developing a contextual approach to 
risk, is the cultural theory associated with the work of Mary Douglas. Writing two 
decades before Beck and Giddens began publishing about the risk society, Douglas' 
contribution is as relevant today as it was then (Douglas, 1999, 1992, 1986a, 1980, 1966; 
Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982;). This work does not necessarily refute the "risk society" 
hypothesis. However, its emphasis on cultural values and community refocuses the 
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analysis of risk presented in this thesis around contestations involving the nonnative 
nature of risk and society. 
Commenting on the development of the cultural analysis of risk, Rayner 
identifies the overarching argument advanced by the approach as the assertion that "risks 
are defined, perceived, and managed according to principles that inhere in particular 
forms of social organization" (Rayner, 1992: p. 84). To restate, risks, although the 
dangers they pose can be very real, are culturally constructed abstractions which are seen 
in relation (either for, or against) the dominant values of a social community. This focus 
led authors such as Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) to ask why society defines some 
technologies as risky and labels others as not-risky? Luhman (1993) similarly questions 
how society differentiates between those hazards it deems necessary to prevent (risks), 
and those it does not (dangers). Taking arguments about risk at face value, Luhman 
observes, does not always accurately account for perceptions of the hazards facing a 
society. Using the following comical example, the important point made by Luhman, is 
that to understand risk, it is necessary to address the ways in which these hazards are 
socially perceived and enacted: 
"In Sweden it was politically opportune to evacuate a large number of Lapps 
by helicopter for the duration of missile testing in their area, although the 
probability and extent of loss in the event of a helicopter crash were far 
greater that the possibility that a single person in a sparsely inhabited area 
would be struck by falling debris. But the one case was apparently assessed 
as a risk, while the other (moreover quite incorrectly) only as a danger." 
(Luhman, 1993: p.31) 
As Luhman's example suggests, risks are only partly a problem of the certainty, 
or uncertainty, of knowledge about the potential realization of risks, or their 
consequences. What is more important, the cultural approach posits that risk 
perceptions represent issues of consent over, what Douglas and Wildavsky tenn, the 
"most desired prospects" for the future (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982: p.S). This 
position looks beyond the perception of physical risks towards the social nonns which 
are being contested (Rayner, 1992: p. 91). In this sense, cultural risk theory is drawing 
on a broad theoretical categorization of the relationship between human society and the 
environment. Partly, the task of understanding risk is therefore a phenomenological one. 
As Douglas states, it concerns "what we believe we know about reality and with how \\-e 
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come to believe it" (Douglas, 1980: p.281). The other half of the task it to understand 
how claims to reality, including risk claims, support moral visions of a certain kind of 
society. The ways in which these perceptions are contested, Douglas argues, demand as 
much scrutiny as the physical and environmental risks which societies face (Doualas 
b , 
1980: p. 295). Douglas gives further strength to this need to interrogate cultural 
conceptions of risk alongside physical determinations of hazards in the following 
statement: 
"[I]t is ... illusory to hope for a society whose fears of pollution rest entirely 
on the scie~tists' teaching and carry no load of social and moral persuasion. 
We cannot hope to develop an idea of our environnlent which-has pollution 
ideas only in the scientists' sense, and none which, in that strict sense, are 
false. Pollution ideas, however they arise, are the necessary support for a 
social system. How else can people induce each other to cooperate and 
behave if they cannot threaten with time, money, God and nature? These 
moral imperatives arise from social intercourse. They draw on a view of the 
environment to support a social order." (Douglas, 1980: p. 290) 
The cultural theory of risk is not without its critics. For example, some authors 
have suggested that by emphasizing the relativity of risk, that cultural theory adopts an 
inherently conservative approach to political action. As Rayner (1992: p. 111-113) 
details, these critiques posit that by drawing attention away from the objective reality of 
dangers, cultural theories undermine risk claims. For example, critics pose the question, 
'if risks are culturally relevant, then on what basis should corrective action be taken.' 
Others, such as Wilkinson (2001), argue that Douglas' lack of an empirical focus, and 
the abstractness of her view of culture, fails to account for the complexity of the ways in 
which people perceive and negotiate risk in their everyday lives. 
However, although this chapter will return to some of these critiques in the final 
section, for the moment it is worth noting that for the immediate purpose of this thesis, 
these critiques do not necessarily discount the overall benefit of cultural theory in 
framing social debates over risk and controversial technologies. Tansey (2003), 
defending the cultural approach to risk, thus argues that the basic premises of the 
argument continue to stand3. These are, to restate, firstly that risks account for more 
Refer also to Rayner (1992: pp. 98-1l3) 
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than a physical acknowledgment of hazards, but are also concepts around which the 
future of society is being shaped. Secondly, far from being politically impotent, cultural 
theories of risk highlight an alternative vision of the politics of risk which envisions risk 
in relation to struggles over competing social values and social institutions4. 
The Political Potential of Risk Theory 
In summary, theories of the social production of risk offer several contributions 
to the understanding of the risk controversies characterizing the debate over new 
agricultural technologies. As exemplified in Beck and Giddens' theory of social change, 
risks are placed within a social and political context, characterized by the complexity of 
modem societies. The risks of new agricultural technologies, in this sense, can be 
investigated in relationship to processes of change such as globalization, or 
industrialization, both of which comprise key themes which will arise in later chapters. 
Likewise, the risk society hypothesis compels risk research on the debate over 
agricultural biotechnology to attempt to link perceptions of hazard to the ways in which 
social institutions, such as government, are perceived to be able to contend with risk. 
Secondly, cultural theory, although not dismissing social change as an important 
factor in understanding risks, suggests that risks are not simply consequences of change, 
but represent normative contestations about the nature of those changes. In particular, 
the work of Mary Douglas suggests the need for social analysis to address what values, 
and what visions of society, lie behind the risk claims involved in the debate over GM 
crops and foods. For example, if the risk society thesis points to the importance of 
modem industrialization in generating social perceptions of risk, cultural theory focuses 
attention on the ways in which the cultural visions behind those changes are contested. 
More specifically, the cultural approach to risk directs us to interrogate the values actors 
ascribe key social institutions in promoting these forms of development. 
Tansey makes this argument in response to suggestions that Douglas proposes a culturally detenninistic 
vision of society, where nonnative values are reflected in the shape of social institutions (for example 
Boholm, 1993). Thus, the important point to underline is that although risks are culturally relative, they 
should not be seen as detenninistic, but contested and subject to political dynamics of the cultures they are 
expressed in. 
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Thus, although the approaches championed by Beck and Douglas are often 
described as in contrast to each other (Wilkinson, 2001), taken together they offer a 
clearer understanding of the politics of risk, than they might alone. 
Social Constructionism 
Alongside theories accounting for the social production of risk, constructionist 
theories of science and technology comprise a second key focus in the literature guiding 
this thesis. Although often overlapping risk theory, it is worth contending with elements 
of the constructionist approach in detail in order to further frame the politics of new 
agricultural technologies. Thus, where the risk society thesis has already called attention 
to the complicity of science in generating risks, along with its inability to fully 
understand or contend with potential hazards, constructionism provides a deeper analysis 
of these failings. At its heart, the constructionist perspective provides a critical appraisal 
of realism's presumptions of scientific knowledge and questions the authority they are 
granted on this basis. Overall, Burr identifies four key propositions which offer an entry 
point into developing an understanding of the critical project of constructionism (1995: 
pp.2-5). Firstly, it takes a critical stance towards taken-for-granted ways of 
understanding the social and natural world. Secondly, constructionism asserts that our 
understanding of 'realities,' including those identified by science, is culturally relative. 
Thirdly, knowledge is accordingly not perceived to be determined by nature but 
constructed by human relations within society. Finally, as a social construction, 
knowledge is the outcome of social patterns of negotiation and politics. 
This section will look first at Burr's principles of constructionism in more detail, 
first looking at their origins in the sociology of knowledge and post-structural thought, 
and secondly as they have been applied in science and technology studies. From this 
basis the section concludes with a discussion of the benefits and limitations of the , 
approach for understanding the politics of new agricultural technologies. 
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The Social Construction of Reality 
Underlying the constructionist perspective is a critique of a dualistic view of the 
relationship between society and the material world. Constructionism, as Latour (1993) 
has argued, seeks to undermine the conception that the natural world is autonomous 
from the social world. More specifically, it adopts this theoretical gaze in order to 
discount realist pretensions which suggest that it is possible to provide objective, or 
absolute, knowledge about the natural world. In other words, constructionism critiques a 
view of the world-which sees nature 'out there' - an external reality which humanity can 
gain knowledge about through the employment of 'reasoned thought' and observation. 
As Shapin and Schaffer (1985) note, nature is seen-to be characterized by static natural 
laws which society is able to bear witness to with the aid of scientific method, tools and 
practices. Drawing on this argument, Latour disparagingly describes this autonomous 
and observable nature in the following terms: 
"Inhuman, reductionist, causal, law-like, certain, cold, unanimous, absolute 
- all these expressions do not pertain to nature as such, but to nature viewed 
through the deforming prism of the glass vessel!" (Latour, 1999a: p.l 0). 
At the centre of this critique is a reconceptualization of knowledge. Where a 
dualistic perspective envisions knowledge as a mode of deriving meaning from an 
external reality, according to Berger & Luckman (1967: p.15) constructionism asks how 
knowledge is shaped as reality. By constructed these authors, are referring to the ways 
in which the meanings assigned to reality are negotiated and struggled over through a 
variety of social relations and practices (Potter, 1996: p.12). Karl Mannheim, whose 
sociology of knowledge has been hugely influential in developing these arguments, thus 
proposes that knowledge is an idea which, when approached sociologically, links 
thought with social action (1936: p.237). It is in this way that the crux of the critical 
potential offered by a constructionist approach to the sociological understanding of 
science and technology can be identified. Ifreality, or more accurately our knowledge 
of reality, is constructed, it is neither unified nor static, as implied by the natural realists. 
Conversely reality, like any other aspect of social life, is perceived to be subject to the 
contestations which characterize everyday human interrelations and society's 
relationship with the material world. Thus, Mannheim advocates the need to recognize 
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the relational quality of all knowledge and experience and to further recognize this 
variation as the embodiment of social conflict. He states: 
"The world is known through many different orientations because there are 
many simultaneous and mutually contradictory trends of thought (by no 
means of equal value) struggling against one another with their different 
interpretations of'common' experience. The clue to this conflict, therefore, 
is not to be found in the 'object itself (if it were it would be impossible to 
understand why the object should appear in so many different variations), 
but in the very different expectations, purposes and impulses arising out of 
experience" (Mannheim, 1936: p.241). 
The contention that our knowledge and experience of reality-are both varied and 
contested can appear at odds to the way in which knowledge is commonly perceived as 
an absolute. Latour, for example has argued that even if social-natural dualisms and 
realist claims of absolute knowledge have never existed, modem societies have believed 
in them and on the surface, at least, have operated on this basis (1993: pp. 10-12). For 
example, as will be discussed in detail below, science has often held a great deal of 
authority in governing technological innovation based on its claims to objectivity (e.g., 
J asanoff, 1990; Fuller, 2000). A great deal of constructionist research has thus sought to 
address how some knowledge, including scientific facts, comes to be treated as objective 
accounts of reality (e.g., Latour & Woolgar, 1986). 
Pursuing this path of inquiry, social constructionism closely shadows post-
stnlctural theories of power and knowledge. In particular, the widely cited work of 
Michel Foucault is very much evident in the constructionist approach. Like Berger, 
Luckman and Mannheim, Foucault is not overly concerned with whether something is 
right or wrong when discussing knowledge. His persistent and critical challenge is to 
question the "teleological" and "totalising" claims to knowledge enacted throughout 
history (1972: pp.15-16). For example, Foucault suggests that homosexuality has 
historically been known as an act of abnormality through the specific languages and 
practices - what he refers to as discourse - related to early medicine and 
psychopathology (Foucault, 1979; Potter, 1996: p.86). The crucial point, as Shields 
(1998: pp. 38-46; refer also to Grint & Woolgar, 1997: p.32) notes, is that in providing 
these observations Foucault links knowledge and social action not in reference to the 
ways in which society makes sense of the world, but in the enactment and 
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materialization of truths (refer also to Foucault, 1977). 
Constructing Science and Technology 
The application of this perspective on knowledge and reality has been a 
particularly popular and fruitful area of research in science and technology studies. Here 
the challenge of absolute knowledge, and the assertion of the sociality of reality, takes 
the form of a critique of scientific and technological determinism. No singular 
determining force-,-whether ideological or natural, is perceived to stand behind any 
scientific fact or technological object. In other words, constructionism posits that 
knowledge and technologies do not embody any essential meaning in and of themselves 
(Latour, 1996; pp. 85-86). 
John Law (1999) describes Actor Network Theory (ANT) - one of the most 
prevalent constructionist approaches to the sociological study of science and technology 
- as characterized by two main projects. The first, begins with a conception of 
'relational materiality' and defines ANT as the ruthless application of a semiotics of 
materiality: "ANT takes the semiotic insight, that of the relationality of entities, the 
notion that they are produced in relations, and applies this to all materials" (Law, 1999: 
pA). ANT's second project suggests that scientific facts and technological artefacts not 
only gain form through their relations with and between entities, but are "performed in, 
by and through those relations" (1999: pA). When taken together these projects of 
'relational materiality' and 'performativity' commit the study of science and technology 
to a sociology of complexity. As a critical project, constructionism vehemently opposes 
all appearances of stability and irreversibility attached to techno-scientific objects, and 
advocates the awareness of heterogeneity and instability. This point is most poignant 
when we consider some of the consequences of recent technological failures, and 
suggests the need to critically engage with absolute claims of technological safety. 
Latour, commenting on the failed attempt to develop a revolutionary public rail system 
in Paris, thus provocatively states: 
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"There's no inertia, no irreversibility; there's not autonomy to keep alive. 
Behind these three words from the philosophy of technologies, words 
inspired by sheer cowardice, there is the ongoing work of coupling and 
uncoupling engines and cars, the work of local officials and engineers, 
strikers and customers... People talk about autonomy, irreversibility and 
inertia are criminals - never mind the purity of their motives. May the ashes 
of Chemobyl, the dust of the Challenger, and the rust of the Lorraine steel 
mines fall on their heads and those of their children." (Latour, 1996: p.86). 
In a similar fashion as Foucault, the constructionist approach puts forward the 
need to engage with the dynamic and local articulation of relations of power which are 
involved in embeading fixed meaning within scientific and technological objects 
(Bijker, 1995: pp. 262-266). Simply stated, sociology is directed to address scientific 
facts and technological objects in relation to the context of social relations in which they 
are situated. Behind any technology or factual claim, the argument follows, are complex 
networks of social relations woven together to give the impression of fixity and stability. 
CalIon (1986) thus directs sociology to understand power in relation to the ability of 
"researchers to impose themselves and their definition of the situation on others," in 
promoting a particular view of a technology (CalIon, 1986: p.196). Stated differently, 
Akrich identifies the construction of technology as a process of inscribing "a vision 0 f 
(or prediction about) the world in the context of the new object" (Akrich, 1992: p.208). 
In each of these arguments, the authors are directing social understandings of science 
and technology away from the subjective actions of the actors in their construction. 
Rather, the ability to shape the meaning of a technology is revealed in the actions taken 
by various actors in their efforts to negotiate, discipline or stabilize a network of social 
relations. In other words, scientific and technological objects only appear real, or 
detennined, when these social negotiations reach a consensus (Latour, 1987: p.180). 
Constructionism thus identifies social action in relation to the processes through which 
order is forged out of disorder and the contested nature of science and technology is 
rendered invisible (Latour & Woolgar, 1986: pp.235-261). 
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The Political Potential of Constructionism 
In adopting a constructionist approach to knowledge, science and technology the 
purpose of this discussion has been to find a political space with which to understand the 
controversy over new agricultural technologies. In developing this space it is necessary 
to note that the critical capacity of constructionism has been contested by others in the 
field of science and technology studies5. It is therefore in the recognition of some of the 
limits of constructionism, or in some cases in its defense against such critiques, where 
the political spaces the theory opens are best revealed. 
A significant critique directed against social constructionist research is that in 
advocating a relativist view of reality, it has been forced down a path of moral 
impartiality. As Pels (1996: p.277) describes, in attempting to "act symmetrically rather 
than asymmetrically in [the] explanation of scientific beliefs," constructionists have also 
strived to be "agnostic rather than normatively partial to winners and losers in the 
scientific game." Simply stated, in declaring all knowledge relative and socially 
constructed, sociologists are seen to have struggled to pay any significant attention, or 
give credence to any moral claims made in debates over science and technology. 
Hacking (1999: p. 187) thus comments that in the fervour with which constructionism 
makes its critiques of absolutism, it fails to grasp how controversies over science and 
technology involve contestations about what is 'right' or 'wrong,' and 'good' or 'bad.' 
The challenge for research in science and technology studies, as Haraway (1991: p. 187) 
explains, is only partially about relativity, but also about holding onto a knowledge of 
technologies and their role in societies which takes account of these values. As she puts 
it "to make a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a 'real' world, one that , 
can be partially shared and friendly to earth-wide projects of finite freedom, adequate 
material abundance, modest meaning in suffering and limited happiness." 
The failure to live up to both sides of these challenges, has probably less to do 
with the capacities of constructionist theory itself, but probably more to do with the 
Significant criticism has also been leveled at constructionism from outside of STS community, particularly 
as relate to environmental matters. These criticisms will be dealt with in the following section which 
discusses the relativity and reality of environmental risks and technology. 
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focus of research in this field. In particular, the above critiques relate to the perception 
that constructionists have become distracted by the spectacle of peeling apart science and 
technology one layer at a time and exposing the social relations behind truth claims. As 
Osborne states, constructionism at its worst is the performance of a 'macho' drama: 
"The macho constructionist likes to be iconoclastic, generating drama by saying 'Look 
here! You thought this or that was natural but it's not, it's constructed all along" 
(Osborne, 1998: p.232). It is a trick which Hacking (1998) suggests, may once have had 
some political merit in its shock value, but which through over use has become tiresome. 
However, these criticisms should not be seen to invalidate constructionism, or 
render its political potential impotent. Alternatively, they propose a challenge to the 
way in which in a constructionist analysis might proceed in addressing the politics of 
new agricultural technologies. Firstly, they emphasize the need to take on a wider 
analytical approach to social processes of construction than simply pulling apart truth 
claims. Authors such as Hacking would thus likely argue that it is not sufficient to 
simply engage tnlth claims about the risks of agricultural biotechnology with the intent 
of undermining their objectivity. For example, this might include dispelling the safety 
claims of industrial science, or the risk claims of the environmental lobby. However, 
keeping in mind the commitment to complexity proposed above by John Law, the 
purpose of constructionism is not simply to deconstruct techno-scientific objects. 
Relativism, in other words, need not be seen as an end in and of itself. Instead, the 
political potential of relativism, stems from its ability to identify and engage with the 
varied social relationships involved in the shaping of new agricultural technologies and 
their role in society. Thus, absolute ascriptions of safety, or hazard, to agricultural 
biotechnology should be of less consequence to the constructionist than are the social 
and political struggles over such labels. Keeping in mind the perceptions of risk 
discussed in the first section of this chapter, this point is of particular importance in 
relation to the controversy over GM crops and foods. A cursory glance at the debate 
already suggests that no singular truth is likely to exist which describes the properties of 
these technologies. Thus, constructionism provides an opportunity to engage with the 
varied social relations behind the advocation of truths and accounts of safety which 
oppose and contradict on another. 
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Furthermore, the above critiques challenge constructionism to address the ways 
in which the knowledge of agricultural biotechnology, and of its risk properties in 
particular, are not only contested but also to examine the moral values tied up in those 
debates. In other words, it challenges a political understanding of the debate over 
genetic technologies to pay attention not only to the value of having alternatives, but to 
how struggles over those values are brought to the political table. For example, as will 
be discussed in Chapters Five and Six, this implies addressing how participants, in 
making risk claims, project images of how new agricultural technologies can be better 
developed, understood and managed. 
Importantly, in taking up the challenge to accentuate the normative possibilities 
of constructionism, it is not necessary to speak only about values in relation to the 
properties of techno-scientific objects themselves. As both Law (1992: p.380) and 
Latour (1999b: p. 17) argue, just because constructionism has focused on the localized 
role of actors in networks of construction, does not mean that it is unable to speak about 
wider social processes. Alternatively, as Hilary Rose states: "the very idea of a socially 
shaped science and technology has opened the door to a self-consciously normative 
project of reshaping, to the possibility of a differently constructed science and 
tec1mology." (Rose, 1998: p.128) Thus, in the same sense that Douglas talks about risks, 
constructionism is potentially able to link the ways in which actors seek to ascribe 
properties to technologies, in relation to the wider normative values of society and social 
institutions. Thus, a further challenge to the understanding of the controversy over new 
agricultural technologies is to link claims about the nature of the technology to these 
normative contexts. For example, looking ahead this includes normative debates 
involving global capitalism and the corporations behind the development of new 
agricultural technologies. 
Overall then, the potential of the social constructionist perspective is derived 
from the contingency it affords any interpretation of scientific knowledge or 
technological objects (Bijker, 1995: p.28). At its least courageous, constructionism 
undermines the stability of techno-scientific objects and identifies those entities 
operating behind its construction and performance. At its most courageous, 
constructionism can be a "post-essentialist" political project (Grint and \Voolgar, 1997: 
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pp. 141-168) which invites society to change the world as opposed to just accounting for 
it. In this sense, the potential of constructionism can be seen beyond any impartial 
attempt to account for the social politics of new agricultural technologies. Moreover, 
through constructionism's relativist approach to science and technology, this research 
gives legitimacy to alternative constructions of science and technology and the social 
contexts in which they are applied. In setting down the gauntlet to researchers studying 
genetic engineering, Yoxen passionately states the need to open the politics of 
agricultural science and technology: 
',[NJothing-is inevitable. The view of technological change held by many 
people is that it just goes on happening relentlessly... However, I believe 
that new technologies, processes and products have to be dreamt, argued, 
battled, willed, cajoled and negotiated into existence. They arise through 
endless rounds of conjecture, experiment, persuasion, appraisal and 
promotion. They emerge from chains of activity, in which at many points 
their form and existence are in jeopardy. There is no unstoppable process 
that brings inventions to the market. They are realized only as survivors. 
If this view is correct, then the scale and social impact of the 
biotechnological revolution must be open to negotiation. There must be 
alternative pathways, which exploit the present scientific possibilities, but 
which frame them differently. Those alternatives should be capable of 
realisation, but only if enough people come to see their value and fight for 
them." (Yoxen, 1986: pp. 27, 29). 
To conclude this section, the political potential of constructionism to the study 
of techno-scientific controversies can be summarized in the following points. Firstly, by 
adopting an anti-essentialist position emphasizing contingency, constructionism 
challenges many of society'S taken for granted assumptions about the stability and fixity 
of technological objects and scientific truths. Secondly, by situating science and 
technology in networks of social relations, it provides a space in which the politics of 
defining agricultural biotechnology can be imagined and suggests the possibility of a 
social praxis in renegotiating these definitions. Thirdly, constructionism expands the 
political landscape by incorporating wider normative and global concerns into the local 
politics of constnlction, without reducing one to the other. 
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Key Issues 
So far, the above discussion has presented a brief overview of theories \vhich 
account for the social negotiation of risk and social constructionist theories of science 
and technology. In general, several benefits have been attributed to each perspective in 
framing the way in which the politics of new agricultural technologies can be 
approached analytically. In this section, the potential benefits of both perspectives are 
further developed around two key issues, both of which comprise important themes in 
the literature surrounding risk and technological controversies and, looking ahead, make 
up important themes in the research data. The first issue concerns research which 
suggests that risk debates, and particularly those concerning the regulation of risks, are 
best understood in relation to a far broader range of knowledge than has traditionally 
been allowed in decision making. This literature builds on both the opportunities 
afforded by Beck and Giddens' claim that science is becoming demystified, and the 
opening of ideas of knowledge and technology afforded by constructionism's critical 
challenge of realism. The second issue involves the potential for understanding 
culturally relativistic interpretations of science, technology and risk in relation to 
contestations over the environment. Of particular concern are the values ascribed to 
nature in debating risks, as well as the ability of relativistic theories to account for the 
sometimes very real dangers facing the environment. 
Democracy and Scientific Citizenship 
An important contribution to the understanding of controversies involving new 
agricultural technologies comes from research which has sought to promote a socially 
democratic engagement with issues of risk, science and technology. Upholding a belief 
in the relativity of knowledge, this research questions the authority of science in society, 
particularly as relates to the ability to speak about and manage technological risks. 
As a starting point to addressing these arguments it is helpful to cite Arblaster's 
(1994) distinction between democracy as a fact and democracy as a concept. As a fact, 
democracy describes specific social structures, or ways of organizing public governance. 
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Alternatively, as a concept democracy refers to a series of contested ideals involvina 
.::> 
issues of inclusion, participation and control over the manner in which science and 
technology are understood and governed. It is in this sense that the democratization of 
decision making processes are presented as a means of contending with the potential 
risks of new agricultural technologies (Irwin, 2001a). Arblaster's definition of 
democracy as a concept thus closely relates to what has been referred to as 'scientific 
citizenship.' This is a term which Irwin argues comprises an attempt to embrace the 
heterogeneity of knowledge and expertise involved in debates over science, technology 
and risk (Irwin, 1995: pp. 9-36). 
Before discussing the theoretical contribution of scientific citizenship and the 
democratization of knowledge in detail, it is essential to note that these arguments are 
advanced as a critique of common practices of understanding and managing risk. In 
particular, scientific citizenship critiques the historical tendency in modem societies to 
prioritize science and expert knowledge in speaking about potential risks, as well as in 
directing how they can be regulated and controlled (Irwin and Wynne, 1996). Simply 
stated, the public has been expected to trust scientists to ask the right questions and 
provide the right answers about matters of risk and safety. In this light, Fuller (2000) 
argues that science occupies a unique place in Western society in that we grant it a 
tremendous degree of authority despite it having no democratic foundation in society. 
Hence, he describes the relationship between science and the public as asymmetrical, 
whereby the public is expected to accept scientific authority, while that authority 
remains unaccountable to public scrutiny: 
"Is there anything more to the much-vaunted autonomy of science than the 
asymmetrical social relationships... whereby the public must make its 
actions accountable to science (say, by responding openly to a treatment) but 
scientists need not, at least not to the same extent, make themselves 
accountable to the public." (Fuller, 2000: p.230) 
As a consequence of the asymmetrical relationship between the public and 
experts, ideals of democratic inclusion and democratic participation come under 
challenge. Public engagement, in this light, is potentially reduced to the processes by 
which society defers to the epistemological authority of scientific knowledge and the 
social authority of the scientific expert. Importantly, it is through processes of 
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governance where these relationships are often played out. As Ezrahi (1990) suggests, 
authoritative deference to science has been closely integrated into the ideals of Western 
democracies and fonned the basis for what has been perceived as a coherent and 
progressive model of decision making. Wynne likewise suggests that this relationship of 
deference has become institutionalized in society and in social structures of governance 
in particular (1996b, 2002). 
Taking these ideas further, J as anoff (1990) argues that by adopting the vision of 
science as the exclusive knowledge provider and authoritative expert in governance, 
societies are led t0wards "technocratic" systems of governance. In these systems 
Government is perceived to be best able to meet its responsibilities to its citizenry by 
abdicating power to the perceived independence, value-neutrality, and decisiveness of 
scientific expertise in building policy and regulating new technologies. Politics in a 
technocracy is divorced from the action of science, and exists only at the level of 
government and the application of scientific expertise, as for example in the use of 
expert advisory bodies (Jasanoff, 1990). Offering an example of this perception of the 
autonomy of science from politics, Cozzens and Woodhouse (1995: p. 552) cite the work 
of Price (1965), "a longtime standard in the field of science politics." He is quoted as 
stating that "the notion of democracy, or ultimate rule by votes of the people, is simply 
irrelevant to science. For science is mainly concerned with the discovery of truths that 
are not affected by what the scientist thinks or hopes; its issues cannot be decided by 
votes." Democracy, to return to Arblaster's definition, is understood only as a fact - an 
institutional context in which science is applied. 
Returning to the idea of scientific citizenship, authors such as Irwin (1995) and 
Wynne (1996a & 1996b) have been very critical of the monopolization of risk issues by 
science. These authors, repeating one of the central mantras of social constructionism, 
argue that scientific knowledge and its authority must be envisioned in context (Barnes 
and Edge, 1982). Wynne, for example has argued that in order to understand the 
development of science, its knowledge must be envisioned in relation to how it functions 
in the "general social context," rather than in an "esoteric scientific context" (Wynne, 
1982: p.228). The argument follows that society is often poorly served by expert 
accounts of risk and attempts to manage risks because they have failed to acknowledge 
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the social assumptions and values behind their actions. For example, where science 
might label a product safe in the laboratory, it often takes no account of the application 
of a technology outside these idealised and artificial settings. This is the case Wynne 
(1989: pp. 36-38) describes in the risk assessment of agent orange (2,4,5-T), a herbicide 
used as a brush killer in agriculture and forestry beginning in the late 1940s. Where 
scientists declared the herbicide safe for usage under specific directions of use, they 
failed to acknowledge that such directions were either ignored or impossible to follow in 
the contexts in which it was being used. The consequence of which was that despite 
expert declarations of safety, the use of the herbicide is now notoriously associated with 
environmental and human health risks. 
Moreover, not only have expert models of nsk been inadequate in protecting 
society from potential hazards, but these failure are perceived as the consequence of 
ignoring the potentially valuable input of the lay public. As Irwin states: 
"[The prevailing approach to public policymaking remains firmly embedded 
in a ... modernistic perspective - where science does indeed construct the 
definition of risk issues and all other concerns, including alternative forms 
of understanding and different value structures, become peripheral." (Irwin, 
1995: p.62) 
Irwin is thus arguing that there are potential benefits to be gained from situating science 
alongside other knowledges and other values, without necessarily prioritizing one over 
the other. To this end, a growing field of research, under the banner of the 'public 
understanding of science' (PUS) has developed in the UK. This research argues that 
governments must not only become more aware of the social values and assumptions 
tied up in expert risk analysis, but also recognize the potential contributions of non-
expert knowledge in contending with risk (Brown, 1992; Irwin, 1995; Irwin and Wynne, 
1996; Irwin et al., 1996; Irwin et al., 1999; Wynne, 1996b). 
Researching public perceptions of the risks associated with a chemical plant in 
the northeast of England, Irwin et al. (1999; p. 1312) summarize three principal benefits 
of giving credence to the experiences and knowledge of lay members of the public. 
Firstly, listening to the public is seen to give legitimacy to decision making processes by 
supporting democratic ideals of inclusion and participation. Secondly, instead of seeing 
non-expert knowledge as deficient, or even counterproductive to the understanding of 
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risk, the public can potentially make important contributions to debates over risk and 
technology. For example, returning to Wynne's account of the regulation of agent 
orange, he thus asks what might farmers or forestry workers have been able to offer 
regulators in describing the contexts and practices in which the herbicide was applied? 
Therefore thirdly, on the basis of these first two benefits, the authors suggest that public 
observations about risk can offer cognitive gains for policymaking and decision making. 
As already suggested, these potential benefits can in part be understood as a 
consequence of the opening up of processes of governance to a wider public. Such 
benefits further relate to the expansion of definitions of knowledge permitted in decision 
making practices. Importantly, this includes seeing the public as the source of valuable 
knowledge about the moral and ethical valuations of risk. Research into the public 
understanding of science thus potentially allows the politics of normative values to be 
made visible and incorporated into governance. In other words, scientific citizenship 
seeks to acknowledge and give credence to those values which authors such as Douglas 
and Hacking (refer above) argue are inherent to debates over risk and technology. It is 
in this sense that Wynne states the need to include "greater issues of what the proper 
human meanings, conditions, limits and purposes of science and technological 
innovation should be" (Wynne, 2002: p. 472) into the formal debate over agricultural 
biotechnology. 
The two following statements from Wynne offer a clear delineation of the 
arguments put forward in advancing ideas of scientific citizenship and the 
democratization of knowledge, and the challenge to researchers in the field of risk 
studies. The first passage reflects his critique of the decontexualized and naive approach 
to the understanding and management of risks, and challenges the perception that the 
public has little to offer in this regard. He states: 
"[E]ven the most controlled, objective knowledge is embedded within a tacit 
framework of idealised, fixed relationships. This is what allows it to be 
controlled knowledge ... The 'objective' framework floats on a sea of 
subjective commitments and assumptions which have to be more openly 
expressed and negotiated in risk assessment processes. Lack of awareness 
and realistic assessment of these assumptions not only risks getting the 
'objective' risks wrong; it also causes socially provocative assertions to be 
made about the moral worth of the relationships and realities of ordinary 
people. In their innocence therefore, scientists peddling the 'objective risk' 
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framework as a decision making standard are unwittingly sowing confusion 
and conflict, when they think they are the last defenders of enlightenment." 
(VVynne, 1989:p. 44) 
In the second citation from VVynne, he argues that the problems with the current 
institutional risk culture is not only that it is exclusionary, but as a consequence alienates 
wider social and cultural issues from governance. As he more eruditely states the case, 
the challenge for constructionist research on risks is therefore to continue to open and 
expose those wider issues with the goal of incorporating them in decision making 
structures: 
"The definitive modem focus of public discourse on the theme of risk and 
insecurity alone, as if this were the universal natural meaning of the public 
issues involved over new sciences and technologies, is a key obstacle to any 
democratic impetus. The effortless cultural-institutional reification of risk 
is an essential factor in this seamless reduction of public meaning, and this 
institutional process seems to intensify rather than abate. The responsibility 
of [constructionist theories of knowledge] is to prise open these scientific, 
risk and environment-consequences cultures, so as to invite democratic 
entry. Exposing the underlying ambiguity of such discourse is crucial to that 
project." (VVynne, 2002: p. 472) 
In summary, debates over scientific citizenship and the inclusion of lay 
perspectives in understanding and governing risks offer important contributions in 
further framing this thesis' approach to the political debates over new agricultural 
technologies. By building on the potential of both risk theory and constructionism, work 
in this area gives more depth to the understanding of the social relations, and those 
outside of science in particular, involved in debates over the potential risks of GM crops 
and foods. Firstly, ideas of scientific citizenship suggest that research in this field needs 
to look at how debates over risks relate to contestations over the inclusion and 
legitimacy of lay expertise in the debate. Secondly, ideas of scientific citizenship 
challenge researchers to ask how the knowledge and values the public offer can 
potentially contribute to the debate. Finally, expressing a fervent commitment to 
democratize structures of decision making, the work challenges risk research to address 
the ways in which lay forms of expertise are involved in formal political struggles over 
the governance of new agricultural technologies. 
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6 
'Real' Risks and the Environment 
A second key issue, alongside democracy and scientific citizenship, concerns the 
relationship between risks and their potential 'real' consequences on the environment. 
Although, the debate over new agricultural technologies involves contestations over 
many aspects of risk, including human health and the economy, it has nevertheless been 
dominated by concerns about the consequences of biotechnology on environmental well-
being. 
In this regard, the relationships between society, techno-scientific development 
and the natural world have already been alluded to by each of the approaches 
documented above. The risk society hypothesis, to recall, in part suggests that modem 
societies are increasingly becoming characterized by the environmental crises they face. 
As Beck (1994: pp. 5-8) argues the benefits achieved by industrialization in the past, are 
now being overshadowed by the environmental costs which have been the byproducts of 
modem development. Douglas' (1980) cultural theory of risk is also concerned with 
environmental risks. Specifically, Douglas is interested in how environmental risks 
relate to struggles over the relationship between nature and society, and the normative 
values exposed in these debates. Finally constructionism, although seldom speaking 
directly to environmental issues6, argues that society's perceptions of the natural world, 
including our knowledge of it, is impossible to see without acknowledging the social 
relations which construct its meaning. 
The remainder of this section will build on these ideas and draw on related 
research in the field of environmental sociology to build a framework with which to 
understand environmental risks. Firstly, nature will be discussed as an increasingly 
important normative ideal in contemporary society. This is an idea which is vigorously 
contested in risk debates on the basis of its relativistic focus. Secondly, the ability of 
these arguments to speak about the relativity of risk without undermining an engagement 
with the potentially 'real' environmental consequences of new agricultural technologies 
In recent years several key texts have now been published which apply constructionist theories to 
environmental issues. For example, please refer to Franklin (2002), Irwin (200 1 b) and Macnagthen and 
Urry(1998 & 1995). 
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will be addressed. 
As a starting point towards developing an awareness of the normative value of 
nature in risk debates, it is helpful to make a disjunction between the simple meanings 
ascribed to .'nature' and its complexities of usage. In its most common form, and that 
critiqued by constructionism, nature refers to the real, or essential quality of the world. 
The Collins English Dictionary thus defines nature as "the whole system of existence, 
forces, and events of the physical world that are not controlled by the human being." 
However, as Raymond Williams (1997) points out, this type of definition reflects proper 
assumptions about- the meaning of words and offers little in understanding the 
complexity of their usage. Thus, when confronted by singular generalizations pertaining 
to the immutable characteristics of nature, Williams reminds us to think, not in terms of 
proper definitions, but in terms of the variation of our experiences of nature: "[WJhen I 
hear that nature is a ruthless competitive struggle I remember the butterfly, and when I 
hear that it is a system of ultimate mutual advantage I remember the cyclone" (1997: p. 
70). 
Through this disjunction between a proper definition of 'nature' and the 
capriciousness of its usage, Williams infers that nature is imbued with an extraordinary 
amount of human history. As he states, the idea of nature is necessarily the idea of 
humanity, society and, "indeed the ideas of kinds of societies" (Williams, 1997: pp. 70-
71). In this way, the construction and performance of ideas like 'nature' and 
'environment' are not neutral statements. Instead, their meanings, values and 
expressions constitute a focal point of modem ecological and social politics. As Harvey 
argues, we assign value to nature in order to give meaning and value to social life 
(Harvey, 1996: p. 118, 157). Furthermore, to accept this premise that nature is a 
nOlmative construction makes it exigent to speak about contested natures and contested 
values. This is opposed to envisioning 'Nature' in the singular where values are only 
contested in terms of a materialist and utilitarian definitions. As Macnaughten and Urry 
cogently argue, if nature is not natural, but socially and culturally constructed, then 
nature cannot compose the basis for any singular moral, or ethical definition of the 
"good life" (Macnaghten and Urry, 1998: pp. 29-31). The constructionist perspective of 
nature thus proposes two umemitting questions which give shape to a perception of 
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nature as the subject of cultural contestations: "Whose Nature? Whose Values?" 
(Proctor, 1996). 
These questions are made even more prevalent in the contemporary political 
context of British society when considered in relation to Beck's (1992, 1994) contention 
that modem societies are characterized by an evolving environmental crisis. Follo\ving 
five decades of growing public awareness of the consequences of human development 
on the material world 'nature' is more and more often understood as interconnected , 
violable, and endangered (Tesh, 2000: p.49). Eder likewise argues that the growth of a 
global culture of environmentalism, and shared perceptions of an environment at risk, 
marks a potential turning point for the politics of modem society (Eder, 1996: pp. 163-
212). It is in this sense that these authors argue that the growth of an environmental 
ethic has situated debates about the value of nature to the forefront of normative 
contestations over the shape of British society. As Eder argues, where the politics of the 
past were oriented around industrialization and the redistribution of resources (a 
utilitarian definition of value), the politics of nature can be found in contestations over 
how nature will translate into the common-good. Franklin similarly argues that in late 
modernity concerns for the natural world play an increasingly important part in the way 
in which society seeks to find moral meaning and ascribe normative stability in the 
world: 
"[I]n very complex ways the natural world is still used by humanity to hold 
a mirror up to itself, to tell new stories about itself and to seek to order and 
reorder itself. Our conclusion argues that the historically sudden and abrupt 
changes in late modernity plunged a hitherto complex, highly regulated 
modem social order and moral community into disorder, moral confusion 
and lack of regulation. Despite continuing environmental problems, nature 
operates as a refuge from this and at the same time a model of order by 
which we may retune and reorder ourselves. Nature seems the panacea for 
our seriously disharmonious world and we can find a pattern that links the 
historically sudden and passionate new affair with the natural world to the 
moral and social collapse of a modem social order." (Franklin, 2002: p.18) 
Having presented this approach to the understanding of risk and environmental 
issues it is important to ask whether speaking of risks in relative terms, may detract from 
social concerns about the possibly 'real' environmental dangers posed by new 
agricultural technologies? This question calls attention to a virulent debate between 
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environmental realists and natural constructionists. The main thrust of the realist 
critique is the argument that by obscuring the division between the social and the 
natural, constructionists, if taken seriously, cripple society's ability to analyse and 
engage with what Searle (1995) refers to as the "brute facts" of nature. Some 
environmental sociologists (Dickens, 1996; Murphy, 1994; Benton, 1994) have thus 
argued that without the ability to claim objective knowledge of the natural world, 
constructionism potentially draws attention away from environmental problems. Benton 
(ibid.: pp. 44-50), for example, suggests that by detracting away from the 'real' 
environmental problems associated with resource depletion, "oversGcialized" visions of 
nature contribute to arguments which deny the existence of environmental limits and the 
need to restrain growth and development. Clearly articulating these arguments, Murphy 
puts forward the following statement. In it he argues that constructionism's denial of the 
ability of science to claim objective knowledge of the natural, fails to take notice of the 
real consequences of human action on environmental well-being: 
"The sociological representation of science as a social construction has 
tended to obscure the discovery of the properties of nature and the effect 
such discovery has on social action, to ignore that nature itself is a crucial 
element in the scientific determination of what will be taken as factual 
knowledge, and to gloss over the manipulation of nature and attendant 
environmental repercussions." (Murphy, 1994b: p. 197) 
These critiques need not necessarily be seen as an invalidation, or outright 
rejection, of social constructionist theories. Alternatively, Dickens suggests that most 
realists are willing to concede that as a discourse, nature is at least in part socially 
constnlcted. However, he further argues that, in the end this insight makes "a great deal 
of ado about rather little" (1996:p. 83), and therefore is of limited consequence for 
understanding environmental issues. The argument follows that accepting that our 
knowledge of nature is mediated by society does not preclude nature from exhibiting its 
own causal powers. For Dickens, the understanding of a causal nature, its impact on 
society and vice versa must remain a central occupation of both science and sociology. 
Some constructions, as he argues are "more equal than others": 
"[W]hat do the scare quotes around the word 'nature' actually allude to? 
Are there really no natural limits as such? Are we not again back to the 
assertion that gravity is simply a product of human consciousness and this 
means we need take no account of it in our actions'? Again, all natures are 
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indeed social constructions. But some constructions are in a sense more 
equal than others. Although they are always revisable, they are 'weak' 
social constructions referring to 'core knowledge' ofthe powers, capacities 
and tendencies of organisms and their development in dialectical relation to 
their environment. And nature here is not in quotation-marks. It refers to 
the real powers of human beings as well as non-human organisms. These 
are not just yet another 'nature. '" (Dickens, 1996: p. 83) 
Defending the political potential of constructionism, Irwin (2001 b) suggests that 
these critiques largely misrepresent the claims made by social constructionists (refer also 
to Burningham and Cooper, 1999). He argues, that the problem begins with the often 
crude caricatures that divide constructionist and realist perspectives_ Taking the middle 
road,Irwin posits that rather than making ontological judgements about "how the world 
is," constructionism is more importantly an epistemological venture concerned with 
"how we know about the world" (Irwin, 2001b: pp. 167-169). Constructionism is thus 
not interested in denying the existence of the material world; the hole in the ozone layer 
for example. However, it is necessarily engaged with questions about how we know that 
such a hole exists, how we define the consequences of that knowledge and how this 
knowledge is performed in environmental controversies (ibid. pp. 167-169). Where 
constructionism focuses its epistemological critique and where it finds its political 
potential is "based less on a denial of the natural world than on analytical skepticism and 
the methodological imperative to maintain an agnosticism in the face of competing 
knowledge claims" (ibid. p. 168). Latour, citing Bloor, similarly argues that the focus of 
constructionism is not realism, but absolutism - the belief that there can only be one 
understanding of reality (Latour, 1999a). Thus, far from ignoring environmental 
degradation, these authors suggest that constructionism can encourage a plurality of 
environmental understandings. Cogently making this case, Irwin states that 
constructionism both participates in, and encourages, a normative debate over 
environmental issues in which a heterogeneity of social and natural values can be 
uncovered. Parallelling Wynne's argument above, the task of sociology is to address 
and enable these alternative, and not to attempt to offer objective accounts of 
environmental debates: 
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"[I]t can be argued that, by avoiding inevitably contestable claims to 'know 
better' than one's opponents, constructivism opens up ethical and political 
choices at the core of environmental engagement. Rather than presenting 
sociology as bringing 'truth' to environmental disputes, the constructionist 
responsibility is to highlight value choices, challenge epistemological 
assumptions and avoid recourse to unjustifiable certainties." (Irwin, 2001 b: 
p.170) 
In concluding this discussion of the relativity of nature and environmental issues, 
this approach further assists an understanding of how debates over the risks and benefits 
of new agricultural technology relate to normative struggles about the shape of society. 
Firstly, overlapping the relativist approaches offered by cultural theories of risk and 
constructionist theories of knowledge authors, such as Franklin (2002), expose nature as 
a potential political category in the debate over agricultural genetics. This research 
suggests that when exploring the ways in which social actors contest the risks of 
agricultural biotechnology, particularly those pertaining to the environment, that further 
attention be paid to the cultural values of nature and society these politics project. On 
the one hand, this means addressing the links between risk claims and the values elicited 
by actors in describing how society ought to relate to the material world. For example, 
constructionist approaches to nature suggest that it may be beneficial to address the 
values and perceptions which support contrasting conceptions of how agriculture 
impacts on the environment. However, on the other hand, this research implies that it is 
also important to address how the normative valuations of nature, which may be 
involved in the debate over biotechnology, relate to the values ordering British society 
more broadly. To continue with the above example, it is of further importance to 
address how environmental debates can help explain debates over the values currently 
driving agriculture and food production. Finally, taking account of realist critiques of 
constnlctionist theories of nature and the environment, it is also import to speak about 
relativist politics of risk without undermining actors claims about the potentially real 
consequences of the developments on the environment. In practice, this does not mean a 
relative approach needs to take a back seat to realist claims about the possible dangers of 
OM crops and foods. Rather, it further commits this research project to address the 
complex ways in which a variegated society knows, defines and performs these 'real' 
risks. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter set out to address some of the ways sociology can help conceive of 
the politics of science, technology and risk, with an eye on the politics of new 
agricultural technologies in particular. More specifically, the purpose of this literature 
review has been to situate debates over the potential dangers of genetics in relation to a 
broader socio-political context. 
In approaching this aim, the often overlapping theoretical fields of the social 
production of risk-and social constructionism were assessed through_ a discussion of 
some of their potential benefits and limitations. Overall, it was argued that theories of 
the social production of risk allow the debates over agricultural biotechnology to be 
envisioned in relation to a context recognizable by the increasing complexity of modem 
British society. Specifically, the work of Beck and Giddens suggested that debates 
involving the risks of GM crops and foods could be understood in relation to 
contestations over changing modes of expertise, authority and governance. Further 
drawing on the cultural relativist perspective of risk associated with the work of Mary 
Douglas, it was argued that the politics of science, technology and risk could also be 
approached in relation to normative struggles involving competing values and social 
VISIOns. 
In addition to risk theories, the benefits of the constructionist perspective were 
envisioned in terms of the ability of social research to move beyond essentialist 
definitions of science and technology. As a consequence of these critiques, 
constnlctionism further posits that science and technology are better envisioned in 
relation to the complexity of social relations through which they are shaped, defined and 
performed. Constructionism thus suggests the need to investigate the variety of values 
and definitions which actors bring to the debate in the struggle to impose a specific 
image of risk, benefit, or safety on agricultural biotechnology. 
Finally, this chapter has argued that within both constructionist and risk 
approaches, two further key issues arise in this literature which hold specific relevance 
for the empirical findings of this thesis. The first of which built on constructionism's 
critiques of an essentialist epistemology and argues that, alongside scientific knowledge, 
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lay expertise and public values can play an important role in understanding and 
managing risks. This suggests the need for this research project to question how debates 
over the risks of agricultural biotechnology involve contestations over the authority of 
knowledge. Moreover this body of research advances the need to address how these 
debates are implicated in the impending contestations over the governance and 
commercial regulation of GM crops and foods in Britain. 
The second key issue to be derived from the theoretical literature, concerns the 
necessity of coming to terms with the importance of environmental politics involved in 
the GM debate. Recent research in the sociology of nature offers a potential way 
forward in this regard. It does so, by linking environmental concerns with the social 
politics involved in contesting the relationships society has with the natural world. 
Agricultural biotechnology and its potential risks can therefore be placed in a wider 
context in which the type of relations society has with the natural world are debated, 
along with the moral and ethical values underpinning these politics. Moreover, this does 
not necessarily imply that the risks faced by the environment as the consequences of 
human development are any less 'real.' Alternatively, constructionist theories of 
environmental risk potentially provide a deeper understanding of those realties. 
Overall, the above discussion helps situate this research project in a socio-
political framework which takes debates concerning risk, science and technology as a 
focus in discussing the politics of GM crops and foods. It situates these contestations in 
the context of an evolving British society, which is struggling to reconcile development 
with growing concerns about the potentially detrimental consequences this is perceived 
to imply. Moreover, in adopting this focus, this thesis commits to the understanding of 
the complexity and heterogeneity of knowledge and values involved in the debate over 
genetic technologies, and the shape of the society in which they are being incorporated. 
With this theoretical framework in mind, this thesis will now turn to a discussion 
of how this project can be accomplished empirically and methodologically. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
Introduction: 
In Chapter Two a theoretical framework was presented that briefly outlined 
theories of the social production of risk, and constructionist theories of knowledge, 
science and technology. These sociological perspectives were advanced as beneficial 
means of understanding the politics of new agricultural technologies within the context 
of contemporary British society. Moreover, for the purposes of this chapter, the content 
and tenor of these theoretical outlooks are furthermore suggestive of an empirical 
approach to the social study of the debate over the use of genetics in agriculture. This 
is not to suggest that these approaches prescribe any single method to the analyses of 
risk and techno-scientific controversies. However, they do guide the empirical approach 
of this thesis in at least two important ways. 
Firstly, recall John Law's (1999) call for a commitment to a sociology of 
complexity. He argued that social researchers' conceptions of science and technology 
must acknowledge the heterogeneity of social relations involved in their construction 
and performance. Building on these arguments, authors in the public understanding of 
science (i.e., Irwin and Wynne, 1996) similarly made a case for recognizing the 
diversity and equality of knowledge claims in speaking about risks. The methodology 
proposed here must, in keeping to these commitments, seek and come to terms with the 
heterogeneity of knowledge and values involved in the debate over new agricultural 
technologies. 
Secondly, work in the field of risk research suggested that risk controversies are 
linked to the broader politics of modem societies. For authors such as Beck and 
-53-
Giddens, the focus was on how risks, understood in a context of social change, are 
challenging the efficacy and legitimacy of social institutions such as science and 
governance. Furthermore, the culturally relativistic position of Douglas addressed how 
people are able to critically engage with the cultural values shaping society in contesting 
risk issues. In this sense, a further aim of this methodology must be to engage with the 
potential ways in which debates over risk and the use of genetics in agriculture are tied 
to these broader social and cultural politics. 
With these commitments in mind, this thesis proposes a qualitative methodology 
of study combining interview and documentary analysis. The following discussion 
details the empirical logic behind these methods, the ways in which they are applied, 
and how the research data will be approached analYtically. To begin the chapter, a more 
detailed exposition of the empirical tasks of this research project will be made. 
Specifically, this will account for the consequences of a relativist perspective for 
conducting social research. Secondly, a description of the data set will be presented, 
including an explanation of the rationale behind the decision to combine interview and 
documentary data. Finally, conscious of relativist arguments about the variegated and 
intrinsically political character of knowledge, a brief discussion of the author's own 
SUbjective position in the debate will conclude this chapter. 
Empirical Approach 
For most researchers working in the social sciences, and for those working with 
concepts of culture in particular, there is little disagreement about the discipline's 
inability to speak objectively about a social reality (Silverman, 2001). In other words, 
after several decades of critical reflection few researchers would purport to be able to 
apply a purely positivist method to the study of society as was often suggested during 
the first half of the last century. As a consequence, contemporary debates in social 
research methods are less about distinguishing socio-cultural methods from positivism, 
and more about how to move forward from this separation (Motherway, 2001: p. 19). 
Yet, the extension of the debate between positivism and relativism discussed in the 
previous chapter to the ways in which the social world can be addressed analytically 
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continues to provide a useful starting point in developing an empirical approach for this 
thesis. The aim is not to try to carve a methodology out of a critique of positivism. 
However, by contrasting the two approaches a better idea of what is required of a 
methodology for the study of the debate over agricultural biotechnology can be 
advanced. Furthermore, broaching the subject in this way sheds light on some of the 
potential pitfalls and weaknesses of relativist empiricism. 
Social Realism and a Relativist Response 
At the time when the social sciences were taking shape in Western thought, the 
development of a social methodology was often prescribed as a way of delineating a 
specific field of social study. Authors, beginning with Comte (1880), argued that 
disciplines, such as sociology, could benefit from the use of the same sorts of empirical 
methods that were being successfully applied in the sciences. Simply, they advocated 
that where the natural sciences applied methods of observation, experimentation and 
comparison to the material world, social scientists could do the same with the natural 
world. 
Radcliffe-Brown, commonly cited as one of the founders of modern 
anthropology, stated the case clearly in a valedictorian lecture at the University of 
Chicago in 1937. In his talk he called for a united social science linking disciplines, 
including sociology, economics and anthropology, around a proposed "natural science 
of society" (Radcliffe-Brown, 1957). The aspiration of social research, he argued, was 
to be able to perform systematic comparisons of different societies (ibid. p.3). 
Importantly, at the heart of this argument, is a vision of society made up of various 
institutions which could be considered as objective aspects of any society or culture. 
Specifically, morality, religion, justice, politics, economics, and their organismic 
relationships were to be the objects of the sociological gaze. Moreover, influenced by 
the French tradition of stnlctural functionalism, Radcliffe-Brown perceived these 
objects as both outside and preceding human interactions. Hence, in advancing a 
positivist method for social scientists, he did so in a manner which delineated a specific 
image of society. Clearly elucidating this relationship between the positivist empirical 
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outlook he proposed, and his vision of the social world as a structural social system, 
Radcliffe-Brown makes the following deduction: 
"If we agree that natural science is concerned with natural systems, and can 
agree that a society is a natural system and one that can be investigated, we 
can have a natural system of society. A natural system consists of entities 
that are in relations of real (existing in phenomenal reality) 
interconnectedness... The relations between individuals in a social system 
are social relations, and these are real things, parts of phenomenal reality." 
(Radcliffe-Brown, 1957: pA3) 
In response to Radcliffe-Brown's hypothesis, the overall relativist framework 
this thesis has advanced is unlikely to agree with any of these suppo-sitions. Briefly 
revisiting the arguments of the last chapter, a relativist critique of social realism can be 
broken down as follows. Firstly, relativism casts aspersions on the ability of science to 
uncover knowledge about any "phenomenal reality," arguing instead that natural 
systems are better envisioned as the product of socio-cultural relations. Thus, the 
foundation of positivism and the natural sciences for social scientific research are called 
into question from the outset. Underlining the relational nature of all knowledge claims, 
relativism would likewise stand in opposition to any attempt to speak knowledgeably 
about an external social reality. Relativism leads sociology away from envisioning 
Society as comprising a series of objective structures and institutions, and towards an 
engagement with society as a series of contested values, knowledge and experiences. In 
other words, the task of a relativist methodology is to investigate the diversity of 
relationships and contingencies involved in the ways realities (natural and social) are 
constructed and struggled over (Irwin, 1995: p. 168). 
Points of Caution 
However, in contrasting the positivist empiricism of earlier social theorists with 
the relative perceptions of constructionism, a couple cautionary points should be noted. 
Firstly, the comprehensive critique of positivism made by the constructionist 
perspective creates the danger of replacing one form of absolutism with another. As 
Bowden argues (1995), the purpose of a relativist methodology should not be to replace 
positivism with constnlctionism as a means of understanding the social or natural 
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worlds. In the same sense, he further argues that no single analytical approach should 
be prescribed as the only way, or the best way, to understand risks, science and 
technology (ibid.: p. 74). To do so, only serves to duplicate the types of segregation 
constructionists seek to unravel, and would, therefore, be hypocritical given the critical 
pretensions of the relativist approach. Similar to the critiques raised by Hacking (1998) 
and Osborne (1998) in the previous chapter, Bowden is particularly concerned that some 
constructionists, distracted by their deconstructionist antics, have consequently have 
committed just such a scholarly offence. He states: 
"First they-substitute one type of segregation for another. Where positivists 
held that a single, nature-based approach (the scientific method) was 
appropriate for understanding both nature and society, recent theorists argue 
that a single, socially based approach (social constructivism) explains both 
the natural world and the social world. This is the conceptual equivalent of 
the feminist argument that you counter one type of sexist perspective (male 
centered) by substituting a second type of sexist perspective (female 
centered)." (Bowden, 1995: p.77) 
To avoid this type of hypocrisy, a constructionist methodology is best served by 
applying the same relativist principles with which it approaches ideas of risk, science 
and technology to its own epistemological ventures. In making this critique, Bowden is 
simply making the case that a methodology should reflect the overall purpose behind a 
research project and not be an aim in and of itself. For example, in the feminist case the 
overall purpose would be to produce a non-sexist paradigm. The overall purpose 
guiding empirical projects in science and technology studies, Bowden argues, is the 
"development of a perspective that truly integrates nature and society" (1995: p. 77). 
A second note of caution in developing a relativist methodology relates to the 
roles of description and explanation in data analysis. Where in positivist research these 
roles intrinsically refer to each other, in relativistic research there has been a tendency to 
isolate one from the other (Collins and Yearley, 1992). For example, Radcliffe-Brown's 
positivist hypothesis operates on the assumption that scientific descriptions of society 
constitute a reality and, therefore, form a basis for explaining the institutions and 
structures of society. However, when the bond between description and reality is 
broken, explanations of society and social phenomena have often been left to the side. 
As Collins and Yearley (1992) cogently argue, the relativist commitments of 
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constructionism have at times led researchers towards providing exclusively descriptive 
accounts of the social contexts and relationships involved in techno-scientific 
controversies. The authors do not mean to suggest that such descriptive accounts are 
not of value themselves, nor are they positing a return to positivist explanations of the 
social world. Simply, they argue that empirical relativism sells itself short by not 
asking, or seeking to offer, answers to critical social questions, particularly given the 
democratic ethos of contingency underlying constructionist research. Explanation 
should, in other words, not be seen as an empirical limitation of relativist principles but 
as enabling a methodology which truly seeks to engage with the social world. Mulkay 
thus argues that the project of sociology is not to simply report, or describe the social, 
but to participate "actively in the world in order to create the possibilities of alternative 
forms of social life" (Mulkay, 1991: p. xix). Coffey and Atkinson state the argument 
this way: 
"We do not simply 'collect' data; we fashion them out of our transactions 
with other men and women. Likewise, we do not merely report what we 
find; we create accounts of social life, and in doing so we construct versions 
of the social worlds and the social actors that we observe." (Coffey and 
Atkinson, 1996: p.l08) 
Empirical Tasks 
Having situated this project within a relativist framework of social research, and 
conscious of the above points of caution, the following empirical tasks, or 
commitments, can be identified. These form the basis for constructing a methodology 
with which to examine the questions advanced in Chapter One. 
Firstly, in agreement with Bowden (1995), the empirical imperative guiding this 
research project is not to demonstrate that positivist perceptions of science and society 
have it all wrong in discussing risks, nor that social constructionists have it all right. 
Much more fundamentally, the emphasis is on building a methodology which is able to 
address the ways in which risks and debates over new agricultural technologies 
negotiate the boundaries between nature and society. Moreover, adopting this focus 
should commit this social research project to the democratic principles underlying 
-58-
constructionist theory. In other words, building on the work of authors, such as Irwin 
and Wynne (1996), one of the tasks before this thesis is to give voice to a diversity of 
experiences and understandings of risk in relation to both the social and natural worlds. 
Secondly this research project is mindful of Collins and Yearley's (1992) 
challenge to combine description with social explanation. In relation to the research 
questions posed in Chapter One, this thesis requires a methodology which is able to 
provide the basis for an explanation about the types of values people hold in making 
risk claims and how these values relate to normative contestations about the shape of 
British society. This includes offering a critical explanation of the ways in which risks, 
values and knowledge are performed in social life, particularly in regards to social 
relations of expertise and authority. 
Part Three of this thesis concerns the way in which social institutions, and 
governments in particular, are able to contend with social conceptions of risk and 
knowledge, therefore, creating a final analytical challenge for this research project. 
Stated simply, the task is to apply a relativist sociology of the debate over new 
agricultural technology within an institutional setting. In this light, institutions will not 
be perceived as objective realities, for example as suggested by social positivism. 
Rather, they will be approached as a context in which the debates over new agricultural 
technologies are orchestrated around formal debates concerning issues of regulation and 
control. The empirical task is in part to describe contestations over risk, knowledge and 
expertise within these formalized debates. Moreover, it must also provide the basis for 
an analysis of the way in which Government is able to respond to these politics in 
making decisions concerning the future of agricultural biotechnology. 
Methodology and Data Set 
Taking account of the empirical tasks laid out by a relativist approach to social 
research does not predispose, or prescribe, any single methodology for the social study 
of risk, science and technology. Thus a choice has been made, based on both empirical 
considerations and practical necessity, to adopt a loosely discursive methodology based 
on a constructionist analysis of talk and text (Potter, 1996: p.1 05) Although discourse 
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analysis can include the use of any number of methodological tools, this research 
project employs a combined methodology consisting of both interview techniques and 
documentary analysis. The discussion below demonstrates the benefits of applying 
these methods and justifies why they were chosen in the context of this project 
Interviews 
Although interviews and discourse analysis are popular ways of proceeding in 
risk and STS (science and technology studies) research, they are notthe only ways to 
address the subject. Ethnography, for example, has been a useful tool for social 
researchers to map and understand the cultural relationships involved in the construction 
of scientific meanings and technological objects. Latour and Woolgar's (1986) 
ethnographic study of scientists has been highly influential in directing research in 
science and technology studies, and has offered significant insights into the way facts 
are constructed in laboratory environments. Others, such as Bijker (1995, also Bijker 
and Law 1992), have applied documentary research techniques providing historical 
accounts of the social and material relations involved in the construction of technologies 
whose meanings we often take for granted (eg. the lightbulb). Focus groups are also 
advocated as a means of providing access to in-depth accounts of people's experiences 
with risk, as well as the values they hold in relation to the potential dangers they face 
from technological, or scientific development (Irwin et aI., 1999; Walker et. aI., 1998). 
Although in some cases it may have been optimal to apply these alternative 
methods in addressing the research aims of this thesis, the context of the debate over 
new agricultural technologies dictated that such methods were either inappropriate, or 
impractical. A critical ethnography could perhaps offer an unparalleled depth of 
analysis of the cultural politics involved in debates over risk, science and technology. 
As Thomas describes, by reflecting on culture, knowledge and action, ethnography 
"opens to scnltiny otherwise hidden agendas, power centres, and assumptions that 
inhibit, repress and constrain." (Thomas, 1993: pp. 2-3) However the depth of access 
provided by ethnography is achieved by tying a research project to a specific locality or 
context through practices of participant observation; for example, the laboratory setting 
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advanced by Latour and Woolgar (1986; also Latour, 1987; Downey, 1998). However 
one of the compelling points of interest in the debate over risks and new agricultural 
technologies, to be discussed in detail in the following chapter, is that these struggles 
are taking place across a variety of social contexts. They may involve scientists in the 
laboratory, but they also involve farmers, environmental groups, corporations, 
governments and of a host of other publics. It is difficult, therefore, to imagine 
ethnography given its emphasis on in-depth and localized research as the best means of 
coping with the diffuseness of the debate. 
Focus groups, or group interviews, are also often presented as a means of 
gaining in-depth qualitative data concerning the ways in which people's attitudes and 
experiences are constructed and expressed around specific topics (Kitzinger and 
Barbour, 1999). Whereas an interview is limited to a one-on-one interaction between 
the researcher and the participant, focus groups involve multiple interactions outside of 
the control of the researcher. As a consequence, Kitzinger states, they provide a 
valuable means of allowing research participants to take "the research into new and 
often unexpected directions and in engaging with each others in ways which are both 
complementary and argumentative" (Kitzinger, 1994: p.166). Given the research 
objectives of this thesis, focus groups would appear well suited to providing the varied 
and culturally provocative accounts of risk this thesis is seeking. 
However, as ethnography was deemed inappropriate because of the diffuseness 
of the debate, focus groups are impractical for similar reasons. Although considered 
early on in this project as a method of analysis, by their nature focus groups require 
bringing people together in one location at a specific time. However, where this task is 
not a substantial barrier in doing research on segments of the general popUlation, the 
questions posed by this thesis direct analysis towards the experiences of those actively 
involved in the debate over agricultural biotechnology. This would imply a use of focus 
groups in either one of two ways. Firstly, a series of groups could have been conducted, 
each generating a set of results around a particular segment of the public (ie. fanners or 
scientists). However, given the variation this thesis seeks, the sheer number of groups 
and the vast amounts of data focus groups provide, such a task would exceed the 
limitations in time and resources of a doctoral project. Secondly, taking account of 
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these difficulties, a series of groups might have been conducted bringing together the 
various active participants in the debate. However, even in a situation such as this, the 
logistics required present considerable barriers to this research project. For example, 
focus groups combining various elements of the debate would require bringing together 
people from around the country to meet in one place at one time. Even if it were 
possible to arrange such a meeting, it would require considerable resources on the part 
of either the researcher, or the participants, to bring people together. Such resources, as 
most readers will be aware, are seldom available in doctoral research. 
For these reasons, interviews were chosen, not necessarily as the ideal means of 
meeting the empirical focus of this research project, but as the best possible means of 
doing so considering the practical requirements of the debate context. Acknowledging 
this should not discount the potential of interviews as a means of accessing the 
experiences and values of actors involved in contesting risks and agricultural genetics. 
However, in order to maximize the benefits of this methodology, three pressing 
considerations overlie the interview process conducted in this thesis. 
Firstly, interviews can be an important methodological tool in that they can 
potentially access a wide range of research participants and their experiences in the 
debate over GM agriculture. Although it is likely impossible to encapsulate all the 
different perspectives involved in the debate, this project applies interviews in an 
attempt to address this diversity to as full an extent as possible!. The project thus 
comprises twenty-five separate interviews, involving research participants from a wide 
range of backgrounds and with varied experiences with the debate (Refer to Appendix 
B). For example, members of the scientific, farming, corporate, and non-governmental 
organization (NGO) communities all volunteered their time to be interviewed2. These 
Although seeking to engage with as wide a variety of perspectives as possible this thesis in no way claims 
to be able to speak for a public in general. By having chosen participants with an active interest in the 
debate over new agricultural technologies, participants often shared many similar characteristics. For 
example, the majority of participants I spoke with had a background in higher education. For many, this 
background included a scientific education and a detailed familiarity with genetic technologies. 
Furthermore, participants often shared experiences in political engagement around a variety of issues. 
In general, interviews lasted between forty-five minutes and an hour. Where possible interviews were 
conducted in person. However, because the participants involved in this thesis came from locales ranging 
from Cornwall to Scotland, it was necessary to conduct some interviews over the telephone. Without 
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participants played many different roles in either contesting, or supporting the use of 
genetic technologies in agriculture. These included involvement in technological design 
and development, governance, activism, public advocacy / lobbying, corporate 
promotions, risk evaluation, and the cultivation of GM crops. 
It should be noted that these labels are in some ways misleading. Participants 
often defined their role in the debate in ways which blurred these boundaries. For 
example, scientists were just as likely to be corporate spokespersons, regulators, or 
activists, as they were to be just scientists. Likewise an environmental campaigner 
could be active in-crop destruction activities, may be working as a lobbyist, or be 
involved in governance. These labels are therefore applied simply as a means of 
guidance in this thesis. 
Secondly, the purpose of the interviews is not to impose a representative account 
of a participant's view of the GM debate, or of their SUbjective experience in it 
(Silverman, 2001: pp. 87-97). It is not the place of the sociologist to be a ventriloquist-
to speak for participants - as Irwin notes (1995: pp. 168-169), but to give participants an 
avenue of speaking for themselves. I do not wish to overstate this point. Indeed, as the 
reader will find throughout the following chapters of this thesis, participants' comments 
are presented and discussed in a manner which interacts with and builds on the 
theoretical arguments outlined in Chapter Two. Rather, the point I wish to make here is 
that a more detailed textual deconstruction of the interview data is neither intended, nor 
desirable, for this research project. Therefore, the intention is not to propose a 
methodology short of sociological analysis, but to provide an analysis which sees 
participants act as co-researchers rather than as research SUbjects. 
To this end a semi-structured interview technique was employed. This allowed 
for a consistency in the data and the ability to make links across interviews, but also 
permitted the interviews to reflect the diversity of contexts and approaches participants 
brought to the research questions. Roughly speaking, participants were asked questions 
along several convergent lines of inquiry. Firstly, as a way of gaining a rapport with 
participants and of gauging their approach to the issues surrounding agricultural 
reservation, it can be stated that both methods proved equally beneficial in engaging participants' 
experiences and arguments. 
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biotechnology, participants were invited to offer an account of their personal 
background leading up to their involvement in the debate. Often this involved a 
detailing of why a participant had been motivated to get actively involved in either 
supporting or campaigning against new agricultural technologies. Moreover, 
participants were prompted to describe their own role in the controversy. For example, 
participants commonly spoke of the missions and political standpoint of the 
organizations they were working with. All participants were also asked to speak 
broadly about the technologies and the controversy from a more personal perspective. 
This included prompting participants to overtly address what they thought were some of 
the normative and moral issues implied in the debate. 
A third consideration, closely linked to the point just made, is that in order to 
avoid speaking for participants, or representing their views, a constructionist perspective 
of the interview has been adopted (Silverman, 2001: p. 95; Potter, 1996: pp. 97-121). 
Although some degree of representation is endemic to any research project (Coffey and 
Atkinson, 1996: p.1 08) this approach attempts to minimize this by focussing on the 
ways in which participants construct the meanings of risk. This opposes, for example, 
research which might attempt to tie specific arguments and values to particular 
individuals or groups, such as implying that environmentalists or scientists share a 
common set of attitudes and values towards GM crops and foods. Therefore, the 
challenge is to provide these accounts of participants , stories without undermining the 
ability of participants to speak for themselves; to balance analysis with description. 
Outlining the goal of the constructionist in using interview data, Holstein and Gubrium 
state this challenge well: 
"The goal is to show how interview responses are produced in the 
integration between interviewer and respondent, without losing sight ofthe 
meanings produced or the circumstances that condition the meaning making 
process. The analytic objective is not merely to describe the situated 
production of talk, but to show how what is being said relates to the 
experiences and lives being studied. " (cited in Silverman, 2001: p. 97). 
In attempting to meet this challenge a rhetorical method of analysis has been 
applied to the interview data in subsequent chapters. As Potter (1996: pp. 106-108) 
notes, this sort of analysis guides the researcher towards an analysis of the resources 
participants use to persuade others of the validity of their own perspectives. The focus 
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is on the types of arguments made in either defending one's position, or challenging that 
of another. For example, as will be discussed in Chapter Five, several opponents of GJ\f 
crops and foods applied a language of risk as a rhetorical device in critiquing the role of 
global corporate capitalism in agriculture, and vice versa. In this sense, a focus on 
rhetoric is a helpful way of guiding the research analysis towards linking claims about 
the risks of agricultural biotechnology, with participants' normative concerns about 
British society. Moreover, in doing so it allows the researcher to SUbjectively create 
some general analytical links across participant experiences, without necessarily 
overriding her/his-own specific experiences and values. 
Documentary Analysis 
In addition to the use of interview data this thesis also employs a range of 
documentary research, particularly in relation to Part Three of this thesis concerning the 
governance of risk and new agricultural technologies. 
Combining documentary data alongside the comments of the research 
participants is beneficial for a couple of reasons. Partly the research aims of this project 
are to address the ways in which contestations over risk are taking place in the 
governance of new agricultural technologies. Documentary data offers a window into 
these processes. This is particularly important as ideas of "risk" increasingly feature in 
the official discourses of British bureaucracy, including perceptions which appear to 
challenge traditional technocratic models of risk management. As an example, Lord 
Phillips' Report (2001a) on the Government's handling of mad-cow disease3 provides 
an invaluable resource for documenting the changing nature of the governance of risk in 
which the current debate over agricultural biotechnology is taking place. 
Moreover, the rapid evolution of the uptake of concepts of risk in governance 
involved in the case of GM agriculture requires a flexible methodology to account for 
this change. Where the interviews conducted over the course of this research project 
account for the debate up until the date of the interview, documentary data has offered 
Please refer to Chapter Seven. 
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the possibility of following the evolution of the debate in government beyond these 
points. During and since the period between October 200 I and July 2002 \vhen the 
majority of interviews were conducted, the political terrain in Britain has evohoed 
considerably. In particular, the Agricultural and Environment Biotechnology 
Commission (AEBC) has been very active over the entire time frame of this project in 
seeking to get non-expert perceptions of risk acknowledged in Government. The 
documentation provided by the commission, beginning with its first report published in 
September 2001 and continuing through the documents associated with the 
Commission's recent (summer 2003) establishment of a public debate on GM crops and 
foods, thus offer considerable insight about the evolution of risk issues in governance. 
In terms of analysis, documentary data is approached in the same ways as that 
provided by interviews. In other words, the documentary data provided should not be 
read as a realistic account of the world, but involved in its own constructions of reality 
(Atkinson and Coffey, 1997: pp. 45-62). The idea of a rhetorical discourse is not 
limited to the spoken interaction of the interview. As Atkinson and Coffey point out, an 
analysis of text can be seen to be fundamentally about how a document "persuades their 
readers ... to get a particular point of view across to others" (ibid.: p. 61). In this sense, 
when possible, the analysis of documentary materials has sought to relate texts (spoken 
or written) to one another. 
Personal Reflexivity 
Through the use of these methods this project offers one interpretation of the 
debate over new agricultural technologies. Thus, although it seeks to give voice to a 
diversity of risk perspectives and cultural values, the interpretation and presentation of 
the data are the author's / mine alone. It is, therefore, worth briefly stating my own 
background and position in the debate over new agricultural technologies in Britain. 
In many ways, I come at this debate as an outsider. As a Canadian, with no 
previous experience of living in Britain prior to this project, my conceptions of 
agriculture and risks, particularly those pertaining to the environment, were often at 
odds with those of the research participants. For example, participants constantly 
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reminded me that agriculture and nature hold a close and symbiotic relationship in the 
British context, which they might not in Canada. The argument follows that where 
hedgerows and agricultural landscapes are essential to understanding Britons 
interactions with nature (Bell, 1994), ideas of wilderness are seen to be more prevalent 
in North America with agriculture often taking place outside the environmental gaze 
(Cronon, 1996; Sandilands, 2000). This provides one example of the difficulties of 
coming to terms with the cultural context in which the debate over GM crops and foods 
is taking place. However, it is certainly not the only one. Others, might include the 
particularity of the growing distrust between British citizens and the Government 
following mad-cow disease, or the relationship between science and authority embodied 
by institutions such as the Royal Society. In this sense, I have attempted to be 
conscious of my own perceptions in describing what are aspects of a similar, but 
nonetheless, different cultural experience. 
Furthermore, I come into the debate over the use of genetics in agriculture from 
a largely academic perspective. Previously I have conducted sociological research on 
the debate over the use of recombinantly engineered growth hormones in milk in 
Canada in the mid-1990s as part of a Master's dissertation (Jones, 2000). As was the 
case then, the adoption of biotechnology as my research focus has been primarily 
motivated by a scholarly curiosity in the debate and the importance it has been given in 
socio-political culture of Western society. As such, I have not come into the debate 
with a clear-cut position in the debate, and after four years of research I would still be 
unable to equivocally say if I was for, or against, the use of biotechnology in 
agriculture. This is not to say that I don't have doubts about the technology, or that I 
have reservations about the manner in which it has been developed to date, but that 
these concerns have not hardened into a clear position. In this sense, I have found it an 
enlightening personal process to hear arguments both for and against the technology by 
participants with passionate views about the future of new agricultural technologies, the 
environment and society. In keeping to the general tone of this thesis, I have sought to 
respect the views of all participants equally, even in situations where I may have 
disagreed with their arguments. The aim has not been to gain an objective vantage from 
which to impartially observe the debate, but simply to give these various perspectives 
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equal voice in the debate. 
However, as noted above, the purpose of any research project is not only to 
provide a description of a particular facet of society, but to engage in the shaping of that 
society oneself. In this sense, I agree with Harvey (1996), who persuasively argues that 
social research must be unafraid to demonstrate commitments to certain social values. 
In Harvey's case these include responsibilities to social justice, the environment and 
what he terms the' geography of difference'. Thus, although somewhat ambivalent in 
my position to GM crops and foods, my own version of the sociological story of the 
debate is motivated by similar commitments. These, include issues nf social justice and 
environmental welfare, but further relate to democratic values of equality, inclusion and 
choice. Simply, this research project hopes to bring these values to the debate over GM, 
and hopes that the participants and readers that have given their time to this thesis 
would be supportive of this project. 
Having introduced the research topic of this thesis and outlined its theoretical 
position and method of research, the following two sections will tum to an analysis of 
the politics of risk involved in the debate over new agricultural technologies. 
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PART TWO: THE POLITICS OF RISK AND SCIENCE 
"Will GM ever really improve the fabric of our society? Will it be a more 
peaceful, more cooperative and more harmonious place, which I assume 
most people are wanting to work towards? We may have different visions 
of what all those words mean." 
- A GM Activist and self-described 'Crop-
decontaminator' (Participant I) 
"People perceive risks through different 'frames' that reflect their values 
world views, and concepts of social order. These frames can influence 
definitions of risk, allocations of responsibility and blame, evaluations of 
scientific evidence, and ideas about appropriate decision-making authority. 
Is risk to be defined as a technical matter to be resolved by measuring the 
extent of harm ? A bureaucratic issue of appropriate regulatory mechanisms 
and jurisdictions? An economic question of allocating costs and benefits? 
A political issue involving consumer choice and control? A moral issue 
involving questions of social responsibility, religious values, equity, and 
rights?" 
- Dorothy Nelkin (2003), "The Social Meanings of Risk." 
2 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE CONTROVERSY 
Introduction: 
This chapter offers the reader some background to controversies regarding 
agricultural biotechnology in the United Kingdom. Given the pervasive and complex 
nature of these controversies, the intention is not to provide a comprehensive account of 
the debate. Rather the aim is to give the reader a brief snapshot of the technologies, the 
public reaction which they provoked in the UK and the context in which this debate has 
taken place!. The focus is on those aspects of the story which are of specific relevance 
to the analysis presented in the following two chapters. In this light, this chapter 
situates the politics of new agricultural technologies within the frameworks outlined by 
research participants in interview2. 
In building this context, three interrelated histories of the controversy over 
agricultural biotechnology are presented. In the first, the development of agricultural 
biotechnology as a public debate in the second half of the 1990s is outlined. Guided by 
participants comments, this history suggests some initial links between the debate over 
the risks of GM agriculture and the evolving social context of this time. Secondly, part 
of this public debate involved a history of the initial commercial growth of the 
biotechnology sector and the subsequent reversal of fortunes of the commercial viability 
A time line of events is provided in Appendix A to assist the reader in drawing these histories together. 
In outlining these histories this chapter will occasionally draw on extracts from the interviews conducted 
over the course of this research project. Participants, in many cases, had long been involved in the events 
leading up to the controversy over OM foods. Thus although this chapter is not intended as an analytical 
discllssion per se, participant statements assist in telling the story of the debate. 
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of genetically modified (GM) foods, and the industries behind their development, are 
documented. Specific attention is paid to the commercialization of GM tomato paste _ 
the first GM commodity to reach the shelves of British supermarkets - and to the life-
industry model behind initial attempts to commercialize GM agriculture. Outlined in 
the final section of the chapter are some of the key scientific cases around which the 
public controversy has developed. This account makes the suggestion that the 
controversies over agricultural biotechnologies are not restricted to matters of 
technological risk alone, but point to science as a focal point in which the social and 
cultural politics of-risk are played out. 
The Growth of a Political Debate 
This section addresses the rise of agricultural biotechnology as a public debate in 
the U.K. It is worth noting from the outset that the development of agricultural 
biotechnology has not always been accompanied by such an overt public debate as 
characterizes the controversy today. When compared to the overall history of the 
technology, the public debate over GM crops and foods is in fact a relatively recent 
event, beginning in the second half of the 1990s. This is not to suggest that the 
technology advanced uncontested from the 1970s up until this point of time (e.g. 
Krimsky, 1992), but rather that its rise to prominence on the political stage has occurred 
only recently. To recall, the overall question asked by this thesis is 'what are the 
politics of new agricultural technologies, and more particularly what are the politics of 
risk involved in the debate over GM crops and foods?' The following discussion will 
give some depth to this question, suggesting that it may be more pertinent to inquire 
into what has brought GM agriculture to the fore of public debate in Britain. 
The Debate Before 1996 
Although, as several research participants noted, one could be forgiven for 
assuming that the commercial development and marketing of agricultural biotechnology 
did not begin until the late 1990s, the technology has a much longer history. Although 
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some will claim that biotechnology dates back to the first attempts at fermentation or 
cheese making, the practice of genetic engineering has its origins in the 1950s with 
Crick and Watson's discovery of DNA. The development of molecular genetics 
accelerated through the 1960s, with the discipline gaining increasing prestige in the 
scientific community. It was not until the 1970s, when scientists were becoming skilled 
at manipulating the genetic structures of organisms, a period Durant (1992: p.1 0) refers 
to as the "true dawn of biotechnology," that any concern was raised. A short lived 
moratorium on some types of genetic manipulation was called by scientists on both 
sides of the Atlantic in 1974, including by Watson. Accompanying_this initial 
moratorium public skepticism about the risks of genetic engineering technologies began 
to develop. However, by 1976 with commercial benefits for the taking and corporate 
research money on the funding table, the moratorium was dropped. Biotechnology 
entered a phase characterized by the search for practical applications and commercial 
markets (Yoxen, 1983: pp. 32-67). As Yoxen states, any apprehensions scientists held 
about the technology were obscured by an "economic sunrise" (ibid.: p. 64). Although 
concern about genetics continued to bubble throughout the next two decades, 
particularly concerning the regulation of human genetics, no extensive public debate 
was evident in the UK during this time (Marris et aI., 2001: pp. 36-42). Any space for a 
public debate that had been opened with the signing of the moratorium, was lost in the 
nlsh for commercial prosperity and obscured by the speculated benefits the technology 
was going to bring society. 
In the case of the development and testing of GM crops in the UK, little public 
debate has accompanied these practices until recently. This despite the fact that 
releasing GMOs into the environment as part of the scientific evaluation of the 
technology has been occurring for close to 15 years, beginning with a trial of herbicide 
tolerant rape seeds in 1987. At the time, no specific legislation existed which covered 
the growing of GM crops for commercial or research purposes. Government and 
industry operated on the basis of a voluntary agreement to carry out risk evaluations 
(health and environment) before any consents would be issued. Even when government 
began to develop early legislative frameworks around the technology at home and in 
Europe, little public interest was raised. Thus, the business of issuing licences for the 
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release of GM crops went ahead in the Advisory Committee on Genetic Modification 
(created in 1984) largely unquestioned for the better part of a decade. Even when the 
voluntary basis of the licencing practices was set out in legislation in 1993 little public 
interest could be generated. One senior civil servant involved in the creation of the 
legislation at MAFF (the then Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Foods, now 
replaced by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) described the 
situation this way: 
"If we go back to the first release ... People are amazed when I say to them 
that the firs_t releases ofGM plants occurred in 1987. People don't believe 
me, but it's true. Herbicide tolerant oilseed rape has been tria1ed in Britain 
in 1987. There were trials in Cornwall, Berkshire and Scotland looking for 
its impact on the environment... So the civil servants were regUlating the 
industry and nobody was taking an interest in it... We made the legislation 
that is currently in force and we had public consultations on bringing in the 
. legislation and nobody in particular took any interest." (Participant X) 
The absence of any public interest in the topic, the participant further explains, 
not only surprised those at MAFF, but given the political climate of the time was the 
cause for some concern. Under consecutive Conservative Governments in the 1980s 
agricultural planning was characterized by policies of increased industrialization in 
farming and industry self-regulation. It is worth noting that these are the same policies 
which have now been implicated in the rise of the BSE epidemic and which in this 
context drew little public or regulatory attention (Miller, 1999). Knowing what we now 
know about the consequences ofBSE, the lack of concerted engagement with the 
changing nature of the UK agricultural industry now appears conspicuous in its absence. 
As the participant cited above further revealed, the only voices of caution were coming 
from within Government itself. Where MAFF did find pressure being exerted on them 
was from an industry and governing party who wanted to quickly deliver GM foods into 
the marketplace at pace with the United States. This contrasts starkly with the sihlation 
today. Generally perceived in favour of the technology, the Labour Government and 
DEFRA (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) have both been under 
widespread and consistent pressure to hold off on the commercialization of GM foods. 
The respondent states: 
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"The main problem we had with introducing the legislation was that the 
industry thought that we were being too hard on them. The Thatcher 
Government was in place at the time they thought we were being too hard 
on the industry and we struggled at that time to make the legislation. We 
were under pressure at that time to make sure that any consents that were 
applied for were dealt within a matter of days. When we issued the Europe 
wide licence for the import of soya, we as civil servants were worried that 
nobody was taking an interest in it, because we thought of it as being 
extremely important; the first genetically modified food to be approved for 
sale in Europe. We thought that this was a pretty big step and there wasn't 
the slightest bit of interest in it whatsoever. I signed the consent on behalf 
of the European Community and nobody took any notice. We got worried 
that nobody was taking any notice." (Participant X) 
As implied in these comments, even amongst the activist communities and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) for which agricultural biotechnology is now a 
foundational campaign issue, concerns over crop biotechnology were, for the most part, 
not even on the agenda in the 1980s and early 1990s. For example, in 1987, the same 
year the first crop trials were being planted, the Green Alliance, a lobbying group whose 
mission is to stimulate debate and incorporate issues of environmental concern into 
Government, attempted to start a debate by inviting Jeremy Rifkin to the UK on a 
speaking tour. Rifkin, an American author and activist had been influential in 
embedding GM issues within the US environmental lobby. Known for his 'evangelical' 
tone, Rifkin's invitation was intended to force the issue onto the agenda at a time when 
the Green Alliance was gearing up to lobby government over the writing of Part Six of 
the Environmental Protection Act (EPA) concerning the establishment of European 
regulations for the growth of GM crops. Yet, despite having some success in their 
lobbying activities, little ground was made in bringing the issue forward in the 
consciousness of the wider activist community whose attention was being focussed 
elsewhere. A participant from an NGO background who has long been involved in 
pushing for the regulation of biotechnology offers the following comment, shedding 
light on the attitudes of the time: 
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"The Green Alliance has always given itself an agenda setting role \\-ith 
environmental issues, rather than necessarily pursuing things in depth. By 
having Rifkin's tour, we felt we were setting the UK environmental policy 
agenda. It would be up to the NGOs to take a hold of it as they wished. At 
this time climate change and ozone depletion were becoming 'respectable' 
environmental issues. Previously they had been seen as wacko claims that 
no one thought were scientifically underpinned. When they became 
confirmed scientifically they became big campaigning issues and it was 
clear in the late 1980s that there wasn't room on the NGO agendas for 
GM." (Participant J) 
From a commercial perspective, when the controversy finally broke, an industry 
which by now had a range of products ready for market mid which nad passed almost all 
the scientific and regulatory hurdles was left perplexed. Looking back from where we 
are in the controversy in 2003, it might be assumed that prior to the late 1990s industry 
and government had successfully colluded to keep things quiet in the hope of avoiding a 
public backlash. However, as a corporate representative suggested in one interview, the 
industry had been very vocal in promoting the benefits of genetic technologies to the 
investment community, supported by a series of vigorous advertising campaigns. Going 
about their day-to-day business within this context of success and perceiving broad 
range support for their early products, they were left floundering when the issue finally 
broke. Furthermore, the biotechnology and seed industry was unable to contend with 
the breadth and pace of the controversy. The following exchange comes from an 
interview with a research scientist whose role following the outbreak of the controversy 
was transformed to that of a corporate spokesperson on agricultural biotechnology: 
"JiVhy was there a shortage ofpublic affairs experience at [your company] 
prior to the GM controversy? " 
"The main reason is that we were not in an area that attracted any kind of 
broad scale public interest; not just controversy, but interest We are a 
company that produces technological solutions for farms and for farmers. 
Our contacts were in farming, agricultural trade, and the specialist 
agricultural press. Nobody ever took any interest in us, until this subject 
came along, so we never actually had need for this kind of an area. It just 
wouldn't have been justified. Occasionally, if we had anything, we would 
use an agency to help the one or two individuals we had in the big head 
offices." 
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"Would it be fair to say that the company was taken by surprise with the 
public reaction?" 
"It would be entirely fair. We were taken by surprise, not only by the fact 
that in our point of view [agricultural biotechnology] was a development 
which we saw as generally very positive in terms ofthe environment, safety 
and benefit. There had always been a very small rumbling voice on the 
fringes through the 1980s and 1990s over here about genetic engineering, 
but it had never really reached any level of profile. I think we were all 
surprised equally by the breadth and the depth this issue has grown to. So 
if you take other areas of controversy where we would regard there to be 
much better reasons to be frightened - like diseases, organisms and 
chemicals-in food - here we have something that with the testing that has 
been done there has never been any example of harm and therefore we 
always felt the facts would come through. It did take us by surprise that 
some groups were able to weave such mystical controversies out of no 
evidence. We wrongly judged that such an issue could become a big issue 
in the early days." (Participant 0) 
As a second research scientist, involved in the promotion biotechnology to the public 
since the mid-1990s straightforwardly states: "Prior to 1996 the public were not 
interested in plant science. I couldn't have bought my way into the newspapers or 
television" (Participant G). 
The Debate After 1996 
However, in the second half of the 1990s the controversy over GM crops and 
foods broke in earnest. As a report commissioned by Commission of European 
Communities demonstrates, by the end of the decade the debate had produced a flurry of 
political activity, generated high levels of media coverage and enrolled the activity of 
the non-organized mass public. By 1999 in Britain, the authors of the report state, 
"everybody has heard about the issues and has something to say about it" (Marris et aI., 
2001: pp. 37-38). 
In describing their own experiences with the controversy, research participants 
in this thesis offered many different suggestions about why a public debate had 
developed in this relatively short period of time. In some cases participants attributed 
the development of the controversy to singular causes. For example, those in the civil 
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service pointed towards the adoption of biotechnology and agricultural regulation by the 
Conservative Party as a central issue in their opposition to the Labour Government. 
Others, particularly from industry and pro-GM science quarters, emphasised the success 
of the activist community in attaching an image of risk to the technology and getting 
this image into the British media. Likewise, participants identified certain key events 
which brought GM foods and crops to public attention. These included several 
vigorously contested and hyped scientific studies which highlighted the potential risks 
associated with new agricultural technologies (see below). The import of unsegregated 
GM products, particularly soya and maize in 1996, was also cited as a source of the 
controversy3. 
Research on public feelings towards GMOs in the UK conducted over this 
period, however, suggests a more cautious approach to explaining the rapid rise of the 
GM crops and food debate (Grove-White et aI., 1997). The authors of this research 
argue that the rise in a public debate does not necessarily denote a change from a public 
attitude of acceptance to rejection of the technology. Rather, this research posits that a 
deep public ambivalence to the technology has always existed, stemming from a 
fatalistic belief that the commercialization of the technology is inevitable, regardless of 
public opinion. Furthermore, the authors argue that this attitude of resignation was 
connected to a wider range of concerns than the direct risks of GM crops and foods 
themselves. These included, as will be discussed in detail in the forthcoming chapters, 
concerns about the commercial nature of the product, its relationship with the 
environment and the trustworthiness of the institutions responsible for regUlating the 
technology. Thus, although each of the above explanations of the rise of the public 
offered by participants are important, they need to be seen within this political context. 
Almost unanimously, when these cases were presented, participants did so 
against the background provided by the re-emergence of agriculture as a hotbed of 
Unsegregated GM soya, engineered by Monsanto to be herbicide tolerant, began entering the UK in 1996 
from the United States where it was then mixed with non-GM soya. As a key ingredient in processed 
foods, this practice impacted large numbers of products being sold in supermarkets around the UK. With 
no labels to inform consumers which products contained GM ingredients, consumer organizations and the 
activist lobby reacted strongly against this practice. Please refer to Chapter Six for a more detailed 
discussion, or refer to Lassen et al. (2002). 
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political controversy in recent years. As suggested by the tenn 're-emergence' 
agriculture has been a consistent political theme in the UK and the subject of public 
disputation for at least the past 50 years. The effects of agricultural usage of chemical 
fertilizers and pesticides on the environment had exposed the industry to tremendous 
public scorn in the 1960s. Rachel Carson's 1963 book Silent Spring, for example. 
warned about the dramatic ecological consequences of using artificial pesticides. Silent 
Spring and DDT became icons for the burgeoning environmental movement, making 
agriculture front and centre in the politically active 60s. Since the 1970s concerns over 
the monocultural approach taken by the Green Revolution4 and its effects on 
biodiversity and human welfare in the developing world have been the subject of intense 
controversy. Today these same battles are concentrated around the patenting of genes 
and the use ofGM cash crops in the developing world (Gillies, 1998; Hannigan, 1995; 
Shand, 1997; Shiva, 1993 & 1995). Likewise, the stewardship of rural Britain and the 
effects of intensive fanning practices on landscape and wildlife have been persistent 
political topics and been foundational to the platfonns of well respected organizations 
such as English Nature and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB). 
Furthennore, the events of the 1990s leading up to, and overlapping, the debate 
over GM agriculture have further established agriculture as a significant arena of public 
interest and political activity. Here controversies centred not on abstract notions of 
environmental degradation and biodiversity loss, or on the distant realities of people in 
the developing world, but on the immediate impacts of contemporary agricultural 
practices on food safety. Public concern has been raised about the transmission of 
deadly bacteria (principally E-coli and salmonella) from animals to humans, 
exacerbated by concerns about the overuse of antibiotics in treating animals with these 
infections. This focus furthennore brought to light the use of antibiotics as growth 
Initially founded by the Rockefeller Foundation in the 1960s, the Green Revolution expanded with the 
support of Northern governments and was further enlarged when adopted by the Breton Woods 
institutions as the basis for modem agricultural development strategies. The approach taken in this regard 
was to replace inferior crop and livestock varieties, commonly associated with traditional fanning 
practices, with superior high yielding varieties which correspond to large-scale intensive methods of 
agriculture. Critics argue that such models have been based on a belief that global hunger and world 
poverty are essentially technical problems which require Northern models of economic industrialIzation 
and modernization. 
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enhancing agents in pig and poultry feeds. Likewise the now well documented 
mishandling ofBSE (Phillips, 2000a) by Government, industry and science was offered 
by participants more than any other explanation for the sudden and widespread public 
interest in agricultural controversies. In particular, participants pointed not only to the 
incorrect assumptions made about the safety consequences of the disease, but the 
willingness of Government officials and scientists to issue statements of fact and 
certainty in relating the potential risks of BSE when considerable uncertainty existed 
(Phillips, 2001; Jones, 2003). Although occurring after the initial spike in the 
controversy over agricultural biotechnology, the outbreak of Foot & Mouth Disease 
(FMD) in 2001 has further heightened the association between agriculture, risk and 
public controversy. The closure of the countryside and the mass cull and destruction of 
ovine herds across the UK, implemented in order to control the spread of the disease, 
bore out an image of British Agriculture as out of control and government, science and 
industry at a loss as to how to regain any sense of order. 
When moves were made to bring agricultural biotechnology to the marketplace, 
it was done so within an evolving and volatile history of political contestation. On the 
one hand, this context has been characterized by the presence of immediate concerns 
over food safety and environmental risk issues. On the other hand, biotechnology 
within this context has served as "lightning rod," as described by one industry 
representative, for broader societal concerns and signified a loss of trust in science, 
government and in industry (both at the farm and at the corporation). A member of an 
advocacy organization calling for a five year moratorium on the commercialization of 
GM crops clearly summarizes the complexity of the issue and expresses a concern 
which extends far beyond technological specificity and immediate risks associated with 
the technologies: 
These concerns stem from fears that the routinization of antibiotic usage in agriculture will generate new 
forms of antibiotic resistant bacteria, or 'super-germs' as they are sometimes popularly referred to. On 
one hand this would mean that bacterial infections would be increasingly difficult to treat at the farm, but 
furthelmore implies a risk that the treatment of bacterial infections in humans could be ma~e more 
difficult as many of the antibiotics used in veterinary medicine are the same as those used III human 
medicine. 
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"~bviously there. is genuine concern, but also it is like yet another thing 
wIth the food cham. Yet another area.... The thing about it is that because 
it is so cross cutting of so many different areas that it has really crystalized 
a lot people's feelings, fears, concerns about science, industrial agriculture, 
about the food chain, etc. It's a big thing and it is a lot more than just the 
issue." (Participant C) 
In summary, providing an explanation of why agricultural biotechnology has 
developed into the political issue it has in Britain is not a straightforward task. In part it 
has been triggered by certain key events such as the importation of non-segregated soya 
product into the UK processed food industry. By the second half of the 1990s these sort 
of events, and the-technology more generally, were immersed in a context of 
agricultural risk and distrust in science, industry and government. In addition, the above 
participant comments and public attitude research cited suggest that the politics of 
agricultural biotechnology has overlapped and become entwined with the various 
debates at the centre of political consciousness in Britain. 
The principal message to be drawn from this discussion is thus that the causes 
behind the politics of agricultural biotechnology are broad and varied. In other words, 
the controversy cannot be delimited to specific cases, or the potential for risk alone. In 
conclusion, one observation stressing the intangibility of these politics came from a 
biotechnologist and advocate of the technology. In her/his statement s/he contrasts 
public reaction to biotechnology with some of the other key technologies in today's 
society. Where innovations such as mobile telecommunications technologies have 
raised some concerns over radiation and their impact on health (eg. from handsets and 
from the siting of antennae) (IEGMP, 2000), the scope and intensity of these 
controversies is not comparable to those surrounding agricultural biotechnology. This 
discrepancy can in part be attributed, in the participant's opinion, to how the risks and 
benefits of the technology are perceived. Where the risks of information technologies 
are deemed acceptable, there is no such clarity to the debate over agricultural 
technology. However, such rationalized explanations do not explain the source of 
public scepticism on its own. Moreover, the intangibility of the politics of new 
agricultural technology is described in terms of a public "gut reaction" against the 
technology: 
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"It hits a nerve with people, that maybe the Internet doesn't. The Internet 
has risks as well. Great benefits, you know, you can get information from 
it very quickly, but it also opens the way into things that you don't want 
your children to have access to. You have to take steps to stop that from 
h~ppening... It carries an element of risk, but people are happier dealing 
wIth that. It has not gone beyond that. Whereas the feeling that there is risk 
with GM, there is something more than that, there is a sort of gut reaction 
to it" (Participant G) 
A Reversal of Fortunes: GM Agriculture and the Life Industry 
From the above discussion of the rise of a public debate over GM agriculture in 
Britain, this chapter will now move to look at two key elements associated with the 
public debate. The first, dealt with in this section, addresses the history of the 
commercial development of the technology in the 1990s. The second, to be discussed 
below, looks at the role of science as a hub in the debate. 
Consumer Reactions to GM Foods 
On February 5, 1996, tins of genetically modified (GM) tomato paste, or puree, 
appeared on the shelves of Sainsbury's and Safeway, two of the United Kingdom's 
largest grocery retailers. Both retailers adopted an open information and labelling 
policy from the beginning, proudly proclaiming the products to be: "Produced from 
Genetically Modified Tomatoes." What separated these tomatoes from their ordinary 
cousins, was the "switching off' of the fruit's softening gene. By doing so, scientists at 
Zeneca (now Syngenta) had produced a firmer tomato which was able to ripen on the 
vine for a couple of days longer than the average tomato. These tomatoes were less 
susceptible to damage during transport, consequently reducing costly wastage. Their 
proponents argued that they offered benefits to the consumer in terms of flavour and 
colour. Furthermore, firmer GM tomatoes required fewer energy inputs in processing to 
thicken into paste with the consequence of reducing the cost of the product to a couple 
of pence less than its competitors. 
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Initially the paste was accepted by consumers and sold very well. By 1997 
Safeway announced that it had sold three-quarter of a million tins of OM tomato paste, 
that it was outselling its conventional rivals and in control of approximately 60% of the 
canned tomato market. It appeared that Zeneca and the supermarkets had found an open 
market for OM products, and industry looked at the successes of OM tomato paste with 
great optimism for the future of OM food products. 
However, by July 1999 the party was over, and the last stocks of OM tomato 
paste were cleared from the supermarket shelves. Public opinion had swung against the 
use of genetic teclmologies in food production. Facing increased pressure from the 
consuming public, both Safeway and Sainsbury's rapidly altered their stances on 
genetically modified organisms. Where in 1996 labels and supporting pamphlets 
proudly extolled the virtues of OM technologies, by 1999 supermarkets were starting to 
pronounce foods as being "OMO (genetically modified organism) free." Voices 
opposing OM foods gained increasing credence and the public were perceived to be 
sceptical of the food industry, government regulations and scientific promises of safety. 
Facing this opposition, the supermarkets made the decision to pull back from their 
support of OM foods. As of Summer 2003, Sainsbury's, Safeway, Tesco's and Iceland 
have all adopted policies which seek to eliminate OM ingredients - primarily OM maize 
and soya - from their own product brands in response to what they conceive as 
"overwhelming customer concern."6 
The Life Industry 
The reversal of fortune experienced by Safeway's and Sainsbury's OM tomato 
purees are indicative of the more general rise and fall of the agricultural biotechnology 
industry. In the late 1980s and early 1990s industry was highly optimistic that 
biotechnology would provide the scientific basis for a new generation of commercial 
products and economic prosperity. It proposed a life-sciences model of industry, which 
Sainsbury, Sainsbury's position on GM food. 
http://www.sainsbul).s.co. uk! gm/main/asp 
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focussed corporate interests around innovations in agricultural technologies as opposed 
to the generation of specific markets. Labelled the "life industry" this strategy 
combined a variety of product areas including agriculture (e.g. seed companies), food 
additives, pharmaceuticals and chemical fertilizers & pesticides. Corporations either 
ventured out into new biotech based enterprises themselves, or sought to capture market 
position through commercial acquisition. For example, between 1996 and 1998 
Monsanto, looking to gain control of the seed market, acquired Monsoy, Asgrow, 
Holden's Foundation Seeds, segments of Cargill's international seed operations and 
DEKLAB genetics. 
The first commodities produced out of the life-sciences model were directed 
towards agriculture and crop protection systems. These included transgenic varieties of 
com, canola, soy and cotton which were engineered to be either herbicide tolerane, or 
resistant to pests8. The companies argued then, as they do today, that these technologies 
allow farmers to control weeds and pests more efficiently with fewer external inputs. 
Farmers, for example, could replace the employment of several different herbicides and 
pesticides with single products tailored to the GM crop being planted. In many 
countries the incorporation of these crop technologies has been widely accepted, 
foremost amongst which are the United States, Argentina and Canada. 
By 2000 it was clear that these successes were quickly being off-set in the UK by 
the British public's reluctance to accept foods containing GMOs, and a growing distrust 
of the companies standing behind their development (Gaskell et aI., 2002). The 
corporations composing the life-industry were not held up as the paragons of progress as 
they imagined themselves to be, but were increasingly seen as brash, profit driven and 
forcing technologies on society without public approval. In promoting agricultural 
Herbicide tolerant crops allow farmers to use broad-spectrum chemical herbicides which kill a wide 
range of plants with the exception of those carrying a tolerance gene. This technology has allowed 
companies, such as Monsanto, to link their commercial chemical and seed interests. Monsanto, for 
example, markets herbicide resistant crop varieties as "Roundup Ready" which are marketed in 
conjunction with the companies popular "Roundup" herbicides. 
Insect resistant crops contain transgenes which enable plants to produce toxins targeted at specific insect 
pests. 
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biotechnology the corporations spoke 
ofJeeding the world, of providing 
'Food, Health, Hope9' and providing 
security in a context of self-
diagnosed environmental insecurity 
(Levi dow, 1996: pp. 57-59). 
However, in the media, with their 
attention increasingly held by 
organisations such as Greenpeace 
and Friends of the Earth (FOE), a 
disjunctive view of GM agriculture 
was becoming evident. A series of 
uncompromising stories developed 
which attached a rhetoric of 
pollution, contamination and 
monstrosity to biotechnology. 
Technologies which produced plants 
with sterile seeds in order to protect 
Will it take a miracle 
to solve the world's hunger problems? 
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Figure 3 - A heavily criticized advertisement 
from Monsanto displaying a stock of com 
growing in a desert. Image reproduced from 
Levidow, 1996. 
corporate property rights were seen as immoral and branded as 'terminator 
technologies/D.' Food products which were found to contain GM ingredients were 
9 
'Food, Health, Hope ' was the moto adopted by Monsanto throughout the company's attempt to promote 
itself as a 'life-sciences' industry. Viewed with skepticism by the public and derided by opponents of 
biotechnology, the motto was later dropped and replaced by the less controversial slogan of ' imagine.' 
10 
This label was coined in 1998 by the Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI), now the ETC 
Group (Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration), a non-governmental organization 
working in the area of agricultural, development and indigenous rights. So-called 'Terminator' 
technologies use genetic engineering techniques to create plants which produce sterile seeds. The purpose 
of which is to force farmers to buy new seeds each year instead of storing and replanting some seeds from 
the previous years harvest. Corporations have been interested in these technologies as they not only 
provide a stable and perennial market, but also offer greater control over the licensing and patenting of the 
tec1U1ology. Similar to ' terminator ' technologies, ' traitor ' technologies refer to crops which require 
farnlers to apply an external chemical inducer to their crop to switch on or off a plant s genetic traits. 
Both of these technologies have received little support and created considerable scorn about the overeager 
profit motivations and hubris of the corporations involved in their development. For more information 
refer to the ETC Group website: http ://www.etcgroup.org 
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labelled 'contaminated J or imaginatively described as 'Frankenfoodsll' 
As described above, over a very short space of time agricultural biotechnology 
had become a topic of political contention amongst the wider British public. Where in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s the development of GM technologies in agriculture went 
forward largely unnoticed and unhindered, by the end of the 1990s the 'life-industry' 
was coming under intense pressure and scrutiny. The so-called 'miracles' (ref. Figure 3) 
offered by genetics and the possibilities afforded by modem agricultural systems were 
being viewed sceptically. The life-industry, at the very least, had lost the opening battles 
of a public relations war over the rhetoric of agricultural biotechnol<}gy. 
The effects on industry were dramatic. Only a few short years after embracing 
the 'genetic revolution' and the life-industry model, Monsanto, the most active and vocal 
proponent of agricultural biotechnology found its stock prices plummeting and saw its 
reputation tarnished. This occurred despite the economic successes the company was 
experiencing through their pharmaceutical subsidiary Searle. With the pharmaceutical 
industry going through a period of rapid consolidation, Searle was a valuable commodity 
and on December 19,2000 Monsanto announced it would merge with Pharmacia & 
Upjohn to form the new pharmaceutical giant "Pharmacia." Monsanto was reduced to 
being the parent company's agricultural subsidiary and quickly sought to retreat from the 
public spotlight12. The company subsequently dropped their slogan of "Food, Health, 
Hope" and further sought to reform its image through the creation of a new corporate 
pledge. The once brash and uncompromising multi-national corporation (Jones, 2000) 
devoted itself to becoming a more respectful, open and transparent company. Monsanto 
promised to be more attentive to public concerns, to work towards gaining public 
approval of new technologies instead of attempting to force products into the 
marketplace, and to emphasise the welfare of growers (both in developed and developing 
II 
1. Hardy, "The Prime Monster," The Mirror, February 16, 1999: p.l 
12 
In August 2002, Monsanto once again became a fully separate and independent company when 
Pharmacia having stripped the company of its pharmaceutical assets distributed its remaining shares of the 
company to their shareholders. 
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contexts) above corporate profits13. 
The bold promises of agricultural genetics and the life-sciences industry model 
had lost their lustre in only a few short years. In 1997 Robert Shapiro, CEO of 
Monsanto at the time, gave an interview to the Harvard Business RevieH' in which he 
predicted that biotechnology, alongside information technologies, would revolutionize 
global society. He promised that the life-sciences would provide sustainable and 
environmentally friendly systems of agriculture, ensure the increased welfare for farmers 
around the world and make a gigantic step forward in solving world hunger. However, 
as Leiss states: 
"Less than three years after the Harvard Business Review interview had 
appeared, both Robert B. Shapiro's bold corporate vision and the 
corporation itself in which it was to be embodied had been shipwrecked 
on the shoals of a risk controversy he neither anticipated nor understood." 
(Leiss, 2001: p.20) 
Is the Controversy Closed? 
The failure to gain public support, or maintain consumer acquiescence, for GM 
foods along with the fading of the life-sciences model constitute substantial stumbling 
blocks for the future of agricultural biotechnology. However, they do not suggest a 
closure of controversies over new agricultural technologies. If belief in the life-sciences 
model and the initial promise of industry's first forays into the marketplace have faded, 
belief in the commercial potentials of genetic engineering in agriculture has not. Plans 
to market herbicide resistant crops are still going ahead with a series of farm-scale 
evaluations being conducted by industry and the British government to test the effects of 
growing these crops on biodiversity and the environment. For many, these farm-scale 
evaluations mark one last hurdle to be cleared before GM crops can be grown 
commercially in the UK14 . Moreover, industry has begun the push to create a more 
13 
Monsanto. The New Monsanto Pledge. 
I.?ttp://www.monsanto.com!monsanto/about-us/monsanto '-pledge/default.html 
The FSEs and the expectations which surround them will be covered in detail in Chapters Seven and 
Eight.. 
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marketable, and what it sees as a more acceptable, 'third generation' (refer to Appendix 
B) of GM products. These include edible vaccines, cancer preventing vegetables, and 
high nutritional foods. All of which are touted as offering very real benefits to the 
British consumer. Furthermore, despite being largely rejected in Europe, GM crops-
particularly canola and soy - are already being grown around the world with the 
situation likely soon to be exacerbated with the introduction of staple crops such as GM 
wheat and sugarcane. With no regulation keeping GM ingredients out of processed 
foods and no current labelling laws compelling retailers to identify these products, most 
Britons are likely -already regular consumers of some GMfood products. Likewise, the 
use ofGM animal feeds is increasingly common outside of Europe and the subject of 
growing contestation. Finally, although often understated, it is important to remember 
that agriculture is not limited to growth of food products. Slow growing turfgrass, 
nicotine free tobacco, trees engineered with reduced lignin to facilitate the recovery of 
wood pulp, and agricultural crops designed to produce biodegradable plastic polymers 
are all in the biotechnology pipeline. 
With the development of genetic technologies in agriculture still very much 
alive, the controversy over their commercialization and implementation is likely to 
persist, at least in the short term. Certainly the questions which have troubled those 
wishing to bring a GM revolution to agriculture persist. As for the life-industry, 
although it is clear that the progressive promises attached to this model have faded, the 
biotechnology sector continues to look to second and third generations of products with 
an eye on potential commercial successes. 
Science as Political Hub 
Science has been a central component in the way in which the debate over new 
agricultural technologies has been framed. Certainly many of the debate issues 
concerning risk, such as the consequences of GM foods on human health, or the 
environmental effects of GM cropping, would appear to be just the sort of questions 
which might be best addressed by scientific expertise and scientific institutions. Indeed, 
the development of the technology under the influence of the public controversy has 
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meant that the risks and benefits of applying biotechnology to agriculture have been 
heavily scrutinized. As several respondents suggested in interview, such inordinately 
close inspection has been unprecedented in the agricultural seed industry. Moreover, 
despite this scrutiny, no decisive scientific picture of the benefits and risks of 
agricultural biotechnology exists. The science of agricultural biotechnology is, in other 
words, as much the subject of contestation and controversy as the larger political terrain 
in which it is embedded. 
The fact that debates over new agricultural technology have been characterized 
by uncertainty anEl- scientific contestation and not immutable facts is- in and of itself 
nothing out of the ordinary (e.g. Beck, 1992). Nor is society likely to find these routine 
uncertainties necessarily or particularly alarming. After all, as one senior research 
scientist stated during an interview "the scientific method is based on uncertainty" 
(Participant U). Science, slhe argued was characterized by the disputation of findings, 
controversy and the continual rejection and renewal of scientific findings (refer also to 
Nowotny et aI., 2001: pp. 1-3). Early sociologists of science make just this point by 
challenging determinant conceptions of science and arguing that scientific knowledge is 
open to continuous, and as Kuhn (1962) argued, sometimes revolutionary changes in 
how we understand our world. 
However, where scientific controversies might be fought out within the confines 
of the discipline on a day-to-day basis, the scientific controversies over agricultural 
biotechnology have been fought out in the open. An analysis of the social and cultural 
meanings of these scientific controversies will be discussed in length in Chapter Six. 
The following discussion describes some of the scientific debates involved in the GM 
controversy and examines the responses they provoked. In particular, the scientific and 
political hubs discussed below underline the importance of issues of risk and science in 
building support or opposition to new agricultural technologies. 
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Pusztai's Potatoes, Monarch Butterflies, and Super Weeds 
Specifically, several key scientific / risk stories, or hubs as they will be referred 
to here, have become central elements of the context in which the politics of ne\\" 
agricultural technologies is taking place. These scientific cases are not of crucial 
importance in and of themselves as they are not likely to provide the key scientific 
evidence which would allow a verdict on the riskiness of biotechnology to be 
determined. However, using the term hub places attention on the importance of these 
cases in serving as" focal points around which the politics of new agricultural 
technologies have developed. Each of these hubs has been well documented in the 
media, become key articles of the opposition platform against biotechnology and forced 
responses from the pro-GM scientific and industrial communities. 
One key hub involved the controversial work and conclusions put forward by Dr. 
Arpad Pusztai. In 1995 Dr. Pusztai, funded by the then Scottish Office of Agriculture, 
Environment and Fisheries Department, began working on the development of a 
scientific risk assessment of the impact of GM foods on human health. With 
considerable expertise in the field, Dr. Pusztai designed a series of experiments to test 
the effect of snowdrop bulb lectin - a naturally occurring plant toxin which protects 
plants from insects - on the health of rats. Previous research had suggested that rats fed 
with the lectin showed no adverse reactions resulting from the ingestion of the toxin. 
However, when potatoes which had the lectin genes inserted into their genome were fed 
to rats he recorded what he describes as a series of "unexpected results" (Pusztai, 2002). 
Firstly, the potatoes were not seen to clearly exhibit the insect resistant properties, 
particularly against aphids, that were expected. Secondly, and more worrying for 
Pusztai, the research results suggested that, when the lectin gene was expressed in 
potatoes, the safety of the toxin was called into question. In particular, the researchers' 
initial results, published in The Lancet (Ewen & Pusztai, 1999), created concern about 
the potential risks of eating GM potatoes on animal metabolism, organ development and 
the immune system. Hazarding a guess as to why this might have been the case, Pusztai 
put forward the hypothesis that the results might be explained by a situation in which the 
transferred genes landed in different parts of the potato genome, thus altering the 
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expression of those genetic traits (Pusztai, 2002: p.72). Pusztai's research, thus, called 
into question both the precision of genetic engineering techniques and the safety of the 
process in food products. 
Also concerned with the risks associated with GM agriculture, this time in 
regards to the environment, researchers at Cornell University began investigating the 
consequences of GM crop planting on species welfare and biodiversity. Under the 
direction of Dr. John Losey, the Cornell research group was interested in the effects of 
the widespread cultivation of insect resistant crops on non-target insect species in the 
wider agricultural-environment. In particular, they were interested in whether or not the 
cultivation of Bt maize, a widely grown commodity crop in the US, created any risk to 
the monarch butterfly - a species which, although not endangered, is increasingly the 
focus of conservation efforts in North America and is publicly popUlar. In their own 
words, they found that the "larvae of the monarch butterfly, Danaus plexipus, reared on 
milkweed leaves dusted with pollen from Bt com, ate less, grew more slowly and 
suffered higher mortality than larvae reared on leaves dusted with untransformed com 
pollen or on leaves without pollen." (Losey et aI., 1999). Losey's research thus provides 
a second scientific account of the potential risks of new agricultural technologies. 
More recently a series of studies in the Americas has focussed public attention on 
scientific debates about horizontal gene transference - the conveyance of genetic 
modifications in commercial GM crops to native landraces of the same species through 
the spread of pollen. One potential consequence of horizontal gene transfer is that native 
species would gain the same resistant characteristics as their commercial cousins, thus 
creating what have been popularly referred to as 'super-weeds.' Dr. Allison Snow at the 
University of Ohio has recently presented research which she suggests reveals the 
dangers of the flow of modified genes from pesticide resistant sunflowers to native 
species. This research found that transferring the Bt trans gene to wild landraces, not 
only gave the modified plants insect resistant properties, but as a result dramatically 
increased seed yields as well (Snow et aI., 2003). Dr. Snow's findings thus heightened 
growing concerns about the plant's potential proliferation as a weed. 
Another source of unease in regards to the pollen transfer of modified genetic 
material pertains to the impact of transference on species diversity. The concern is that 
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the spread of modified genetic materials amongst native land races will undermine 
species biodiversityl5 in the agricultural environment. For example, in l'vlexico, home to 
many native maize species as well as even more primitive maize varieties such as 
teosinte, considerable concern has been raised about the potential for these species to 
horizontally acquire the genetic traits of GM com. In November 2001, microbiologists 
Ignacio Chapela and David Quist of the University of California Berkley produced 
research which seemingly gave credence to these fears. They reported the "presence of 
introgressed transgenic DNA constructs in native maize landraces grown in remote 
mountains in Oax-aca, Mexico" (Chapela and Quist, 2001). 
Biodiversity loss, envisioned loosely as an 'umbrella term' for describing 
nature's variety (Hannigan, 1995: p.146), is perceived as much more than an 
environmental risk, but one which could potentially hold severe economic and social 
consequences. For example, it is from this diversity that today's commercial crops have 
originated and are enabling modem agricultural systems to produce highly efficient and 
resilient crops. More worrying, many cultures around the world are dependent in crop 
diversity in generating their own livelihoods. As Vandana Shiva persuasively makes the 
case, high yielding monoculture crop systems have proven to be fully inadequate in 
meeting the multiple needs of the populations of the South. She reminds us that rice is 
not just a grain, but also provides straw for thatching, mat-making and fertilizer, fodder 
for livestock, bran for fish ponds and husk for fuel (Shiva, 1993: pp.4S). Shiva 
summarizes what she identifies as the consequence of biodiversity loss in no uncertain 
terms: 
15 
"Biodiversity erosion starts as a chain reaction. The disappearance of a 
species is related to the extinction of innumerable other species with which 
it is inter-related through food webs and food chains, and about which 
humanity is totally ignorant. The crisis of biodiversity is not just a crisis of 
the disappearance of species ... It is, more basically, a crisis that threatens the 
life-support systems and livelihoods of millions of people in Third World 
countries" (Shiva, 1993: p.69) 
Dharam Ghai, makes a more definitive statement in defming biodiversity "as the variability of life in all 
forms, levels and combinations - not the sum of ecosystems, species and genetic material, but rather the 
variability in and among them." (Ghai, 1996: p.i). 
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A Struggle for Public Opinion 
Although, the research involved in several of these cases originated in the United 
States where crops where GM crops are in commercial use, in the UK, public interest 
and a heated political debate flourished around these hubs. In a context in which risk is 
an increasingly prevalent part of the political landscape, these studies attached an 
element of uncertainty and the possibility of hazards - on human health, environmental 
well-being and socio-economic welfare - to agricultural biotechnology. Consequently in 
the struggle for public opinion, research findings hinting at risk wer€ either adopted as 
support for opposition platfonns, or vociferously attacked by proponents of the 
technology. 
For example, the environmental lobby has frequently hyped such cases and 
adopted the research findings as conclusive evidence of the risks posed by GM foods and 
GM crops. Moreover, the potential of these cases to demonstrate risk has been used to 
support wider claims against the viability of intensive agricultural systems and the 
corporate structures behind their development. For example, on November 28,2001, a 
day before Chapela and Quist had their research letter published in Nature, Friends of 
the Earth (FOE) issued a press release applying their own discourse of environmental 
threat to the study. Entitled "Wild Maize Contaminated with GMOs," FOE advanced the 
need to halt what they tenned as the "reckless experiment" of growing genetically 
modified maize in an environment which is home to the many wild landraces from 
which today's commercial crops have been developed. Pete Riley, Senior Campaigner 
for FOE's Real Foods campaign, put it this way in the press release: 
16 
"These findings are deeply disturbing and highlight the huge gamble the 
biotech industry is taking with nature. The long-tenn implications of 
allowing GM crops to contaminate wild plants are unknown and will be 
almost impossible to reverse. This is why Governments around the world 
should halt the dangerous experiment of growing GM crops outside."16 
Friends of the Earth. "Press Release: Wild Maize Contaminated with GMOs." November 28,2001. 
-92-
On the other side of the debate, critical responses to each of the above cited 
scientific cases appeared immediately upon their release. Members of the pro-
biotechnology scientific and industrial communities mocked and berated the scientific 
conclusions of these studies. Moreover, each case was dismissed with an eye-opening 
degree of vehemence and in an overtly pejorative manner. A common strategy by the 
pro-GM crop camp was to treat the offending studies with contempt and to deride the 
scientists involved. 
Dr. Pusztai, for example, was ridiculed for exaggerating the findings of his 
research in the media, had his scientific credibility and objectivity renounced, and his 
data rebutted by the scientific establishment (refer to Levidow, 2002; Pusztai, 2002). 
Following some early comments to the media about the potential implications of his 
study, a tremendous amount of pressure was placed on Dr. Pusztai and the Rowett 
Research Institute (RRl) where he was employed. Most notably, heavy criticism came 
from the UK's prestigious Royal Society (RS) which had convened a special committee 
to investigate Pusztai's research and conclusions. The RS subsequently produced a 
damning report (1999) which declared Pusztai's findings 'non-significant' on the basis 
that the research was based on an inadequate methodology. Surprisingly, the Royal 
Society's investigation of the data took place before it had been subj ect to the standard 
practice of peer review17. The authors were thus never given the opportunity to respond 
to the criticism of their peers by editing their conclusions, before being made the subject 
of intense criticisms. Clearly concerned about the Royal Society's circumvention of 
ordinary scientific practice, Richard Horton editor of The Lancet published an editorial 
comment entitled "Genetically modified foods: 'absurd' concern or welcome dialogue?" 
alongside Pusztai and Ewen's research letter. In this comment Horton states: 
17 
"Berating critics rather than engaging them - and criticising reports of 
research, as the Royal Society did with the Pusztai data, before those data 
were reviewed and published in the proper way - will only intensify public 
scepticism about science and scientists." (Horton, 1999: p. 1315) 
Ewen and Pusztai's paper was scrutinized by no less than 6 referees, five of whom supported its 
publication after three rounds of revisions (Pusztai, 2002: p.73). 
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Many of Pusztai's supporters interpreted the Royal Society's possibly 
overzealous attacks on Pusztai as an attempt to bury the connotations of risk they affixed 
to GM agriculture and stem the impact of the studies on public opinion. Such concerns 
were seen to be given further credence when, as a result of the pressure being put on 
them by scientific establishment, the RRI suspended Pusztai, who shortly thereafter 
retired from the institute. 
While the Pusztai affair has received the most public and vociferous treatment 
each of the other scientific hubs has been subject to similar attacks. Chapela and Quist 
have had their data critiqued, as well as their personal motives and qualities as scientists 
(Lepkowski, 2002; Metz and Futterer, 2002; Kaplinsky et aI, 2002). The same is true for 
Losey, who although being somewhat more cautious in presenting his results, has had 
the implications of his findings repeatedly downplayed by those in the agri-biotech 
industry. In the quotation below, Cropgen - an association of 'independent' 
biotechnologists funded by industry who have picked up the gauntlet of defending 
agricultural biotechnology in the media and with a mind towards influencing public 
opinion - are dismissive of Losey's findings. They infer that, although Losey offers a 
contribution to our scientific understanding of agricultural biotechnology and 
biodiversity, his study represents an extreme case - something unlikely to occur under 
normal circumstances - and one that doesn't paint a picture of the full context in which 
agricultural biotechnology is being applied: 
18 
"The laboratory experiment with the Monarch caterpillars was designed to 
show what might happen in the worst imaginable situation. Such a 
'worst-case' scenario is a bit like crash-testing a car: it is not intended that 
cars as a rule should crash but we have to know what happens if they do. 
Although Monarch caterpillars would not normally choose to eat maize 
pollen in the wild, in the experiment they were encouraged to eat high levels 
of pollen from GM maize containing Bt toxin. Not surprisingly, some ofthe 
caterpillars died - but remember that current agriculture uses insecticides 
which kill caterpillars and other insects outright regardless of whether or not 
they are pests."18 
Cropgen. What about Monarch Butterflies? Isn't there evidence to show that they have been adversely 
affected by GM crops? Http://www.cropgen.org 
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Again, in the case of Snow's research into the risks of geneflow relating to the 
production of superweeds, the response from industry has been decisive. With her 
findings extensively covered in the press and adopted by the environmental lobby, Dr. 
Snow's research had placed considerable political pressure on Pioneer Hi-Bred the 
company behind the development of GM sunflowers. As a consequence the company 
voluntarily pulled back from attempts to seek commercial growing licenses for the plants 
in the US. However, as a further response Pioneer Hi-Bred revoked Dr. Snow's rights to 
use the trans gene which they were working with. This action has elicited criticisms that 
industry has attempted to preempt any further findings which could prove damaging for 
the industry as a whole (Dalton, 2002). 
It is fair to say, that out of this intense and heated controversy, there was no clear 
scientific picture being relayed to the public about the potential risks of GM agriculture. 
For example, each of the above cited cases received extensive coverage in the British 
media, and in the UK broadsheet press in particular. This coverage has unsurprisingly 
been contradictory. Where The Guardian firmly offers an affirmation of Pusztai's 
findings by proclaiming "Food Scandal Exposed"19, The Independent equally decisively 
states "Scientists revolt at publication of 'flawed' GM study"20. Supporting the 
perception of risk posited by Losey's research The Times and The Independent ran 
headlines which decry "Modified maize 'killing butterflies"'21 and "US butterflies killed 
by modified pollen provide key evidence of risks"22. Contradictorily, The Irish Times 
provocatively posits that "Reports of Monarch's Death Greatly Exaggerated"23, a 
19 
Gillard, M.S., L. Flynn and A.Rowell. "Food scandal exposed" The Guardian. February 12, 1999. 
20 
Connor, Steve. "Scientists Revolt at Publication of 'Flawed' GM Study." The Independent. October 11, 
1999. 
21 
Hawkes, N. and N. Nuttall. "Modified maize 'killing butterflies.'" The Times. May 20,1999. 
22 
Conner, Steve. "US butterflies killed by modified pollen. Butterlies provide key evidence of risks." The 
Independent. May 20, 1999. 
23 
O'Sullivan, Kevin. "Reports of Monarch's Death Greatly Exagerated." The Irish Times. November 22. 
1999. 
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headline which Monsanto proudly posted on the corporation's website. Likewise, in 
reference to Chapella's findings in Mexico The Guardian reported that "GM pollutes 
vital gene pool in Mexico"24 while The Times reported that the "Attack on safety of G~l 
crops was unfounded"25. 
It would be therefore be more accurate to see these scientific debates as 
cementing impressions of uncertainty than either clearly confirming or denying the risks 
of GM. Thus, the political activities around these scientific hubs underscore that the 
politics of risks are as much about the potential for risk as they are about the actual risks 
themselves. It is the struggles over these potentials which further suggests that techno-
scientific controversies need to be understood in other ways than contestations over 
facts, but as struggles over public support for, or against, GM agriculture. As this 
section has begun to suggest, this includes struggles for support of genetic technologies, 
or food products, but in the institutions and actors involved in these debates (e.g. Nelkin, 
1992). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to shed some light on the social and political context 
which has accompanied the development and attempted commercialization of 
agricultural biotechnology. By addressing this context the analysis provided in this 
thesis is directed in several ways. Firstly, this chapter looked at the early ambivalence 
about the development of GM. When the issue did come to head in the second half of 
the 1990s, participants placed the politics of new agricultural technologies within an 
evolving and volatile political context of social debate, and agricultural debate 
specifically. Secondly, this chapter provided a general history of the commercial 
development of the technology, outlining the early successes and subsequent failures of 
24 
Brown, Paul. "GM maize pollutes vital gene pool in Mexico." The Guardian. April 19,2002. 
25 
Henderson, Mark. "Attack on safety ofGM crops was unfounded." The Times. AprilS, 2002 
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the 'life-industry' in its attempts to create a market for GM agriculture and GM foods. 
This history highlighted the volatility of the topic and draws attention to the importance 
of the development of public skepticism in the safety of the technology, and the 
revolutionary promises of progress industry attempted to attach to it. In section two, the 
importance of several key scientific loci were identified. Cases such as Pusztai's study 
of GM potatoes on animal metabolism underlined the importance of science in 
establishing a hub around which debates over agricultural biotechnology are being 
fought. At these hubs the politics of GM technologies in agriculture has not been 
enclosed within scientific boundaries. Rather as a centre of political- activity these 
scientific events have attracted varied and vociferous debate, merging scientific risk 
debates with broader notions of social and enviromllental risk. 
In conclusion, together the .three histories presented here suggest that the politics 
of agricultural biotechnology cannot be reduced to the inherent qualities of the 
technology itself - that GM crops and foods are necessarily good or bad, risky or safe. 
Rather, new agricultural technologies and their risks are events which, despite their 
scientific and technological focus, are part of a broader political arena. The issues at 
play in this arena are as varied as they are often intangible. The politics of risk involve 
contestations over the delineation of hazard, but also over expertise, appropriate forms of 
governance, social organization and human-natural relations. As a factor of the breadth 
and width of these politics, contestations over risk are cultural by nature. Such politics 
involve diverging conceptions of appropriate social and natural relations - the subjects 
of a normative politics as described in Chapter One. The following two chapters address 
two key areas in which these politics are revealed: first in relation to contestations 
involving the position of the life-industry in the debate, and secondly through a 
discussion of the role of science in society. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE LIFE-INDUSTRY, CONFLICTING 
PERCEPTIONS OF RISK, BENEFIT AND CHOICE 
"We're tal~ing about a massive restructuring. We're talking about 
essentially getting rid of corporate capitalism. That's what it all comes 
down to at the end of the day. That's what the whole GM campaign is 
about." (Participant I). 
"I think there are others that have far more sinister political agendas out 
there. There are a number of things that came together in this controversy 
in terms of the history of human development. One obviously was the East 
vs. West system with the coming down of the Berlin Wall. [Another was] 
the collapse of things like the Communist Party in Britain. That kind of 
culture moved into different camps. I think there has definitely been a shift 
in the spectrum of some of the pressure groups as a result of that." 
(Participant 0) 
Introduction 
In this chapter the politics of new agricultural technologies will be addressed 
through an analysis of the contested position of the life-industryl in the innovation and 
shaping of agricultural biotechnology. Overall, the question posed here asks how the 
politics of new agricultural technology, and the politics of its potential risks, relate to 
normative contestations over the role of the life-industry in contemporary British 
society? In response to this question the following discussion delineates a debate which, 
although concerned with issues of risk, is also situated within social and political debates 
The life-industry, to recall from Chapter Four, is an unofficial consortium of corporations who, during the 
1990s, engaged in a strategy of convergence around a variety of product related markets. These market 
areas included agricultural and seed products, food additives, pharmaceuticals and chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides. 
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over the extension of global corporatism into the agricultural and food industries. Using 
data derived from a series of in-depth interviews, these debates are presented as a 
dialogue between those who oppose new agricultural technologies and those who 
support them. On the one hand, this dialogue consists of controversies over 
technological risk and how best to protect society from those potential hazards. On the 
other hand, these politics of risk are further addressed in relation to contestations over 
nonnative values which reflect opposing visions of society and social progress as 
expressed by participants. 
In line with the interview data, three themes will be discussed. Firstly, the 
research data is applied to a discussion of the way in which participants debated concerns 
over the increasing predominance of the corporate actor in agricultural development and 
food production. From this more generalized discussion, the analysis is directed towards 
the ways in which participants perfonned these debates in weighing the risks of new 
agricultural technologies against their potential benefits. In the third section of this 
chapter, I explore the extent to which the politics of new agricultural technologies and 
the life-industry involve contestations over democratic rights of choice and consent. 
Risk, Blame and Trust 
The two quotations at the top of this chapter come from interviews with 
stakeholders at opposite ends of the debate over GM crops and foods in the United 
Kingdom. They serve to give some sense of the breadth of the politics involved in this 
dispute. The first statement is an extract from an extended harangue by a vocal opponent 
of agricultural biotechnology. The second statement comes from a plant ecologist and 
outspoken proponent of the use of genetic technologies in agriculture. It is drawn from a 
provocative series of comments in which the participant described the debate over GM 
crops and foods as an unwarranted attempt by a vocal opposition to "knock the system" 
and "create unrest." At the core of both of these comments are familiar struggles over 
the material and ideological driving forces behind an emerging global society. The 
activist, challenging agricultural biotechnology is presented as a task which implies the 
need to challenge corporate capitalism. For the corporate spokesperson advocating the 
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2 
3 
technology likewise implies the need to defend the corporate development of science and 
technology from the "sinister" motives of opposition "pressure groups." 
The two statements above stand out in that they reflect an especially polarized 
and semantically evocative account of the debate over GM agriculture. However, 
although less abrupt in tone, similar statements were made by almost all of the interview 
participants. For example, a former Agriculture Minister and still active Member of 
Parliament underscored the primacy of the globalization debate in generating public 
opposition to agricultural biotechnology (Participant L)2. Likewise, a crop scientist and 
representative of apro-GM lobby group described the opposition to GMOs as a strategic 
move against the multinational corporations comprising the life-industry (Participant 
G)3. Others posited that the politics of GM crops and foods is not only a reaction against 
globalization and the growth of the life-industry, but also reflects anti-American values 
and the unease of the growing influence of American corporate capitalism in Europe 
(Participants J & Y). 
The degree to which participants related the politics of GM technologies with 
unrest over the emerging role of American corporate capitalism and the life-industry in 
British agriculture varied. For some participants this meant delineating debates over risk 
as secondary precipitations of the wider globalization debate. In other words, the debate 
over new agricultural technologies was seen as a debate only in proxy. As a 
consequence, to take the pro-GM position, opposition claims concerning risk and safety 
could be discounted, or undermined, due to their subordinate status in the debate. For 
example, some participants argued that the scientific attestations of hazard advanced by 
The participant states: "I think my own view at the moment is that, apart from the straight scientific argument, 
part of the reaction to globalization has been, for example, the reaction against genetically modified crops. 
This is because on all the science I've ever seen the risk factors of some awful thing happening to the nonnal 
biosphere is pretty low. I won't say there is no risk, there is always a risk, but the definable risk - 'is it going 
to threaten mankind's food supply?' - well, from what I've seen the answer is no." 
In response to a question asking why the environmental lobby had reacted against GM in the manner 
they had, the participant offered the following comment: . . 
"If you talk to them privately they are not against GM itself... they just don't like it being used the way It IS. 
They are really against multi-national companies, they're against capitalism and they see this as putting, 
agriculture more into the control of large multinationals. It's really part of the globalization [debate]. Of 
Course it has nothing to do with the science." (Participant G). 
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opposition activists could be discounted as a result of their links to the wider political 
debate. By becoming tied up with social and political debates, opposition science was 
derogated because it was perceived to have lots its objectivity. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, this was a common scientific argument raised against dissenting 
academics such as Pusztai (2002). Yet, for others, the politics of risk and the politics of 
corporate capitalism were not perceived as subordinate to one another, but inextricably 
linked. Activists, for example, described the potential risks of GM crops and foods as 
part and parcel of environmentally and socially intrusive models of agriculture they link 
to the life-industry: 
Notwithstanding the varied ways in which this political relationship is contested, 
the point to be underlined here is that whether castIng reprobation or support for GM 
agriculture, these arguments were often interwoven with a critique or defence of the 
preeminence of corporate models of development. Participants' accounts of the 
relationship between the politics of new agricultural technology and the role of the life-
industry, therefore, pose an important question. If global forms of social politics are 
inextricably linked with the politics of new genetic technologies in agriculture, what 
does this mean for how we understand the politics of risk and danger also attached to the 
technology? 
Risk, Blame and the Opposition of Moral Communities 
It is helpful at this point to refer back to the cultural theory of risk advanced by 
Mary Douglas in Chapter Three. To recall, Douglas theorizes that struggles over risk are 
part-and-parcel of "normative" struggles (Douglas, 1986b; 1992, pp. 43-44) over the 
types of societies we wish to live in. In this sense, contestations made in relationship to 
globalization, capitalism and the life-industry are united with struggles over 
technological risk by an overarching cultural politics occurring between conflicting 
moral communities. Douglas (1985) further characterizes this political context by 
suggesting that risk is best understood as the attribution of blame. Likewise, conflicts 
over the risks of agricultural biotechnology are best understood as moral judgements of 
social responsibility. Tansey, describing the strengths of Douglas' theoretical 
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framework, spells out the types of questions these ideas suggest for understanding the 
politics of genetically modified organisms (GMOs): 
"Risk becomes politicized not simply because it is a threat to ways oflife ... 
At whom is the finger of blame being pointed? Who is being held 
accountable? What is being rejected and what is being defended in 
particular collective social action? This implies that for issues such as 
genetically modified organisms, research that seeks to demonstrate the safety 
of the technology will not dissipate political opposition since protest is in 
defense of a moral boundary." (Tansey, 2003) 
Mindful of the types of statements which opened this chapter, responding to these 
questions focuses -analytical attention clearly on perceptions of the culpability of the life-
industry in generating novel risks to social and environmental well-being. The following 
discussion provides three examples of the types of arguments participants made 
involving issues of risk and blame in relation to agricultural biotechnology and the life-
industry. 
The first example comes from a self described 'GM crop decontaminator' and 
activist. With a history of campaign work involving whaling, nuclear development, 
global warming as well as a host of other issues, the participant joined the debate over 
agricultural biotechnology during the second half of the 1990s. This is precisely the 
point at which the controversy was reaching its hottest levels. As her/his following 
statement details, when asked what the issues were that drew her/him into the debate, the 
participant responded by stating that GM crops and foods may indeed produce novel 
risks, but that these hazards came from familiar sources. Herlhis comments describe GM 
agricultural products as an immediate threat and an overarching symbol of the types of 
issues the environmental lobby has traditionally engaged with. Risk, in this sense is a 
term which encapsulates both the participant's immediate anxieties about the technology 
(e.g., it will harm biodiversity) and the normative values about the type of society s/he 
supports. As the participant states, risks to human health and the environment are the 
same risks that threaten herlhis democratic values: 
"Take any issue in the world and it boils down to this. Someone at the 
middle who's out to make a fast buck at the expense of somebody else. 
Basically, these things are just symptoms ofthe disease. It just happens that 
GM is a more glaring example of the disease. It has been an amazing 
campaign and has included people from all sorts of political and ideological 
backgrounds. Whether it is people that are interested in civil rights, 
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~emocratic rights, environmentalists, consumer rights people or whatever, 
It has really pulled everybody together. It is such a scary campaign. It is 
such a significant threat to everything: human health, the environment, 
democratic rights. It is such a blatant example of everything that we 
campaign against. There is no real difference between these corporations 
and any other corporati ons ... It's the same game we're playing." (P artici pant 
I). 
A second participant advanced this same convergent perspective of risk when 
discussing her/his individual motivations for getting involved in the controversy. Like, 
the activist cited above, her/his concerns about agricultural biotechnology are immediate, 
but also relate to issues which have long provided the foundation o(the participant's 
politics. With a background in civil organizations extending more than 35 years, the 
participant's concerns come via a longstanding engagement with agricultural 
development projects. Although until recently reluctant to accept issues of risk and 
safety as part of her/his lobby, the participant clearly sees the ability to provide products 
which meet adequate safety standards as the responsibility of science and industry. 
Moreover, it is equally transparent in her/his comments that if s/he was ever to accept the 
use of genetic technologies in agricultural development that certain moral criteria must 
be met alongside standards of safety. Specifically, long-standing relations of inequality, 
exploitation and poverty associated with the life-industry and the peoples of the 
developing world must be broken. As the participant's following statement suggests, 
her/his support for agricultural biotechnology is likely to be contingent on how 
immediate issues of safety are negotiated with longer standing perceptions of justice and 
equality: 
"What was your main concern about agricultural biotechnology at the time 
you got involved? " 
"It was certainly not safety. It continues today to be much more concerned 
with ownership and control. Who is making decisions about technology? 
What kind of technologies are they going to focus on? What ones are they 
not going to focus on? Who is going to benefit? Who profits from it? That 
has always been our major focus ... " 
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"Would you say that is the same now?" 
"It is, although in the last five or six years the shock to us has been the safety 
questions which we thought were marginal we now recognize are not so. 
Many ofthe groups that we were not particularly impressed by we now have 
to agree that they have a point. We are not against genetically modified 
organisms in principle ... In the context of the technology, the belief is that 
these technologies should be used, that they should be developed and when 
the proper safety standards are developed to test things by and that it meets 
clear human needs, then it should be used in the field. But, when it meets 
those needs and when we know it is safe" (Participant Q). 
The statements of a campaign director at a large environmental NGO provide a 
third example of the relationship between issues of risk and a politics of blame. In 
her/his statement cited below, this participant outlines a commonly evoked criticism of 
agricultural biotechnology and the life-industry. Slhe accuses industry of failing to keep 
in touch with public interests, or intentionally overriding their concerns. Although 
individual technologies and corporations may stand out as of particular concern, herlhis 
critiques, like the two participants cited directly above, cast blame more widely. The 
culture of corporate development, s/he argues, is also to blame. As the participant 
suggests, the motivations behind life-industry models of agricultural development are 
being driven by an overarching concern for profit, with scant regard paid to whether new 
agricultural technologies are potentially beneficial or harmful to society: 
"[W]hat has happened is that the power of the corporates has enabled them 
to shape the food chain and shape research to their own end. Because they 
are fundamentally only answerable to shareholders, and shareholders are 
traditionally only interested in the dividend at the end of the year, then a lot 
of important questions have not been addressed." (Participant T). 
Although each of these three examples offers individual insights, they all make 
claims to risk in relation to allegations of blame. Risks, in other words, first challenge 
the acceptability of the technology and secondly question the institutions and more 
importantly the values driving the development of GM crops. 
However, before turning to a more detailed analysis of the various manifestations 
of these debates, it is first necessary to point out that Douglas' conceptualization of risk 
as blame is not limited to a discussion of dissenting positions alone. 
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Risk, Trust and the Life-Industry 
When referring to the position of those who have aligned themselves with 
industry in this debate it is helpful to speak not only of risk as blame, but also of its 
opposite - trust. In situations where blame is levelled against the life-industry, these 
circumstances can also be characterized as lacking of public trust or confidence in the 
life-industry. In this way, differentiating between blame and trust is a helpful means of 
analysing the political actions of participants in this debate. 
Several of-the pro-GM spokespersons interviewed worried that industry had lost 
the tnlst of the public in the 1990s when companies, such as Monsanto, belligerently 
pursued the commercialization of GM crops despite growing public concerns. As a 
consequence these participants see industry as having to fight an uphill battle to regain 
public trust in the technology and in the industry if it is to eventually succeed in 
commercializing GM crops and foods in Britain. Exacerbating these concerns, 
participants also worried that the NGO community, including large environmental 
organizations such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, had gained the public'S 
confidence over the same period. The task they see before them is, therefore, not only to 
regain the public's confidence, but in order to do so they realized that they would have to 
challenge the NGO's ability to speak for 'the public'. 
A public relations officer for a life science company was one participant who 
spoke at length about the need to reestablish a relationship of trust with the public. S/he 
pointed to the establishment of the Agricultural Biotechnology Council (ABC) - a 
coalition of six of the largest biotech companies in Europe4 - whose principal mandate is 
to engender public trust in biotechnology and the industry. The participant's comments 
outline an attempt to communicate more effectively with the public. This move reflects 
a trend in risk and public relations in post-BSE Britain which highlights the need for 
institutions to be more transparent and open in their communication with the pUblic. In 
this sense the ABC envisions communication as a means to fill what it sees as gaps in , 
the public's understanding of the risks and benefits ofGM crops and foods. Moreover, it 
4These are A ventis, BASF, Dow AgroSciences, DuPont, Monsanto and Syngenta. 
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is through these gaps in public knowledge, that the ABC perceives the NGO community s 
ability to generate and exploit public anxieties about GMOs. The committee thus 
describes the overall goal of communication as promoting "a fair debate on behalf of the 
UK agricultural biotechnology industry" (ABC, 2002). The participant details this 
project in the following statement: 
"The ABC report is mea culpa. It's an admission that the industry hasn' t 
communicated well in the past. The opponents of the technology have been 
much better communicators. They've been moving and shaking a lot better 
than we have ... There is research suggesting that big industry is the worst 
possible messenger. Weare the least trusted people. I can show you a slide 
which is all about trust [ref. Figure 2]. It has industry, government and 
regulators all labelled according to their levels of trust within industry being 
the least trusting. Then you get this 'circle of trust' which is essentially 
environmental groups, NGOs, the media and the public which have this circle 
of communication. NGOs are essentially seen as the guardians of the 
environment. They have no vested interests like big business in making 
profits and making money, although they have an interest in raising funds. 
The slide is a stark indication of the battle we have to actually try to wrest 
some of the ground away from these people." (participant Y) 
Although it is generally believed that transparency and open communication marks 
an improvement in the relationship between industry and the public, it is worth noting that 
social commentators have expressed some reservations about the sincerity and viability of 
such moves. For example, Grove-White et al. (1997) argue that unless assumptions 
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which view public 
knowledge as deficient in 
risk debates are avoided, 
communication strategies, 
such as those proposed by 
the ABC, may in fact further 
undermine public trust in 
industry. The authors state: 
"picturing trust as 
contributing to the goal of 
restored control, through 
the instrumental 
propagation of infonnation, actually implies a negation of the authentic spirit of trust 
relations themselves (ibid.: p.34). 
It is, therefore, important to note that although seeking to generate trust in 
agricultural biotechnology and the life-industry the ABC could potentially be 
exacerbating its problems. Where the comments of the GM opponents broaden notions 
of risk to include the moral responsibility of institutions alongside tec1mological 
hazards, the model of trust presented by the above comments obscure this relationship. 
Adopting a deficit model of expert-citizen relations, the ABC assumes that public 
apprehension about GM crops and foods stem from a lack of accurate infonnation about 
the technology. This position further implies that if the public is given more accurate 
infonnation about the risks and benefits of GM -crops that it will be persuaded to come 
around and side with industry. In this way trust is used as a way of reasserting the 
boundary between technological and social politics. Evaluations of the technology are 
in this way distanced from concerns about the corporate origins of GM -crops and foods 
and the role of these corporations in society. All questions of moral responsibilities are 
turned aside. As another scientist and corporate spokesperson argued, "we don't tend to 
get embroiled in world politics and issues like democracy" (Participant 0). 
Summary 
Through an analysis of stakeholder comments, this section has argued that the politics 
of new agricultural technologies are intertwined with global debates about corporate 
capitalism. Moreover, in line with the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis, this data 
has been presented in a fashion which neither reduces issues of risk to global politics, 
nor ignores them in favour of speaking solely in technological tenns. Instead, 
controversies involving risk have been presented in tenns of a cultural politics of blame 
and trust. In doing so, this argument has tied concerns over the hazards of GMOs to 
political struggles between opposing moral beliefs about the social benefits offered by 
GM agriculture, and the institutions behind its development. From this foundation it is 
now possible to tum to a more detailed account of how the politics of risk, blame and 
trust is contested in the debate over the use of genetic technologies in agriculture. 
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Contesting Risk and Benefit 
In the above section data was presented that suggested that risks in the debate 
over new agricultural technologies are not objectively given, but identified in relation to 
intense moral and cultural politics involving the legitimacy of the life-industry. Otway 
(1992, p. 223) notes that one important way in which risk and social perceptions of a 
technology may be further understood is in reference to "perceptions of its benefits, 
[and] the social and political outcomes associated with its use." Stated differently, how a 
technology is selected as risky (or not) and whether those risks are acceptable (or not) is 
closely linked with the visions of society and progress proposed by opposing moral 
communities. Therefore, it follows that we should -explore how participants ascribe risks 
to new agricultural technologies in relation to arguments about their potential benefits, as 
well as addressing the types of values embodied in these ascriptions. 
Biotech Generations 
A common point of contention in the debate over GM crops and foods is the 
relationship between the benefits agricultural biotechnology offers industry and its 
capacity to respond to public interests and contribute to wider social well-being. 
Participants, discussing the risks of agricultural biotechnology and whether it is worth 
pursuing, offered differing evaluations of the positive and negative aspects of the 
technology. This included benefits being proposed in relation to those crops now ready 
to reach commercial markets, but also the promised advantages agricultural 
biotechnology is proposed to offer in the future. Specifically, these discussions were 
raised in relation to what are commonly referred to as first, second and third generation 
OM technologies (Appendix B). 
First generation technologies consist of crops which have been genetically 
modified to be herbicide resistant or to express insecticide genes. These crops are 
designed to be cultivated in coordination with specific chemical regimes which are then 
sold alongside the seed licence. Chiefly, these crop technologies have been applied in 
cash crops such as soy bean, maize, rape seed, cotton and more recently in wheat and 
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sugar cane. For example, Monsanto now produces several Roundup Ready T\! crops, 
including cotton and maize. These crops have been engineered to allow plants to survive 
being sprayed with Monsanto's hugely prosperous Roundup variety of herbicides. It is 
worth noting that several of these crops are nearing commercial regulation in Europe and 
are also grown in numerous other countries around the world. 
Opponents of agricultural biotechnology unsurprisingly reject any pretensions of 
benefit ascribed to first generation GM crops. They argue that the benefits of these 
technologies are primarily directed towards the life-industry itself, its corporate 
shareholders and J3Dssibly to some farmers. Herbicide tolerant crops, for example, are 
seen to epitomize corporate values of greed and reflect the life-industry's detachment 
from the values and needs of the British people. In part, profits are derived from these 
crops through the direct sale of seeds and crop licenses to fanners. Additionally, 
corporations such as Monsanto have been able to use herbicide resistant crop species to 
encourage farmers to exclusively employ their profitable brands of chemicals. As one 
corporate spokesperson resentfully acknowledged, industry is seen "to be selling 
herbicide on the back of a GM technology" (Participant W). 
Similarly, opponents of the commercialization of GM crops and foods further 
argue that first generation technologies offer few discernible benefits to the British 
pUblic. If any benefits can be postulated, they are seen to be overly abstract. As a result, 
with only industry seen to benefit directly from the technology the attention of 
opponents has been focused on perceptions of risk. Thus in justifying their position 
against first generation technologies, these opponents asked why, if there are no agreed 
benefits of the technology for broader society, should anyone take any risk at all? These 
views are expressed in the following statement from a participant who is part of a 
campaign calling for a temporary moratorium on the commercialization of GM 
agricultural products. If, as s/he states, herlhis membership is going to accept the 
technology then the benefits to society will have to be concrete and easily discernible. 
Furthennore, unless those benefits can then be seen to outweigh any identifiable risks, 
future support for GM agriculture would not be forthcoming: 
"The problem with agricultural use at the moment, particularly in the UK, 
is that the consumer knows that there are no conceivable benefits to 
consumers from the crops that are being grown at the moment. It's quite 
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clear with rape, soya, and maize - the comrtlodity crops - that the benefits 
are going to be with industry and possibly, although possibly not, with the 
fanners that take it up ... People are very cautious of potential risks now, and 
for them to accept it as a benefit, that benefit will have to be shown to 
outweigh the potential risks that are being flagged-up." (Participant C) 
Proponents of first generation technologies were keen to counter these critiques. 
They argued that although they hoped herbicide tolerant and insect resistant crops would 
generate commercial benefits, they also saw these crops as generating substantial 
industrial, social and environmental benefits. By altering the "input" traits of plants, first 
generation technologies were described as able to increase productive outputs, while also 
reducing the number of chemical inputs applied to a crop. Using decreased amounts of 
better targeted herbicides and pesticides, proponents of the technology argued, would 
save fanners money and increase fann profitability. Furthennore, these practices would 
serve to protect both society and the environment from the well-documented risks of 
chemical usage. In the following excerpt from an interview with a crop scientists and 
industry spokesperson, the participant advances these claims, identifying agricultural 
biotechnology as a means of improving the quality of life for Britons. It is worth noting 
that the participant further suggests that these benefits are being offered at some risk to 
the corporation itself through an implied reduction in chemical sales: 
"Often people are ill-advised on the potential benefits that [first generation 
crops] could bring ... I'm not saying that putting a broad spectrum contact 
herbicide on genetically manipulated crops is always going to give you 
100% better weed control, but effectively in that situation you can reduce the 
amount of herbicides and the grams active ingredients you are applying. 
That is an example where it has cost us business, because we were selling 
products in other countries that were applying more grams active herbicides 
than spraying a herbicide resistant crop once ... Part ofthe challenge that the 
industry faces in linking crop protection and GM is asking where do they fit 
in tenns of the objectives of a better society. In reality all these things are 
being driven for economic benefits for everybody. Yes commercial 
companies are there and commercial companies only survive to make 
money. But, at the end of the day if they improve the quality oflife for all 
of us ... Some people would say 'hang-on' biotech selling chemicals is a 
disconnect. Well our attitude is that there is a role for both, we sell both and 
it's according to what gives the best improvement to quality oflife for all of 
us." (Participant W) 
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Looking beyond first generation GM crops, debates also encompass arguments 
about the potential future benefits of continuing innovation and development in 
agricultural biotechnology. For example, industry representatives routinely sought to 
outline the potential of applying genetics to agriculture by situating these innovations in 
a linear history of agricultural and technological development. A representative of the 
agrochemical and biotech industry makes this argument in the following statement. In it 
s/he distinguishes between benefit and need, suggesting that a technology does not have 
to directly address social needs to be envisioned as a positive contribution to society. 
Rather, benefit can be ascribed to a technology if it provides any degree of improvement 
in productivity, or environmental protection, when compared to its technological 
counterparts. In other words, s/he envisions that social needs can best be met through 
the gradual advancement of science and technology5, arguing that GM crops and foods 
should be further evaluated on this basis: 
"It's a question of how you define need ... I do think that it is the case that 
for a new technology to be accepted that there has to be some benefit 
demonstrated. Whether that equates to need is debatable. But, for example, 
in the chemical world with which I am most familiar, when companies are 
developing a new technology they will test it alongside chemicals that are 
on the market already to see whether it produces a similar degree of control 
of a particular pest and so on. They will look at standards of toxicity as well. 
I am not saying that every new chemical is better than what has existed in 
the past, but there is a general trend in that direction. Companies are going 
to look to improve upon what we have had in the past so there is a benefit 
that can be explained. A chemical might be more specific in the way that it 
works and not harm non-target species. Or, it might be more rapidly 
biodegradable in the environment... Sometimes I think that those facts are 
not put across particUlarly well. I think in the chemical arena, for example, 
people still quote the Rachel Carson book Silent Spring, and think that the 
pesticides that we used then are the same as we use now. They are not. 
Things have moved on. The chemistry has moved on. The regulation has 
moved on ... But that is a question of benefit rather than need. I think there 
probably is a difference." (Participant B). 
In less abstract terms, the benefits of agricultural biotechnology are also debated 
in regards to what are commonly labelled as second and third generation crops. 
The benefit of science as a necessarily progressive force in social development will be discussed at length 
in Chapter Six. 
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Addressing the perceived shortcomings of early crop protection technologies, both of 
these subsequent generations are targeted towards offering direct benefits to the 
consumer. Second generation crops seek to generate these benefits by genetically 
modifying the output traits of plants. For example, in the following passage an 
agricultural geneticist describes the motivation behind her/his research as stemming from 
the ability to engineer a wide range of potentially positive consumer traits into bananas: 
"What makes me excited is how you actually go about making a product that 
somebody can use ... What does the consumer actually want from a banana, 
because at the moment every banana is exactly identical to every -other 
banana. Can you actually make them different colours? Can you make them 
taste better? Can you make them last longer on the shelf? Can you make the 
texture better?" (Participant U) 
The development of third generation technologies likewise is targeted towards providing 
direct benefits to the British consumer. Instead of trying to improve on upon the 
characteristics of a plant, for example by making it a more attractive colour, industry is 
attempting to engineer novel traits into plants. Chiefly this process includes modifying 
food crops in order to supplement their nutritional value (nutriceuticals), or to provide 
other health benefits, for example preventing heart disease (functional foods). 
On the basis of the potential for these technologies to provide consumers with 
healthy eating alternatives, at least one critic of GM technologies and the life-industry 
was willing to grant second and third generation crop technologies some grudging 
support: 
"In theory, [the life-industry] could have something to offer, for sure. 
Again, when you get to an area like 'generation three' where you have 
nutriceuticals and pharmaceuticals with an 'f, and you have the ability to 
develop foods that are healthier for us than that is something that they could 
have to offer. However, it will take time and money to develop these kinds 
ofthings. They are mainly for the yuppy market, or at least, for the northern 
industrialized market, but that can still be beneficial and helpful." 
(Participant Q). 
Yet, most opponents of the technology were unimpressed by the benefits of either 
second, or third generation technologies being promised by industry. They perceived 
these benefits as too abstract, were sceptical of the motivations of the life-industry in 
bringing these technologies forward, and were reticent to attribute any benefits to the 
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technology in relation to its position in the linear advancement of agricultural science. If 
any future generations of GM products could be seen as beneficial, several opponents 
suggested, then they would need to directly address social needs. Looking back at the 
comments of the GM campaigner who was willing to grant limited support to second and 
third generation technologies, it is important to note that the participant qualifies herlhis 
support with the words "in theory." Likewise, the opinions of a consumer advocate 
demonstrate a sceptical belief that the potential benefits of these products could ever 
reach fruition given the motivations of the corporations. In the following interview 
excerpt the participant scoffs at the idea that the life-industry has brought forward these 
technologies with the health of society as its paramount concern. Instead slhe speculates 
that nutriceuticals and functional foods represent a cynical attempt by the life-industry to 
establish a market for a new range of products in the consumer led economies of the 
developed world. S/he states: 
"I think you have to look at the face of global business in terms of where it 
is looking for new markets, and what's actually driving the development of 
these new [technologies]. It's shareholder imperative. If you look at the 
developed economies, these are people who've got money to spend ... People 
aren't developing these products because they genuinely think this is going 
to make us all healthy. It's not altruism. It's shareholder returns which are 
driving this." (Participant D). 
Benefits to the Developing World? 
It would be inappropriate to discuss the risks and benefits ascribed to all three 
generations of agricultural biotechnology without also addressing controversies over the 
role of GM crops and the life-industry in the developing world. Although concerning the 
potential of the technology outside of the immediate experience of the British public, this 
has been one the most overt, contested and publicized arenas in which the benefits and 
risks of agricultural biotechnology have been fought over. It is also an arena in which 
industry has often been vocal in promoting the life-industry model and the promises of 
all three generations of genetically engineered crops to the British public. 
Several pro-GM participants eagerly made the case for the application of 
agricultural biotechnology in the developing world. Voicing a commonly made 
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argument, a public relations officer for an agricultural biotechnology corporation 
claimed GM crops and foods were essential tools in the battle to prevent famine and feed 
the world's poor. For example, plants with increased productivity levels, or which could 
survive in more hostile conditions, were presented as a response to a looming Malthusian 
catastrophe resulting from the rapid growth of the populations of Asia and Africa (ref. 
Figure 3 in Chapter Four). As Levidow has commented, the promise made by industry 
has been to provide food security to the citizens of the developing world as well as 
providing security to the rest of the world from the global instability created by 
widespread famine (1996: pp. 57-59, also Levidow and Tait, 1995).-
In adopting this assessment of the technology pro-GM supporters argue that it is 
not fair to discount the potential of GM agriculture'by weighing its benefits against its 
potential health and environmental risks in the British context alone. What's more, they 
contend that it is equally unfair to claim that the life-industry has adopted a cynical 
public relations approach to development when the benefits to the developing world 
could be so dramatic. On this basis, a research scientist working to develop genetically 
modified crops accused the environmental lobby of, "deciding on behalf of the third 
world whether or not" they reap the rewards of GM technologies (Participant G). 
Likewise, the comments of a life-industry spokesperson echo these same sentiments. 
S/he states that GM crops and the life-industry have roles to play in the development of 
third world agriculture, independent of how they are viewed in Britain: 
"One ofthe major flaws I see with the adversarial people in this debate in the 
UK is that they are only looking at the UK. I think in about another 25 years 
time there are going to be another two billion people on the planet, but we're 
not going to have any more land resources on which to grow crops. I think 
the available arable land is diminishing. Productivity has got to come from 
somewhere. GM can help you produce crops on brackish saline areas that 
aren't available for agriculture at the moment. Hopefully we can use some 
ofthat marginal land to help feed that burgeoning population. Again we get 
pilloried for coming out with the developing world argument. We can't 
bring it up in any way. But, I think it is easy to lose sight of some of the 
benefits GM crops can provide in those areas ... I can give you all sorts of 
examples of where we have donated technologies in East Africa and South 
East Asia. It's not just a PR exercise that we are just trying to get mileage 
out of it, because we are not making anything out of it. It is actually trying 
to help certain groups of people with their agriculture ... " (Participant V). 
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Although it is the promise of production benefits which has traditionally been 
associated with agricultural development initiatives, supporters of GM suggest that 
second and third generation technologies also have a vital role to play. The most 
publicized example is the much hyped and heroically named "Golden Rice." Engineered 
to contain beta-carotene (a precursor to the production of vitamin A), Golden Rice has 
been developed to address vitamin deficiencies which are a major cause of illness and 
blindness in the developing world6• Alongside these types of nut rice utica Is, industry 
points to products, such as delayed ripening fruits, which would allow fanners in the 
developing world-to market their products to the economies of the North. Described in 
the comments of a corporate research scientist below, the message being put across is 
that once again technology and industry are in a po-sition to assist in improving the 
welfare and security of the world's poor. Asked how s/he valued her/his work the 
participant offered the following response: 
"Another problem we have had is that the products that have all come out 
today have benefited the big chemical companies and the farmers. Big deal, 
how is that going to benefit the consumer? How is that going to benefit the 
developing countries where these crops are going into? That's why, for me, 
working on the quality traits of bananas is something I feel comfortable 
with. I see that there could be a long term value in some ofthese benefits to 
the consumer. Not just in the Western consumers that can afford it, but I am 
working on some high vitamin content products and we do have routes of 
getting those into developing countries safely and meeting all the regulatory 
requirements ... You will be familiar with Golden Rice. [We are also] looking 
at things like delayed ripening of Papaya because it is hard to ship long 
distances without going mushy. You can see that in some developing 
countries, if they can get hold of that technology it vastly opens up their 
markets. But, my worry is that we are coming too late with some of these 
products that can benefit the consumer and that we already have such a 
negative feel with GM that it is not going to redeem us." (Participant U). 
If the above cited participant sounds defensive in advancing this argument, it is 
because attempts to commercially establish GM crops in the developing world have been 
hotly criticized by social commentators. At best, these arguments are dismissed as the 
The rights to Golden Rice are currently held by Syngenta, although the corporation has released licences 
to scientists working to develop the potential of the technology. The company has committed to make the 
technology free of charge to farmers in the developing world. 
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cynical types of public relations exercises which Participant Y (above) has sought to 
defend against. At worst, they are seen to express a paternalistic desire to exert control 
over Southern farmers through the imposition of Northern agricultural markets and 
systems (Shiva, 1995; Shiva, 1993: pp. 65-88). For example, corporate patenting 
practices are criticized for allowing companies to gain property controls over seed use. 
In practice, patenting would require farmers to opt into more expensive GM crop 
systems and prevent them from saving seeds to replant in subsequent seasons (1995: 
p.199)7. Patents are accordingly seen to force farmers into a dependent and exploitative 
relationship with the life-industry (Fowler, 1995; Gillies, 1998). Overall, these 
sentiments were summarized well by an anti-GM campaigner who stated "that the people 
that consume the food and grow the food should have strong control over what goes on, 
rather than anonymous companies" (Participant T). 
These censures on the benefit of agricultural biotechnology and the life-industry 
in the developing world contain criticisms of the technologies themselves. For example, 
with its emphasis on the cultivation of commercial monocultures, Shiva argues, that GM 
agriculture would devalue the crop biodiversity which the people of the developing 
world rely upon to meet their nutritional and material needs (Shiva, 1993). Moreover, 
these criticisms again point to a deep lack of faith in the motives of the life-industry. To 
return to the reluctant supporter of second and third generation technologies quoted 
above, the participant was once again hesitant to fully dismiss the benefits of the 
technology in relation to the developing world. However, asked whether these 
technologies could ever be a benefit while associated with the life-industry the 
participant was far more assured in herlhis statements. In the following extracts slhe 
forthrightly expresses disbelief that the life-industry and its emphasis on patenting, 
profits and markets will ever be part of a just or equitable programme of agricultural 
development in the south: 
Behind these critiques is a concern that GM agriculture risks replicating the disasters of post-WWII 
development initiatives and the agricultural reforms of the Green Revolution in particular. Levidow and 
Tait (1995, p.129), thus ironically point out that the success of the Green Revolution has been to "produce 
more food and more hunger." For a more complete discussion please refer to Escobar (1995a; 1995b). 
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"What really bugs you about the way zn which agriculture IS being 
developed globally? " 
"[Arguments that] this will all be done for the benefit of the poor. The first 
time I ever heard about intellectual property rights related to agriculture was 
when Gene Whelan, who was [the Canadian] Minister of Agriculture in 
1974, talked about how the reason to have plant breeders rights in Canada 
was to make a more beautiful Canada to feed the hungry. The thing I was 
absolutely sure of was that no one developed intellectual property law to 
make a country more beautiful, or to feed the poor. It never happened! It 
was bullshit! It still shocks me that we have some of the 'gene giants' 
saying that [agricultural biotechnology] is the way to feed the world's 
hungry. They know that's not true. You talk to them one-on-one and they 
know that's bullshit. They have this trickle down theory that somewhere 
down the road it will be indirectly beneficial, but they know it's not 
beneficial now." 
"Is [the life-industry'sJ targeting o/the developing world as a market/or 
agricultural biotechnology necessarily a bad thing, or do they have 
something to offer?" 
"Will they ever have anything for the poor? I really doubt it. There is no 
historical precedent to show big companies ever trying to do anything, or are 
ever able to do anything, for the poor. Ijust don't believe it, frankly." 
"What are the solutions then? " 
"The solutions to the broader questions are always ones of equality, justice 
and so on. They are very sweeping sorts of solutions." (Participant Q) 
Summary 
In summary, this section set out to look at the ways in which the politics of blame 
and trust involving the life-industry were mediated through debates over the risks and 
benefits of GM agriculture. In both the discussion of biotech generations and GM crops 
in the developing world, participants presented very different valuations about what they 
identified as beneficial about the technology. On this basis, significant differences 
existed between what participants identified as risky and whether the benefits of GfvI 
crops and foods could be seen to outweigh these risks. Of particular note, the ways in 
which participants discussed the benefit of new agricultural technologies very often 
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reflected the relations of risk, trust and blame identified in the opening section of this 
chapter. Participants who were supportive of the technology spoke about its potential to 
generate benefits for the citizens of both the developed and developing worlds. The life-
industry was envisioned as a means of bringing these benefits forward. Those 
expressing hesitancy, or opposition, to GM crops expressed very different conceptions of 
risk and benefits. Although not dismissing the potential of the technology to offer 
advantages to consumers, the environment or the world's poor, these participants did not 
see this potential as inherent in the technologies themselves. They instead highlighted 
concerns about th€- corporate context in which agricultural biotechnology was being 
developed and the values and motivations of the life-industry. Identifying the ability of 
agricultural biotechnology to meet social needs is a process entangled with uncertainty 
about its relation to values of equality, fairness and justice. Here again, the life-industry 
is called into question for failing to meet these standards, or for exhibiting values, such 
as greed and control, which run counter to what is deemed by opponents to be 
acceptable. 
Democracy, Choice and Control 
Along with contestations over the benefits agricultural biotechnology, another 
way in which the politics of risk, blame and trust were enacted by participants was in 
regards to matters of democracy, choice and control. In the remainder of this chapter 
these disputes will be discussed in terms of participants' perceptions that the life-
industry, and its attempts to bring GM crops and foods into the marketplace, has ignored 
the public's interests and concerns. Moreover, these concerns will be specifically 
discussed in relation to the labelling of GM products and consumers' rights to 
information and choice. 
The Subversion of Choice 
The rise of the controversy over GM crops and foods in the UK is strongly 
associated by some participants with a feeling that genetically engineered products and 
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agricultural regimes were being forced on Britain by the life-industry corporations. \\Tith 
a history of development ar:d regulation in the UK extending twenty years, the explosion 
of the debate in the late 1990s created the impression that the life-industry had been 
attempting to sneak a potentially dangerous technology into British fanns and 
supermarkets. Additionally, with the Government already facing a crisis in trust 
following the BSE scandal, an impression developed that Government had either been 
forced into supporting the technology or colluded to go along with industry from the 
beginning. These perceived failures to give the public an opportunity to raise concerns 
about the technology, its risks or its impacts on agricultural practices and food 
production systems became the focus of several interviews. 
Participants described the actions of industry and government as the subversion 
of fundamental democratic principles of participation and consent. Below are two 
excerpts from interviews with critics of agricultural biotechnology, both of whom make 
this critical link between the arrival of GM and perceptions of a loss of democratic 
freedom. Both offer these conclusions in response to questions about why they had 
been compelled to become actively involved in the debate: 
"What drew you into the debate? What was it that made you want to get 
involved? " 
"The way that this was sprung on us I think. We were just so horrified that 
this was happening. We didn't know about it. No one had been asked. 
When they want to build a motorway or a house and you can oppose it, even 
if you don't win. But, this seemed to be snuck in. This was happening and 
we didn't know. We've always been told that we live in a democracy. This 
seemed to be something that went against everything." (Participant M) 
"What motivatedyou to get involved in the debate? What were the issues 
which you believed were paramount and which really pushed you from 
going beyond growing an organic garden to getting involved. " 
"If you are campaigning for change in any way you always come up against 
the system and the lack of voice that the public have in whatever the issue 
might be. This was a clear case of the corporations and the industry behind 
the introduction of GM - primarily Monsanto at the time, the big baddy -
were not really acting within the bounds of democracy. Their influence over 
government was detrimental to democracy in a way. Those elements really 
got me angry." (Participant C) 
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As was the case in contestations over risk and benefit, concerns over the loss of 
choice and the undennining of principles of social consent were seen to impact upon 
social perceptions of risk. As a senior policy officer for a consumer advocacy group 
argued in interview, risks are more likely to be met with anxiety if the public feel they 
are being denied the right to evaluate risks themselves and make decisions over what 
risks they want to take or reject. Her/his statements mirror research which suggests that 
public tolerance of risks, alongside issues of benefit, are rooted in public perceptions of 
choice and trust (Simmons & Walker, 1999). Research conducted by Miles and Frewer 
(2003: p. 280), for-example, has sought to demonstrate that "under circumstances where 
people feel they have little personal control over their exposure to genetic modification 
and pesticides ... the hazards may appear out of control, which results in greater perceived 
seriousness of the associated risks in comparison to other hazards where personal control 
is greater8." The important point to be emphasised in this research is that public 
perceptions of agricultural biotechnology relate both to hazard issues, and the ways in 
which the public's relations with these hazards are delimited. Here the point is stated 
eruditely by the aforementioned consumer advocate: 
"Why [do] people get more anxious about risks that if you look at the pure 
statistics are relatively small, or relatively remote? Some people would like 
to describe the people as irrational, but actually when you look at it from the 
perspective of the public, it is entirely rational, often the decisions that they 
make. If you are driving a car you think that you are in control. You think 
you can drive carefully. You think that if something happens out there that 
you are a good driver and that you can control it. People feel in control and 
there's evidence that people who are in control of risk, then you know they 
are prepared to take a higher level of risk. With something like BSE, or 
something like GM foods people feel completely out of control. You can't 
make a choice, not a real choice." (Participant D). 
As this comment suggests the provision of choice is therefore identified as an 
essential means of addressing public concerns about the risks of new agricultural 
technologies, and their scepticism in the values of the life-industry. Choice, in other 
words, is an important factor in the way in which opponents of new agricultural 
Miles and Frewer (2003) further link these public risk perceptions to situations in which the social. 
institutions perceived to be responsible for the management of risk and the prevention of hazard mdlcate 
uncertainty about the ability to do so. 
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technologies weighed risk and benefit. Likewise the perceived failure of the life-
industry to offer the public the ability to make these decisions between risk and benefit 
for themselves is an important factor in the degeneration of trust in these relationships. 
Recall for a moment the communications strategy advanced by the industry led ABC. It 
assumed that public support for GM crops and foods could be generated by educating 
people with the facts about the technology. However, when we consider this 
communication strategy in relation to the concerns expressed about deficits of public 
choice and control it is clear the strategy falls well short of addressing issues of risk as 
the opponents of GMOs see them. In the following interview passage from a senior 
campaigner at an environmental NGO, this position is well laid out. In her/his statement 
the participant derides industry's approach to pUblic engagement and argues that public 
concerns about risk can never be alleviated until such fundamental democratic issues of 
choice and control are dealt with: 
"[Industry] have to address how they communicate with people and its 
whole attitude with the general public which tends to be arrogant. It tends 
to be aloof. It tends to treat people with contempt at times. Unless they 
address those issues and become much more open and honest with people 
about the uncertainties in the science they are doing and the risks involved 
and say 'we don't actually know what the long term effects ofthis are going 
to be, but these are the risks and its up to you to make your judgement and 
you will do that in the full face ofthe facts. So, ifpeople accept things when 
there is openness they will start buying things ... Often [new technologies] 
are tried to be forced through without the public having a say. We think that 
this is fundamental to the whole democratic process. If you can't decide 
what you eat then a lot of your democratic rights are being eroded." 
(Participant T) 
Consumer Rights and Product Labelling 
One of the defining moments in the development of the debate over GM foods in 
Britain was the importation of unsegregated genetically modified soya from the United 
States in 1996. By unsegregated it is meant that American soya imports made no effort 
to trace or separate regularly produced soya from the herbicide tolerant varieties (in this 
case Monsanto's Roundup Ready product) which were being grown in North America. 
The wide coverage of the issue in the press and its subsequent adoption as a key policy 
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by opponents of GM in government and in the NGO community propelled the issue onto 
centre stage in the early phases of the debate over GMOs. Soya became a svmbol of a 
technology and way of agricultural production whichjeopardised fundamental 
democratic processes in Britain9 (Lassen et aI., 2002). 
The response to the soya case was a call for labelling by NGOs and consumer 
organizations in the UK. These calls were supported by the majority (approximately 
82%) of the British public who were strongly in favour of labelling practices (European 
Commission cited in Lassen et aI., 2002: p.295) The National Consumer Council- an 
independent consumer advocacy group supported by the British Government - thus 
began lobbying for regulations which would legislate the traceability and labelling of 
GM ingredients in food products. The rationale behind this regulation was that labels 
would allow consumers to know "what they are eating and how it is produced."10 
As Mikael Klintman writes, labels are presented by their proponents as a means 
of reclaiming democratic control in response to perceptions of increasing isolation from 
the agriculture and food production chain (2002: pp. 76-77). In line with the consumer 
movement, the participant whose statements above linked risk perceptions to choice, 
advocated labelling as a response to the invasive actions of the life-industry. At the 
centre of this position is a belief that labels are key to re-establishing public control of 
the risks they face in their daily lives. Let the public make their own assessment of risks 
and benefits, the participant further argues: 
Several participants made these claims in reference to the protection of British sovereignty. An anti-GM 
activist thus made the following statement: "They seemed to be saying that it had been planted in 
America and tested in other countries and should be Ok. But we're an island and we should have the 
right... They should ask us really." 
10 
http://www.ncc.org.uklpubs/pdf/gm_at_a_glance.pdf. 
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"We did some market research on this recently that was specifically about 
labelling and the introduction of use, the ED proposals on labelling. You 
know, people, strongly felt they had a right to know. And they felt that if 
they were denied that right to know then they're not happy about it. I'm 
making huge generalisations here because some people are far more happy 
about it than others, but we're all aware that actually the groundswell of 
public opinion is that the public hasn't seen a benefit to them in GM. 
Therefore, why take any risks? People are quite sophisticated at weighing 
out risk and benefits." (Participant D). 
Such has been the public support for labelling that none of the participants 
interviewed were 9Pposed to such a move. Chastened by ~he loss of public confidence in 
the life-industry, corporate representatives also put forward their support for the labelling 
of GM products. In several cases industry representatives, using the example of GM 
tomato paste, argued that labelling was not necessarily an impediment to the market as 
labelled products had sold well in the past (e.g. Participants D, P & W). However, the 
tone of others was more conciliatory, demonstrating a recognition that if industry is 
going to achieve commercial success in the future than some effort to address public 
rights to choice will have to be made. The following comments from a research 
scientist not only offers her/his support for labelling, but casts aspersions on the practices 
of the pastil 
"Everybody must have a choice. Certainly our company's philosophy was 
very positive on labelling, so people would have a choice. Part of the 
problem with the soya industry was that you had all these dirty great soya 
mills chucking out products and they did not want to offer a freedom of 
choice with non-GM soya... That was wrong. Our philosophy is that 
everything should be labelled." (Participant W) 
Although the need for labels was agreed in principle by participants, the 
information to be contained in labels in the event of European commercialization is 
certain to be contested. As a representative of the Food Standards Agency put it, the 
challenge would be to provide consumers with information that is "meaningful" 
(Participant V). Thus, for example, various contestations already exist over what should 
II 
In locations such as the US where the debate over GM has been more muted industry has aggressively 
challenged fue legality and ~ecessity of labelling. Labels which identify products as "GM -free", for 
example, are criticized on the basis that they misrepresent risk by inferring that they are safer than those 
that are not GM-free (Klintman, 2002). 
-123-
be included under labelling legislation. Should labelling include information which 
identifies products made with GM derivatives (ie. vegetable oil produced using G~f rape 
seed), or processing aids? Should products derived from animals reared on Glv1 products 
(ie. fodder com) be labelled? What, if any, is the maximum level of GM material which 
can be identified in a product before it has to be labelled (.1 % to 5%)? All these 
questions suggest that the future of labelling and the information these labels embody are 
likely going to be more of the subject of contestation than the interview data may at first 
suggest. 
However, as Grove-White et al. (1997, pp. 12-13,29-30) argue, providing 
information to consumers about the presence of GMOs in food products only partly 
encapsulates public concerns about democracy and the lack of choice. This is because, 
as this chapter asserts, anxieties over the hazards posed by GM are made more complex 
by their relationship with the politics of the life-industry. Feelings of "cynicism, 
fatalism and resignation" (ibid.: p.I3) not only relate to subversions of consumer choice, 
but in the subversion of social choice in dictating the direction of development in the 
agro-food industry. 
These sentiments were echoed by a participant from the Food Standards Agency 
(FSA). Identifying her/his role within the FSA as one of "putting consumer interests 
first," the participant was working to ensure that labelling would provide the British 
public meaningful, accessible and enforceable information about where their food came 
from and what it contained. In the following statement, the participant voices concern 
that these efforts may shortly be irrelevant as the techniques of genetic engineering are 
applied to crops, such as wheat and sugar, which are found in almost all processed foods: 
"Some of the [European] commission's proposals aren't going to be 
enforceable and work once there is a much broader range of products. With 
GM sugars or wheats you would have so many products in the market to 
have a traceability system on. It really would be a huge task. That is why 
we are looking further down the line to see the range of products that are 
likely to come on. It's no good just focussing on one or two products that 
you've currently got. Any future legislation must be anticipating a wider 
range of global GM crops." (Participant V) 
Thus, although participants put forward labelling as a response to the actions of 
the life-industry with the aim of reestablishing democratic control over the risks ofG0.1 
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agriculture, these actions must be seen as limited. Through the aboye comments the 
shortcomings of labelling as a means of enabling democracy and public choice are 
revealed. 
Summary 
The case of products containing GMOs and labelling places the life-industry and 
the debate over GM agriculture in a political context shaped by contestations over 
matters of choice,-control and democracy. Opponents of agricultural biotechnology and 
the life-industry situated their political opposition in relation to feelings that the life-
industry had foisted a technology, its risks and a model of agricultural development onto 
the public without either consultation or consent. This they argued counted as a 
subversion of their democratic rights. Through the advocacy of GMO tracing and 
labelling participants believed these rights could be returned to consumers. However, 
although labelling was agreed by participants from all sides of the debate to be a 
common goal, it was suggested that labelling could only partly address uncertainties 
concerning the life-industry's subversion of democracy. Thus it was suggested that 
struggles over choice and consent would continue in the debate over the information and 
meaning encompassed by labels. However, more importantly, labelling cannot 
encompass the complexity of concerns over democratic participation involved in the 
contestation of the role of the life-industry in agricultural development. 
Conclusion 
The question posed at the start of this essay asked how the politics of agricultural 
biotechnology related to normative contestations over the role of the life-industry in the 
debate and in wider British society. Drawing on the work of Mary Douglas and her 
cultural perspective on risk, this question was placed in a context of risk, blame and 
trust. Interview data showed that for many participants contestations over risk were 
made more complex through the interrelationship between hazard and a wider debate 
over the life-industry and global corporate capitalism. 
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Directed by the insights of the research participants this convergent politics of 
risk, blame and trust was approached in greater detail in two regards. Firstly, the 
contested position of the life-industry was discussed in tenus of further contestations 
over risk and benefit. Here perceptions of benefit and the acceptability of risk varied 
greatly between those in support of GM crops and those who resisted their development. 
Risks were presented in ways which depended on how participants envisioned the role of 
the life-industry in providing technologies which bettered agriculture and benefited 
society more broadly. Furthenuore, benefits related not only to the direct potential of the 
technology, but aI-so to how the life-industry's application of the technology confonued 
with,or stood against the moral values of the community. 
Secondly, in the concluding section of this chapter, the politics of risk, blame and 
trust involving the life-industry was discussed in regards to issues of choice, consent and 
democracy. As voiced by participants resistant to the use of genetic technologies in 
agriculture, the life-industry was accused of attempting to force GM crops and foods 
onto the shelves of supenuarkets without the consent of the British public. How 
participants approached the technology and tolerated risk thus related to perceptions of a 
loss of control in making decisions about the acceptability of GMOs or the 
developmental trajectory they represent. In particular, participants drew on arguments 
for the tracing of GM materials in food production and the labelling of products· 
containing GM ingredients. Here, although it was argued that the political potential of 
labelling was limited, participants used calls for labelling as a means of reasserting their 
democratic rights of choice and consent. 
As this chapter has demonstrated, the contested role of the life-industry in the 
debate over new agricultural technologies is both pervasive and varied. This thesis will 
now tum its attention to an equally divisive and pervasive theme in these politics - the 
contested relationship between the public, science and expertise. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONTESTING SCIENCE 
"Society's relationship with science is in a critical phase. Science today is 
exciting, and full of opportunities. Yet public confidence in scientific advice 
to Government has been rocked by BSE; and many people are uneasy about 
the rapid a-dvance of areas such as biotechnology arid IT - eVen though for 
everyday purposes they take science and technology for granted. This crisis 
of confidence is of great importance both to British society and to British 
science." 
Introduction 
- House of Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology (2000: p. 5) 
As this statement from the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology suggests, the role of science in society is increasingly the subject of social 
and political debate in the UK. The position of the GM debate in the maelstrom created 
by a series of risk controversies in agriculture, of which mad-cow disease, or BSE, has 
been the most prominent, has made this a timely and consequential topic. As such, it is 
not surprising that the research data gathered in this thesis identifies science as a focus of 
contention in the controversy over new agricultural technologies. Concisely stated, this 
chapter questions how participants debated developments in GM agriculture in relation 
to normative contestations over the character of science and its role in society. 
Accordingly, the following discussion is developed along three overlapping 
avenues of inquiry. The first avenue of investigation addresses the role of science as a 
force of progress in society. In particular, this discussion follows participants' debates 
over the development of agriculture and the sustainability of its future. Secondly, in 
contesting the role of science in society, this chapter addresses the way in which 
participants debated the certainty and trustworthiness of scientific knowledge in 
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contesting the development of GM crops. This includes a discussion of the degradation 
of public trust in science that participants associated with previous risk incidents. as \vell 
as the link between trust and a perceived lack of public input into agricultural 
development. Finally, the disputed correlation between scientific expertise, and 
governance comprises a third way in which participants contested the role of science in 
society. Each of these three themes is united by an analysis of a conflict over the 
determination of acceptable science-society relations. 
Science, Progress-and the Production of Sustainable Technologies -
In Chapter Five the controversy over agricultural biotechnology was discussed in 
terms of competing visions of risk and benefit. Illustrating this point, the interview data 
indicated that through these valuations participants were actively contesting the role of 
the life-industry in modem society. Dependent on scientific and technological 
innovation, the life-industry and the controversy surrounding it are closely tied to 
debates over the role of science in society. In a similar vein to the material developed in 
the last chapter, the ways in which participants spoke of the risks and benefits of 
scientific innovations in agriculture comprise the analytical focus of this section. In 
opening this discussion some observations will be made concerning the way in which 
participants debated the progressive aspirations of science in the development of 
agricultural technologies. From this more general basis, a discussion of competing 
visions of sustainable forms of agricultural production offers a more specific example of 
the contested relationship between science and social progress. 
Agricultural Science and Social Progress 
To recall, in Chapter Two scientific determinism was identified as the object of 
critique for social constructionist theories of scientific knowledge. Putting aside those 
critiques for a moment, determinism was defined as the ability to generate knowledge 
which corresponded to a natural reality. Accordingly science is envisioned as the 
practice of uncovering facts. It therefore follows that the more you uncover the greater 
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your knowledge and ability to master the natural world. Harvey (1996) has argued that 
within this world view, social descriptions of science have swung between triumphal 
visions of social progress and anxious concerns of social regress. In the first instance, 
agricultural development has often been seen alongside other modernist institutions as 
part of a progressive social project (Figure 5)1. However, authors such as Beck (1992) 
have argued that recently the pendulum has started to swing away from these visions. 
Instead, Beck argues, science and modernity are increasingly called into question by 
widespread public concern about the consequences of agricultural development on the 
environment. Thus it is in this sense that participants contested the role of science in 
society in fairly abstract, or wide-ranging, fashions. In other words, the politics of new 
agricultural technologies were situated within a context whereby the progressive and 
regressive attributes of science were also being contested. 
Figure 3 - "The Human Drift," a utopian conception of modernist conceptions of 
progress (Segal, 1985). 
I 
Refer to Bantjes, 2000 and Harper, 2001 for discussions about history of agriculture and farming as a 
' modem' enterprise. 
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Worried by their early failures to gain approval of new agricultural technologies, 
some of the participants interviewed in this thesis sought to reassure the public of the 
progressive potential of agricultural innovation. These participants placed agricultural 
biotechnology within a continuous chain, or lifeline, of development and advancement. 
Risks, they argue, are always pertinent, but must be seen in relation to the general 
amelioration of social welfare afforded by techno-scientific innovation alongside any 
immediate benefits offered by a new technology. The role of science in society cannot 
be determined by weighing the risks and benefits of GM crops alone, but as these 
participants argue,·such appraisals must also take into account the value of science as an 
institution of modernity. They ask that society hold onto the promises of modem 
development and remember the benefits this afforded society in the past. 
These 'ideological' arguments were put forward by a former Agriculture Minister 
and acting Member of Parliament for the Conservative Party (Participant L). S/he 
argued that the perceptions of risk voiced by opponents of GM agriculture were tainted 
by a conservatism analogous to the Luddites2 of the industrial age. Accordingly, public 
scepticism about the risks and benefits of GM agriculture is reduced by the participant to 
an irrational fear of change and progress. Such fears s/he believes to be misguided 
because they ignore the previous successes of science's contribution to agriculture and 
social welfare. In her/his statement below, the participant thus argues that the manner in 
which society values agricultural biotechnology must include the relationship of GM 
crops to the development of more productive field systems, mechanized farming and 
high yield seeds. Her/his comments are made in response to being questioned as to 
whether s/he agreed with perceptions that the relationship between the public and science 
had degraded, or whether the public were simply more aware of the risks of 
development: 
It is worth noting that the reduction of the politics of the Luddites and machine breakers of the industrial 
age to ilTational fears of progress has been convincingly challenged academically. For example., E.P. 
Thompson (1963) has argued that Luddism was an integral part of the development of class polItIcs In 
England. In this light, it is necessary to be wary of the participant's equation of opposition to GM Wlth a 
fear of development. Refer also to Grint and Woolgar (1997: pp. 39-64). 
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"When you look back at British industrial history you could argue that the 
Luddites were a classic example of people saying 'no we don't want 
change,' 'we feel threatened by it,' 'we much prefer what we've got,' 'there 
are things that are unknown,' therefore 'we don't like it... , [SJometimes 
people don't want change for political reasons. They just don't like it." 
"If you look at the jumps in yields in grains, you can see that the sort of 17th 
and 18th century change in farming started to have a big effect. I expect they 
probably had the same arguments we are discussing now about enclosing 
land, which is the outrageous thought about making a big field. Now we'd 
think you were sort of a bit odd if you thought you could have strip 
agriculture in the United Kingdom. But then the next application of 
technologywas when they invented hybrid seed varieties, when suddenl y the 
yield after about a hundred years of bumbling along at more or less the same 
level suddenly shot up in the 1970s. And that was a result ofthe application 
of science and the virtue of man intervening to breed seed varieties which 
had the characteristics of increasing the yield. Nobody got too upset about 
that. We all breathed a huge sigh of reliefbecause larger numbers of people 
on this planet could be sustained as a result of that technology." 
(Participant L) 
Moreover, the former Minister suggests that the identification of risks should not be seen 
as a sign of the weakness of scientific knowledge, but offers proof of its successes. The 
trouble with risk, as the participant states, is that the public have failed to see it in the 
context of a general shift forward in the standard of life in Britain: 
"So, as we become more knowledgeable with science we identify more and 
more potential risks to worry about without taking into account it is actually 
increasing the comfort zone. The one intriguing fact in all of this, is that as 
we have proceeded in getting more and more worried about the potential life 
threatening arguments that are brought forward about the use of chemicals 
in the context of agriculture, improved social conditions, improved public 
health, and improved diet have simultaneously contributed to a rapidly 
lengthening lifespan." (Participant L) 
Participants from within the industrial scientific community made similar 
arguments, centring their comments on the development of chemical pesticides and 
herbicides (Participants B & W in particular). Chemicals, such as DDT, were introduced 
in the 1940s alongside attempts to modernize agriculture by increasing crop yields and 
herd sizes. High yield crops require increased levels of nutrients and, therefore, place 
heavy demands on the soil, necessitating the input of artificial fertilizers. Likewise, 
these crops required increased pest and weed protection as a combined result of grO\ving 
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single types of a species (a mono culture ) over large stretches of agricultural land 
(Harper, 2001). However by the 1960s, chemicals such as DDT had become widely 
vilified as symbols of the environmental degradation associated with the intensification 
and industrialization of agricultural production. Consequently, chemical inputs are today 
more likely to be seen as chemical poisons which pit industrial gain against 
environmental welfare, than as the sorts of progressive aids science hopes to offer 
society. 
Yet, despite a general condemnation of DDT within society, several pro-GJ\f 
participants argued that DDT should be seen in a positive light according to its past 
successes and its potential benefits in the future. Risks, they argued, do not preclude the 
progressive valuation of innovations in agriculturai science. Instead, they argued that the 
risks of DDT are tempered by the benefits it has offered social welfare in terms of 
agricultural development3. Although willing to admit that the chemical's role in crop 
protection is at an end, the participant was reticent to avoid dismissing the future benefits 
of DDT altogether. Specifically, s/he alludes to the revival of debates over the potential 
of DDT as a means of preventing the spread of malaria (transmitted by the mosquito) in 
the developing world (refer to Attaran and Maharaj, 2000)4. The participant's comments 
demonstrate an unflappable belief in the progressive capacity of science and agricultural 
development to generate greater social well-being: 
In addition to their comments above, the former Agriculture Minister who participated in this thesis, 
offers the following statement linking her/his conception of progress with the social benefits of DDT: 
"It is quite clear, I mean if you look at something like DDT, a highly toxic chemical, today it wouldn't be 
allowed and we'd all say rightly so. We go back when it first came in, in terms of dealing with pesticide 
risk. I f you look at crops and look at what uncontrolled pests can do, it can be the difference between 
large numbers of people having food and not having food. Therefore a chemical that comes along that 
gives mankind a better than evens chance of surviving is welcomed, but by today's understanding of the 
technology we are saying it's wrong." (Participant L) 
Carter, Tom. "DDT: Malaria's answer in Africa?" The Washington Post. June 16,2001. 
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"The purpose [ of science] is to create a better quality of life. I think that is 
very important. I said earlier that there is no such thing as zero risk. What 
I am saying is that a lot of the positives that have come out of modem day 
understanding / management of the environment have had negative 
consequences. Nobody is ever going to deny that there are some negati\'es. 
There always will be. But, it doesn't put things in perspective. The things 
crop protection has done for the world. Everybody slights DDT these days, 
but I challenge anyone to show me anybody that died from the correct use 
of DDT. Yes, it hangs around in the environment and it was time to move 
on, but look at what it did in terms of underdeveloped countries at the time. 
Perhaps this is an example of progress. The one priority for the world health 
authorities is still malaria and we still haven't got solutions there. Nobody 
is proud enough to point to the potential of DDT --that disaster that people 
make it out to be. Yes, I'll accept that it is still found in shore crabs off 
Cornwall, but... Those are the types of perspectives I like to bring forward." 
(Participant W) 
Needless to say, not all participants shared this modernist perspective of 
agricultural science. Although no participant categorically discounted the benefit of 
scientific knowledge or technological innovation, one of the most direct evocations of a 
loss of faith in the progressive value of science came from an anti-GM activist. The 
participant presented a pointed challenge of what s/he described as assumptions about 
the linear development of science and technology. Her/his disquiet with the science of 
GM foods is not necessarily just about the particular risks of agricultural biotechnology. 
Instead, her/his concerns encompass what s/he sees as the dogmatic acceptance of 
scientific authority in arbitrating risks in society. In the following interview excerpt 
these arguments are outlined in an explication of what the activist felt the risks of 
agricultural biotechnology actually were. Her/his statements mock the epistemological 
value of science, question scientific authority and moreover belittle the model of society 
these values are interpreted as engendering: 
"Don't question what the technology is. Don't question the need for the 
technology. Don't question the long term effects of the technology. Just 
say, 'it's technology,' 'it's new', 'it must be all singing, all dancing and 
brilliant.' It's that aspect of the technology which frightens me, not the 
specifics of 'will it give us all cancer,' 'will it mean that there are three 
headed rabbits running all over Britain.' I'm not interested in that. I give 
you a ludicrous example and I don't genuinely believe any of that stuff. It 
doesn't matter. The simple fact ofthe matter is that we are blindly adopting 
an ideological stance that says 'this is science,' 'this is progress,' 'it is 
therefore good' and 'we will follow this model. '" (Participant I) 
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Although this statement was one of a few statements directed specifically against 
an ideology of scientific progress, it was certainly not the only criticism made. In 
particular, a debate over the social merits of science as progress were focussed around 
contestations over science and the innovation of sustainable technologies. 
Technology Sustaining Agriculture 
Scientific innovation, as related to sustainable agriculture, was one issue around 
which the role of science in society was critically discussed by participants. 
Sustainability in this situation does not refer to a straightforward technical concept, but a 
contested ideal demarcating the appropriate role for science in the pursuit of social 
progress. It is therefore advantageous to think of sustainability as what Olson (1995) 
refers to as a social vision for the future5• In this light, participants from all sides of the 
debate evoked different perceptions of good and bad science in reference to opposing 
definitions of sustainable agriculture. These valuations of science were determined in 
relation to two universally accepted goals: i) to provide a quality agricultural system, and 
ii) to do so in a manner which preserves the welfare of the environment. 
Supporters of agricultural biotechnology from within the scientific and industry 
communities held up genetics as a key to providing the UK with a sustainable 
agricultural industry. An industry representative (Participant B) described the innovation 
of new agricultural technologies as enabling sustainability in two senses. Firstly, s/he 
argued that GM crops combined with the development of "new and better" chemicals, 
such as promised by first generation technologies, would lessen the impact of agriculture 
on the environment. Secondly, and of equal importance, the application of genetics to 
agriculture, was presented by the participant as a means of effecting economic 
Not all authors commentating on sustainability view the concept with as much optimism as Olson. For 
others, sustainability is seen as a perpetuation of the domination of nature and society characterizing 
modernist programmes of development (eg. Banerjee, 2003; Spaargaren & Mol, 1992; Escobar, 1996). It 
is therefore wOlih noting that although not all participants spoke of science in terms of the production of 
sustainable technologies, no participant offered a position which overtly criticized ideas of sustainability. 
As has already been suggested in this thesis, several participants have been very critical of capitalist 
models of development, however no overt links were drawn between these criticisms and sustainability as 
such. 
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sustainability. The argument follows that if scientific innovation combined with Good 
b 
practice can create profits for farmers, then a healthy agricultural system can be 
engendered which offers benefits to both food production and the environment 
(Participant L). 
An agricultural geneticist likewise supported the sustainable potential of 
agricultural biotechnology. However, not entirely satisfied with the dominant approach 
to genetics, the participant argued that a widening of the scientific gaze could further 
help to realize these promises. Specifically, the participant identified a need to move 
beyond a "reductiEmist approach" to the science of genetics. S/he described this 
approach as involving the detailed work concentrating on the genetic make up of 
individual plant species. This involves first figuring out the functions and relationships 
of genes in an organism, and then seeking how these traits can be applied to the 
development of new commercial products6. In contrast to this reductionist approach, the 
participant encourages the incorporation of adaptationist, or evolutionary, science to the 
development of agricultural biotechnology. Scientists, s/he argues, need to get out of the 
laboratory and examine the behaviour of plant species within the agricultural 
environment. By attempting to shift the science of genetics towards an adaptationist 
approach the participant expresses the need for agricultural development to take account 
of the consequences of GM crops on the environment. However, neither the reductionist 
nor the adaptationist approach is perceived by the participant as an acceptable means of 
providing sustainable technologies itself. S/he states: 
6 Yoxen refers to this as the Meccano approach to molecular biology. He states: 
"I prefer to think of molecular biology as the expression of a Meccano view of nature. With a fairly 
simple conceptual kit and with a limited number of elements, molecular biologists have been able to 
represent living nature with a series of increasingly complex mechanical models. They have spent years 
figuring out what pieces there are in nature's Meccano set, and how they fit together... And now, finally, 
since the early 1970s they have figured out how to start bolting pieces together, making new models that 
are not even in the instruction books. To push the model to its facetious conclusion, we could say that 
molecular biologists are now realising what they can build and just how pleased their new patrons will be 
with their inventiveness." (Yoxen, 1986: p.35) 
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"As you are probably aware there are two types of scientists. There's the 
reductionist who works out how things work but doesn't really work out 
why. Then there is the adaptationist who works out the wonderful ecological 
and evolutionary ideas but hasn't got a clue what makes things work." 
"Could you give me an example of both parts of that?" 
"[For example], plants defend themselves when they are attacked by insects. 
There is more and more research going on showing that. Now a reductionist 
approach to that would be to work out which chemicals are involved, which 
genes are involved, and possibly make a transgenic plant which elevates that 
gene. [Then], in a laboratory still see whether it changes the behaviour of the 
insect. Ok?" 
"Right. " 
"Whereas the ecological adaptationist would ask, 'are these interactions 
important in ecology and in nature?' So, you find examples in which plants 
outside the laboratory clearly defend themselves against insects. Do those 
plants benefit evolutionary and ecologically from doing so? Are the genes 
responsible for it passed on such that if you collect the offspring from these 
plants that they do it too? All ofthat can be done without a clue as to what's 
going on [in terms of specific gene relationships] ... " 
"I think we need to be able to understand how to take apart what the critical 
issues are in terms of what interactions are going on - why is it happening, 
how can it be controlled - within the context of what are the bigger 
questions in terms of what does this mean in terms of environment and 
ecology." (Participant S) 
Others within the scientific community take these moderate critiques of genetics 
a step further, contending that genetics is not the sole means of fostering sustainable 
development in agriculture. Alternatively, it was proposed that sustainability could best 
be achieved by pursuing alternative forms of agricultural science alongside research in 
genetics. This argument was made by two senior research scientists working for a 
nonprofit collective mandated to provide sustainable futures to farmers (Participants A & 
F). Each participant maintained that a scientific focus on genetics in innovating 
agriculture could be beneficial in certain sectors and with certain crops. However, they 
also advanced that there were both space and need for alternative paths of innovation. 
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For example, Mendelian techniques of selective breeding7 were still seen to be highly 
effective means of engendering positive plant traits in crops such as beans, pulses and 
legumes. This includes producing plants with higher yields, of higher quality and which 
are easier to grow and manage (i.e. weed and pest control). Likewise, both scientists 
supported research into mechanical weeding techniques and the use of insect traps as 
alternatives to chemical herbicides and pesticides. 
Closely resembling the advantages of sustainability promised by the supporter of 
GM crops cited above, developing alternative paths of scientific innovation in 
agriculture was perceived to offer two primary benefits to society. firstly, one of the 
two research scientists just mentioned (Participant A) argued that these alternatives were 
potentially less intrusive on the environment than first generation GM crops and their 
associated chemical regimes. Secondly, both scientists argued that these alternative 
techniques not only made environmental sense, but good commercial sense as well. 
Perceiving a context in which the future of agricultural biotechnology remains the 
subject of considerable public controversy, they saw alternative paths of innovation as a 
means of commercially exploiting consumer uncertainty about GMOs. For example, 
breeding high-protein crops to manufacture livestock feed supplements could offer 
farmers alternatives to growing or using the GM soya crops which currently dominate 
the feed industry8. 
Arguments about the relationship between science and sustainable development 
with more far reaching implications were offered by participants from the environmental 
lobby. Like the two research scientists cited above, these participants offered their own 
Mendelian techniques involve selectively breeding desired traits, such as increased yield or hardiness, into 
a crop based on a detailed understanding of the inheritance mechanisms of the plant and the transmission 
of desirable characteristics from parent to progeny (Welsh, 1981: pp. 4-16). 
It is necessary to note that although both scientists advanced this argument, their commitment to GM 
agriculture differed. One of the participants (Participant F) felt uneasy in discussing these commercial 
benefits. This was because s/he did not believe that organic farming was fmanciaUy sustainable in the 
long run, and because s/he did not want to support the view that GM technologies were risky. The second 
participant (Participant A) was far more comfortable in asserting this position. Somewhat sympathetic to 
environmental politics, s/he fervently argued that it was important that science could provide marketable 
and "sustainable technologies" which could compete with the products of more intensive agricultural 
systems. 
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alternatives to genetics and modernist programmes of agriculture. Where the two 
research scientists emphasised the inherent benefits of various forms of techno-scientific 
development, what differentiates the environmentalists' argument is that it asserts the 
need for science to be founded on environmental values9. In other words, the 
environmental position shifts a vision of development based upon the ability of science 
to engender progress, to one which sees progressive ideologies as engendering good 
social practice lO • 
Echoing Barry Commoners (1972) "laws of ecology," the environmentalist 
position emphasi:ces the complexity and interconnectedness of the natural world, where 
seemingly small changes in the environment could lead to unforseen consequences. As a 
result the activists interviewed firstly proposed the need for science, and the science of 
risk assessment in partiCUlar, to take a precautionary approach to development. 
Furthermore, participants put forward the need for a scientific approach built around a 
less environmentally intrusive model of technological development. In order to meet 
these needs, a senior environmental campaigner outlined a strategy of development 
focussed on what s/he describes as innovations in sustainable techniques. This approach 
is contrasted with an industry model of development based on the innovation and 
application of agricultural products, such as chemical inputs or genetically engineered 
seeds. Drawing on scientific research into sustainable farming systems 11, the participant 
Although often criticized by the pro-GM camp for taking positions which are irrational or anti-scientific 
(refer for example to Chapter Five footnotes 2 & 3), it is worth noting that the close link between 
environmental claims making and science has existed since the inception of the environmental movement. 
Y earley, for example, argues that science enables campaigners to speak on behalf of the environment and 
to offer universal and definitive environmental truths in calling for action (Yearley, 1993: pp. 59-62; refer 
also to Yearley, 1991 & 1992). He gives the example of the ozone hole as an environmental issue which 
is framed by an environmental discourse centred around the chemical makeup of the atmosphere, and 
which can only be known through that discourse (1992: p.512). Aside from these sorts of large 
campaigns, grassroot movements without the scientific backing of the large environmental organizations, 
have been shown to rely heavily on outside scientific expertise in making environmental claims (Tesh, 
2000). 
10 
F or a more complete discussion of the relationship between sustainability and social values please refer to 
the work of Dave Toke (2002). 
11 
For example, please refer to the work of Jules Pretty (2002) at Exeter University. This research posits t.hat 
non-product based alternatives to development are not anti-science, but propose the alternatIve types ot 
development advocated by the GM campaigner. This position is eruditely presented in the following 
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argues that by focussing on techniques, fanners can better integrate production with the 
natural processes which input-based systems are seen to affront. Asked if s/he opposed 
the technology outright, the participant offered the following response. In it s/he firstly 
urges a cautious approach to agricultural development, but also affirms a commitment to 
techno-scientific innovation if it corresponds to the environmental values and model of 
sustainability s/he advocates: 
"[My organisation's] position is that the area of molecular genetic research 
is interesting and that we wouldn't want to see it stifled at the moment... 
There are a lot of questions that need to be answered about a) how plant 
genes funGtion in the natural state, and b) what happens when you start 
randomly farrowing in genes from other species into a genome. From our 
point of view these are fundamental scientific questions about safety that 
have to be answered before we go into conimercial production. On top of 
that there are some serious scientific questions about how you go about 
testing the environmental impacts of crops without having an irreversible 
impact on the environment. If we get it wrong then we could end up with 
something that is very difficult to eradicate ifpossible. All the more reason 
for proceeding with caution rather than proceeding at all haste like we are at 
the moment." 
"We think that there are much more important things that scientific brains 
should be applied to, rather than this particular technology. These hold up 
more possible solutions to global agricultural [development] than [industry] 
are saying GM does. The problem is that a lot of those solutions are not 
product based, they're knowledge based ... They are techniques and ways of 
fanning, rather than specific seeds or chemicals. Some ofthem may require 
new technologies as well, which is another area where we think research is 
needed." (Participant T). 
For each of the participants cited above, sustainable development was a target 
which they could mutually agree upon. No proponent, or opponent, of agricultural 
biotechnology diverged from a line of argument which advanced the need for 
development strategies which could provide for the economic viability of the industry 
while also protecting the integrity of the environment. Likewise, science plays an 
statement by Pretty and Howes: 
"[Sustainable agriculture] does not constitute a return to low technology or low output farm~g. It is not a 
single system of technologies and practices. It includes a wide spectrum of farming systems mvolvmg 
prudent use of pesticides, antibiotics and fertilizers. Conventional practices are not rejected, but the 
innovative resource-conserving practices are emphasised. These usually involve the substItutIOn of 
labour, knowledge and management skills for the former high use of external inputs." (Pretty and Howes. 
1993, p. iii). 
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important role in demarcating each of the above visions of sustainability. What is 
contested is the model of science which is envisioned as best meeting social and 
environmental ideals of sustainability. For some participants new agricultural 
technologies were part of a sustainable solution, if as one participant argued it could be 
better focussed towards environmental concerns. For other members of the agricultural 
research industry, traditional paths of innovation, such as crop breeding, could 
complement genetic technologies and provide farmers with alternative types of 
sustainable development. And, as the environmentalist position argued, science could 
play an important-role in sustainability, if it conformed to ecological visions of the social 
and natural worlds. 
Summary 
In this section, participants contested GM crops and foods in relation to differing 
and sometimes opposing beliefs about the role of science in society. For some 
participants the science of genetics was part of a process of linear development and the 
provision of social welfare. Although recognizing development as imperfect and 
potentially risky, the overall process of accumulated knowledge and innovation was 
portrayed as one of overall social progress. Other participants, either directly questioned 
these assumptions, or as was more often the case, debated the progressive role of science 
in society through ideas of sustainable agricultural development. In these instances, 
participants shared common desires to apply science and technology in ways which 
would enable a productive farming system while also protecting the welfare of the 
environment. 
Significantly, the role of science in society was not contested between 
participants who were for science and those who were against science. Instead, 
participants proposed alternative versions of innovation which reflected differing values 
of development. For a few participants, GM crops, such as those currently being 
developed by industry, were already seen to engender sustainable development. In this 
sense, their position closely parallels modernist equations of science with social 
progress. However, the majority of participants argued that the science of genetics must 
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take account of environmental values if it was to be truly progressive. Contestations 
over sustainability in this sense involved the varying degrees to which participants 
identified the need for environmental values to dictate scientific practice. 
Uncertainty and the Robustness of Scientific Knowledge 
In this section the role of science in society is discussed in relation to issues of 
risk and trust in science. It addresses how participants debated the ability of science to 
protect society from any detrimental consequences associated with technological 
development. An analysis of participants' comments suggests a response to this 
question which is only partly based in contestations over the certainty, or uncertainty, of 
scientific knowledge and risk management. However, as the above discussion of science 
and development has demonstrated, it would be misleading to approach these debates in 
relation to a single monolithic vision of science. As Irwin argues, it is better to speak 
about sciences and the heterogeneity of knowledge and institutions that go under this 
label, rather than view science as a singular and authoritative account of the world (1995: 
pp.50-51). 
Participants often linked their confidence in scientific knowledge with debates 
over the value of public science as opposed to industry, or corporate, science. By value, 
I refer to what Nowotny et al. (2001: p.25) describe as the "social robustness" of 
scientific knowledge. According to these authors the advantages afforded by science are 
not measurable in terms of reliability and validity, but in terms of its value to society. In 
other words, they do not expect knowledge to be certain, but more importantly demand it 
take account of the normative social values expressed by participants. 
Agricultural Genetics in a Context of Uncertainty 
Participants universally recognized that the debate over risks and new agricultural 
technologies was entangled within a political context shaped by questions about the 
certainty of scientific knowledge. Given recent failures in the evaluation of the risks 
associated with modem agricultural practices, a majority of participants put forward the 
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need to interrogate the value of scientific expertise in society. Or, at the very least, 
participants recognized this as inevitable in the current political context. 
In making this case, participants spoke of a diversity of risk events overlapping 
the development of GM crop technologies. These included Foot & Mouth Disease 
(FMD), salmonella, E-coli, and the use of hormones and antibiotics in rearing livestock. 
Likewise, the handling of BSE was seen to ensure that the politics of GM agriculture 
was also the politics of trust in science. Although the history ofBSE and the 
Government's response to the disease will be the subject of detailed analysis in Chapter 
Seven, for the moment it is sufficient to say that the controversy cast considerable doubt 
about the certainty and authority of scientific knowledge. 
As one participant recounted, the consequences ofBSE on public perceptions of 
risk and science were twofold. Firstly, s/he argues that BSE made risks real to the 
public, even if only a relatively small percentage of the population had been directly 
affected by the disease. Secondly, the uncertainties of science and the fallibility of 
science as a basis of the Government's failed strategy for contending with risk were 
rendered clearly visible. In a post-BSE context, the participant argues that the types of 
categorical assertions of safety accompanying the development of GM agriculture hold 
considerably less merit. Involved in the environmental lobby and a member of the 
Government's Agriculture, Environment and Biotechnology Commission (AEBC), the 
participant offers the following appraisal of public-science relations following mad-cow 
disease: 
"There was genuine scientific disagreement when [the risks ofBSE] were 
considered in the UK; whether these things mattered or not. That doesn't 
instill confidence; whether the scientists know what they are talking about. 
The trouble is that you are down to such infinitesimal degrees of risk. But, 
then we have experienced the same things with BSE. You know there are 
risks and they have different degrees, but those posited risks have come to 
pass, although at a low rate. But nonetheless there were things that were 
considered at infinitesimal possibilities at one stage and have been realized. 
There are people who died [as a result ofBSE]. It's very hard for people to 
get a handle on calibrating these risks, so what becomes the focus is the 
uncertainty in people minds; that there is no categorical assurance available 
and no real quantification of risk, or comparative risk." (Participant J) 
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Participants active in the development of agricultural biotechnology also agreed 
that the public confidence in science had become an inescapable context in which the 
future of the technology will have to be evaluated. However, although resigned to 
developing GM crops and foods in this context, not all participants were willing to 
concede a lack of certainty in the evaluation of agricultural biotechnology itself. For 
example, a spokesperson for the life-industry grudgingly admitted that, because of BSE, 
industry could not ignore issues of uncertainty and public trust in science. However, 
s/he does not question the objectivity, or the authority, of scientific knowledge in 
speaking about th€-potential risks of agricultural biotechnology. As-herlhis below 
statement posits, the necessity of a debate over science is principally furnished by the 
need to contend with public scepticism about scientific claims of certainty and respond 
to opposition claims of risk. This debate is not, according to the participant, necessitated 
by any lack of certainty in industry's scientific conclusions about the safety of growing 
GM crops or consuming GM food products: 
"There were a whole number of things in the UK around the timing of the 
introduction ofthe technology. It became a lightning rod because there have 
been certain societal changes that we sense as a science driven industry over 
the past few years. There has been an erosion in the trust of scientists. 
Scientists were previously up here and highly respected, now people are 
more sceptical of the science. People are far more questioning about the 
food they eat. GMOs were introduced following a whole lot of other food 
scares such as BSE and dioxin. I think, if you like, Europeans were highly 
sensitized to the next food scare, although there hasn't been a single proven 
case of a safety scare or health being damaged through GM foods. I think 
there have been a number of bodies that have had a vested interest in actually 
creating alarm around it." (Participant Y) 
Yet, despite the intransigence of some supporters of the technology, others from 
within the pro-GM camp offered a more conciliatory approach to the perceived lack of 
public confidence in science. Unlike the above statements which fall short of admitting 
to the need to challenge industry's own preconceptions of scientific certainty and risk, an 
agricultural geneticist offers a more humble evaluation of science's past failures. 
Although without specifically underlining the uncertainty of scientific knowledge 
involved in the BSE case, the participant does deride the Government's use of a 
discourse of certainty in reassuring the public of the safety of British beef at the time. 
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On this basis the participant proposes that scientists re-examine the way in which they 
communicate with the public. Importantly, in stating this belief, the participant does not 
reduce communication to a monologue centred on more effectively getting the facts out 
to the pUblic. Instead, the participant begins to veer away from the paternalistic 
approach to science-public relations, described as the' deficit model' of public-science 
relations. Accordingly, s/he puts forward the need for the creation of a dialogue between 
science and the public. Divulging some uncertainty in how far slhe is willing to take this 
idea, the participant nonetheless states: 
"I think the problem with BSE was that people -felt that they had been 
hoodwinked - that they hadn't been given the information. Government 
ministers were saying 'it's fine,' 'it's safe,' and 'you can keep eating beef.' 
Yet, quite obviously, there were problems. t think the general public lost a 
lot of faith in scientists. I think they see us as very remote and not 
communicating particularly well. Maybe scientists aren't particularly good 
communicators. Perhaps one ofthe things we're not very good at, we might 
be quite good at talking about what we do, but not always that good at 
listening. Perhaps not necessarily listening, but demonstrating that we are 
listening to the public - being proactive." (Participant S) 
This discussion of science, trust and certainty situates the debate over GM crops 
and GM foods in a political context created by over a decade of scientific and risk 
controversies in agriculture. This is a context which participants suggest has emphasised 
the very real consequences and risks of agricultural development on the lives of Britons. 
Moreover, by bearing witness to these risks, participants argue that the public has 
become conscious of the routine uncertainties in scientific knowledge and the fallibility 
of science in managing risk and protecting society from the unforseen consequences of 
development. Stated concisely, debates over risk and the future of new agricultural 
technologies are tied to contestations involving the re-negotiation of the relationship 
between science, expertise and the pUblic. 
Contesting Public Science 
In speaking about trust in science and the need to re-negotiate science-public 
relations, participants focussed their attention on the perceived interdependence between 
science and industry. A common concern raised by participants was that science was not 
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meeting its responsibility to society as a consequence of agricultural genetics' close ties 
to the life-industry and its corporate values. Although these criticisms were implicit in 
much of the discussion of risk, blame and trust in the preceding chapter, participants 
explicitly made these types of arguments in advocating one model of science over 
another. Specifically several participants broached the issue in terms of the need for a 
public scientific approach to genetics. 
These arguments were not limited to the comments of opponents of agricultural 
biotechnology, but were presented by participants from all sides of the debate. For 
example, a scientist and industry insider when questioned about decreasing public trust 
in science initially responded by making a firm commitment to the progressive role of 
science in society. However, s/he also worried that there was a lack of controls in place 
which could ensure that the potential benefits of agricultural genetics would address 
public needs and not just those of the corporations. S/he does not blame industry for 
developing products targeted towards securing commercial profits l2 but reprehends 
Government for not providing alternative paths of innovation. The root of the problem, 
s/he argues, is a shortage of financial support for "independent research" in the field of 
genetics which could meet social needs not covered by commercial interests. A senior 
official in an organization representing corporate interest in crop protection technologies, 
the participant offers the following comments: 
12 
"I've got a scientific background so I have an inclination towards progress 
and scientific research coming up with new ideas. So I don't think we can, 
or should, stop progress. I think that humanity will always have that 
curiosity to not only know how things work but to push the boundaries and 
play around with things... There are so many things in scientific 
development that could be used for good or for bad. I think it is up to 
society to make sure that it has the proper controls in place to make sure that 
scientific developments are used for the good." 
A university based geneticist and supporter of GM crops offers a more critical take on the relationship 
between industry and science. Although willing to lend herlhis support in speaking on behalf of the safety 
and benefits of GM crops, the participant differentiates this from giving support to the way the 
corporations have proceeded with the technology. Speaking of the role of herlhis advocacy group, s,he 
states: "We offer a service to give balanced information, but we are defending the technology and gene 
recombination, not the fact that Monsanto are using it for this or that... I am willing to discuss how this 
type of technology can be one, and I stress one, of a useful toolbox to use to solve critical issues in the 
world. It would be a shame to throwaway that potential. But, I'm not necessarily going to defend the 
policies of Monsanto to produce Bt cotton in such and such an environment." (Participant S). 
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"You have touched a bit of a. sensitivity with me in terms of university 
research because a lot of that IS funded by industry now. It has been the 
Gove~.ent t~at h~s. pushed us in that direction. A lot of people that are 
workIng In UnIVerSItIes spend an awful lot of their time gettina research 
money.from industry as you are aware... If society is not willing °to pay for 
quote 'Independent research' then it is going to have to come to terms that 
industry is going to pay for a large proportion of it and make commercial 
gain out of it where appropriate." (Participant B) 
Others more forcefully pressed the need for publicly funded independent 
agricultural science and were far more critical of the relationship between agricultural 
genetics and industry. For example, a farmer and director of an organization 
representing small acreage farms in Britain advanced the need for a public science to 
instil an ethos of precaution in the innovation of new agricultural technologies. The 
participant suggests that the current domination of agricultural science by industry has 
resulted in a development model based on getting products to market as quickly as 
possible. The consequence s/he ascertains from this argument is that profits have 
become the motivating force behind genetic research and adequate attention is not being 
given to assuring product safety. As the passage below outlines, science needs to take 
issues of risks more seriously, firstly on the grounds of safety, but also as a step towards 
fostering public trust in agricultural development. The participant remains unconvinced 
that the benefits of the crops, as they stand, outweigh these potentially deleterious 
consequences. S/he states: 
"Most farmers' attitude toward GM is that they don't want it right now. The 
public don't want it. But, don't throw the baby out with the bathwater. 
There might be something in it, so carry on the research. I think one of the 
problems that has happened in agriculture was that agricultural research is 
no longer funded by government in this country. [Government research] had 
no commercial axe to grind. It did take many years for things to come 
through, but the research was pretty thorough. Now the research tends to be 
done by commercial companies who obviously don't want to spend twenty 
years researching something ifthey can get it to market in five ... I remember 
there was a story that Monsanto admitted to. I can't remember what crop it 
was, but when they transferred the gene they wanted into this crop they also 
discovered some time later, after it had been commercialized, that they had 
transferred five or six other genes they hadn't intended to at the same time. 
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And it was like 'oh well, what does it matter.' To me at that time I was 
thinking well how do you know it doesn't matter. Where is the research?" 
(Participant H). 
These comments reflect a commonly expressed view by participants that 
industry's domination of agricultural science was related to the corporate control of 
agriculture in general. In the previous chapter elements of industrial control were 
discussed. For example, participants were concerned that the benefits of agricultural 
biotechnology were directed solely towards the life-industry and that consumers were 
being given very 1!~t1e choice about the types of foods and agricultural systems being 
developed in Britain. However, participants were also worried that new agricultural 
technologies could be used to force farmers to adopt industrial systems of agricultural 
production based on intensive cropping systems and meeting the demands of global 
markets 13 . The farmer cited above was, in this sense, not only worried about risk and 
public support for agriculture, but was further concerned that farmers, particularly the 
small and family farmers s/he represented, were being cast aside by the life-industry. 
The type of agriculture represented and engendered by GM crops was described as less 
capable of responding to local needs or incorporating the knowledge oflocal members of 
the agricultural community. In the following statement the participant declares that 
industry'S approach to agricultural innovation undermines the knowledge of crop welfare 
and plant breeding which farmers bring to the agricultural industry: 
"There is a lot of apprehension and a growing awareness of the corporate 
control of farming ... Farmers don't express it very well, but if you narrow 
down the genetic field into very few lines, if those lines are susceptible to 
anything you can have big problems. Among smaller farmers there is a 
growing awareness that these companies are breeding very few varieties ... 
When I was a student the lists of varieties of different types of barley or 
wheat were almost endless. Now there is twenty to twenty-five main 
varieties, which account for probably 90% of the cropping and many of 
those are related. A lot of them are susceptible to disease. But, of course 
that's all right, because most of the seed breeding companies are also owned 
by companies that will sell you sprays to treat the diseases." (Participant H) 
13 
For a more complete discussion of agricultural biotechnology and the corporate control of farming please 
refer to the work of Goodman and Reddift (1991: pp. 167-200). 
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The prioritization of local fonns of agricultural development was also made by 
participants in reference to calls for scientific innovation to be more closely correlated 
with the needs of local communities. To recall, an argument was put forward by a 
lobbyist in the previous chapter which suggested that agricultural technologies must do a 
better job at reflecting human needs and respecting values of equality and justice. 
Continuing this line of argumentation, the participant propounds that, in order to reflect 
these needs and values, entrepreneurial projects should avoid altering local people's 
approaches to agriculture. Instead of working on a belief that Southern farmers are 
underdeveloped --lacking the methods, tools and experience of the developed word 
(Escobar, 1995b: pp.213-214) - the participant argues that science needs to work in 
coordination with local peoples. For example, this might include applying genetic 
technologies to crop breeds and cropping systems which respect the diversity of species 
grown by fanners in the developing world and which consequently meet the cultural and 
material needs of the population. Crucially, the participant argues, the pursuit of "public 
sector" innovations must be advanced for reasons other than commercial gain alone. 
Thus, even if these innovations are unlikely to generate the same types of commercial 
successes associated with more industrial fanning systems and their ties to global 
markets they must be backed by science and society. S/he states: 
"The real solution today with technologies is to try to find ways in which 
fanners, and especially poor fanners, are able to influence the type of 
science being developed ... To have both public sector science and a small 
entrepreneurial science, particularly companies that can be based in the 
South, work with those fanners to develop those technologies. There will 
certainly be significant areas of technology which have a for profit 
possibility and it should be used so as to be beneficial to everyone. And 
there are areas of pi ant breeding and fanning systems which really can only 
be developed very closely with the fanner and by the public sector because 
it will never be profitable in the commercial sense." (Participant Q) 
As each of the above cited participants have suggested, issues of trust and debates 
over the role of science in society closely appertain to the role of industry in the 
development of new agricultural technologies. More accurately, each of the extracts 
cited above outlines an argument for the inclusion of some form of public science, as 
opposed to the industrial model of innovation which is seen to dominate the 
development of GM agriculture to date. However, the way in which public science was 
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defined varied considerably, although all participants identified it as an alternative which 
could emphasise public needs over those of the corporation. For some, public science 
could be accomplished in conjunction with life-industry led research science if the 
Government were willing to fund it. For others, the barriers to public science were 
deeper rooted, involving efforts on the part of industry to advance industrialized market-
based systems of agricultural production. Corporately controlled science, as these 
participants described, was seen to fail society by emphasising profit instead of caution, 
by seeking supplant the local knowledge of farmers and by ignoring the needs of local 
communities. 
Summary 
The above discussion embeds participants' political engagements with new 
agricultural technologies within a debate over the robustness of scientific knowledge in 
society. In other words, the potentially progressive role of science in society was not 
judged in terms of its ability to make claims to absolute knowledge, but in its capacity to 
reflect the social needs and normative valuations of society. Participants described their 
position and motivations in the debate over GM crops and foods in reference to a context 
in which the value of scientific knowledge had become the subject of considerable public 
scepticism. Following events such as BSE, this lack of confidence in the scientific 
epistemology was related, in particular, to the inability of science to understand and 
manage the risks associated with technological development. Within this context of 
uncertainty, the debate over new agricultural technologies is, therefore, both the product 
and producer of an evolving debate over the relationship between science and the pUblic. 
One manifestation of this debate related to the desire of participants for a public 
alternative to prevailing models of agricultural science which were perceived to be 
dominated by industry and under the direction of corporate interests and values. As was 
the situation described in the case of sustainable development, this debate did not pit 
science against non-science, or necessarily cast industry science against public science. 
Participants, both for and against GM agriculture, saw public science as a means of 
improving the ability of science to meet the needs of Britons in general. However, 
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controversies involving issues of trust in science did arise in relation to what a public 
science might look like. It is in these contested visions of public science where, what 
should by now be familiar cultural contestations over the position and values of the life-
industry, once again took centre stage in the debate over new agricultural technologies. 
Science and the Governance of Risk 
A final way in which participants contested the role of science in society relates 
to the role of science in the governance of risk. In the previous section participants 
situated the controversy over GM crops and foods in a context of scientific uncertainty 
and distnlst in prevailing models of industrial innovation and corporate science. 
Similarly this section addresses the way in which participants contested scientific 
authority in the identification and management of the possible risks associated with 
agricultural development. However, here an analysis of issues of trust and science are 
extended to a lack of confidence in science as applied in the governance of new 
agricultural technologies. This section thus seeks to address how debates over 
agricultural biotechnology relate to attempts by participants to renegotiate the 
relationship between expertise and governance. 
Governance and the Public 
The public and its relationship to expertise were the focus of participants' 
engagement with issues of trust and the scientific governance of new agricultural 
technologies. As such, it is necessary to re-emphasize the importance participants 
granted the context of uncertainty which permeates the debate over agricultural 
biotechnology. Participants voiced considerable apprehensions about whether the 
Government would be able to apply science in effectively determining the risks of GM 
crops and foods, or in making appropriate regulatory decisions about the future of these 
technologies. Moreover, perceiving this void in trust, several participants advanced the 
need for greater public involvement in expert decision-making processes. 
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As suggested, when speaking about the authority of science in general, 
participants linked issues of trust, science and governance to the context of uncertaint\' 
created by events such as BSE. Without labouring this point, the two following 
statements forthrightly articulate the attitude of several participants. Their comments 
reflect an uncertainty in the ability of science and Government to avoid repeating past 
failures in making decisions about the future of agricultural biotechnology. The first 
extract relates to the Government's mishandling of scientific advice and the failure to 
communicate uncertainty and risk effectively with the public during the BSE affair of the 
1990s. The second statement mockingly criticizes the veracity of the Government's use 
of science as a means of public reassurance about the potential risks of GM food: 
"There are a lot of issues about democracy, participating in the decisions 
which are being made. As well as being kept informed. BSE and the fact 
that there was a lot of misinformation coming from science and the 
Government has made people very wary of the evidence that is being 
presented." (Participant C) 
"You have the Government who obviously likes to wheel out someone in the 
proverbial white coat and say 'look, listen to them, they're a scientist and say 
it's all OK.' And we're supposed to say 'phew' it's all OK and tuck back 
into our GM processed meal that we have in the microwave." (Participant I) 
A more analytical account of the loss of trust in scientific governance was 
presented by a consumer advocate. The participant argues that questions about the social 
robustness of science have effected a fundamental change in the relationship between 
science, government and the public. More specifically, s/he hypothesizes that public 
expectation about the role of scientific knowledge in managing risk has changed in post-
BSE Britain. The public not only distrust Government scientists in their white coats, but 
as a consequence of the diminishment of scientific authority, they are described as 
willing to take more control over the mediation of risks themselves: 
"I think that we have seen a change in people's attitudes, and in the 
Government's attitude as well. Historically people have expected 
government to take care of them and to take decisions on the behalf of the 
whole and we would anticipate and expect that they would put our safety 
pretty high up their agenda of things... Obviously that has changed for a 
number of reasons. Partly because Government doesn't necessarily see itself 
as playing that role any more ... In many ways it's much more sort of hands-
off government these days. Coupled with that people's expectations are 
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quite different... [P]eople said 'we want to be more informed, we want to 
know what is going on, we don't want all these decisions taken on our 
behalf.' BSE was a classic example of where, quite rightly, our faith in 
those that s~ould have been looking after our interests, was absolutely 
sh~ke~. ThIS does. have broader implications... People are questioning 
sCIentIsts and medIcal people and they are no longer willing to accept 
reassurances of experts." (Participant D) 
The participant's comments do not bemoan the loss of scientific credibility and 
scientific authority, nor do they perceive the solutions to risk issues as the need to do 
science better, or for governments to apply science better. Rather, her/his comments 
pose some critical- questions pertaining to the governance of new agricultural 
technologies. These include, 'who should make decisions about the future of GM crops 
and foods?' 'who should be responsible for determining the acceptability of risk?' and 
'what types of knowledge should form the basis of these decisions?' Herlhis response to 
these questions is that the input of the public should be central in any attempt to regulate 
risk and govern the use of agricultural biotechnology. Several participants thus saw the 
public involvement in regulation as a means of democratizing governance and expanding 
notions of governance. For example, a politician with an interest in agricultural issues 
made the case for the inclusion of public voices in making regulatory decisions about the 
commercialization of GM crops and foods. Although generally supportive of 
agricultural biotechnology, the participant makes the case for reversing a trend which has 
seen the exclusion of the public from processes of governance in the past. A trend, 
which s/he suggests, has led to public disillusionment in governments and a distrust of 
politicians: 
"It is very important that you try to take into account the views of the public 
in ways that they can feel engaged in the decision making process and where 
they can see that their views have actually been listened to and responded to. 
There has got to be better ways to take into account public opinion and I 
think this is part of the reason why our political mechanism sometimes gets 
sidelined, because people say 'well they don't listen,' 'they don't take 
account of our views.' So better ways of doing that have got to be a way 
forward ... That's why they put politicians in place, because they want them 
to make sensible decisions based on well informed debate, and they want to 
be part of it." (Participant L) 
Other participants argued that public engagements with the governance of 
agricultural biotechnology should be extended beyond decision making processes. This 
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was the argument made by a campaigner calling for a moratorium on the development 
and commercialization of agricultural biotechnology. S/he suggests that being in\'oh'ed 
in the decision making process means going back to ask the public fundamental 
questions about whether they believe biotechnology is "a good development for UK 
agriculture, or not" (Participant C). An anti-OM campaigner from the environmental 
lobby likewise argues that the entire process of techno-scientific innovation must be 
democratically opened to the public (Participant T). S/he suggests that democratic 
participation is not an end in itself, but that the value of public participation is moreover 
evident in the perspectives and experiences the public brings to the table. Each of the 
two statements cited below suggests that increased public involvement can help place the 
debates over OMOs in a broader context than pemiitted by scientific risk analysis alone. 
The first extract, from an anti-OM lobbyist, labels the non-expert contributions of the 
public as a "common sense" approach to decision making. The second statement, made 
by a consumer advocate, argues that any decision over the future of genetics in 
agriculture will involve a judgement call about the risks and benefits of these 
technologies. It is in these areas, the participant states, that the public are well placed to 
be involved in that process: 
"I think there is a need for the general public ... to be asked directly as to 
what they feel about the new technology along several key stages along the 
process of approval. Often, I think if there was that sort of common sense 
filter by the general public, a lot ofthings wouldn't get past the starting gate. 
They would be perceived to be frivolous or ethically unacceptable ... Often, 
although they may not know all the ins and outs of the science of a new 
technology, the public apply some good common sense questions which 
means that the scientists involved actually have to think about what they are 
doing in a wider context." (Participant T) 
"You have to make a judgement about the introduction of any new 
technology or new product and judgements cannot be about science alone, 
Being a politician, you can't hide behind science. You have to look at all the 
other factors that come to bear [whether they are] ethical, moral, or 
economic. Science is important, but it's not the be all and end all. .. " 
(Participant D) 
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Reasserting the Autonomy of Scientific Knowledge 
Many of the scientists interviewed as part of this research project were cognizant 
of the arguments being made around the public trust in science and the role of scientific 
expertise in governance. However, several of the scientists who expressed support for 
the commercialization of new agricultural technologies felt some of the criticisms 
levelled against their discipline were unjust. In making these claims they proposed an 
alternative vision of science in governance to that which has been the subject of criticism 
above. In doing so, they are seeking to reassert the autonomy and validity of scientific 
knowledge, its role in society and its role in governance in particular. 
In Chapter Two the idea of a technocracy was put forward as a way of theorizing 
the link between scientific authority and government decision making. Conceptually it 
posited that science, through discourses of objectivity and factuality, exerts tremendous 
influence in governance without being held politically accountable. A common 
argument made by scientists in defending public trust in scientific knowledge was to 
deny the existence of these sorts of technocratic relationships. As a plant geneticist 
working in industry asserted, the scientific discipline involves fundamental processes 
through which scientific ideas are actively challenged and debated. In herlhis day-to-day 
work the participant describes working in an environment in which scientific uncertainty 
is the norm. Risks are not discussed conclusively, but are described in terms of 
probabilities. If scientists have got themselves into hot water, the argument follows, it is 
because they have not been able to translate these probabilities to the media or 
Government who are seen to desire certainty in their relationship with the public: 
"Scientists are trained right from the start to never put their head on the line 
and say things are black and white. It's always grey ... [I]f you read a 
scientific paper people never make very bold statements. They say, 'this 
potentially would indicate that... , But, then if you go to a politician they are 
great at avoiding the question. If they do have to give an answer, they will 
give quite a blank straightforward answer which can leave [scientists] in hot 
water. I think interpretation is really a key point. We might be writing 
scientific reports and there are not clear messages coming out of those 
because we are talking about risk and possibilities. Yet, as a politician or a 
journalist, you need to get the clear facts down on the paper." (Participant 
U). 
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Other participants similarly argued that it is not the responsibility of scientists to 
make political decisions. The role of science in governance is posited solely as 
providing advice to Governments. It is, therefore, seen to be up to the politicians to 
weigh the scientific evidence provided about new agricultural technologies in relation to 
any other relevant considerations. This might mean taking account of public attitudes 
towards GM crops including the types of common sense knowledge identified by the 
environmental lobbyist cited above. Or, it may involve weighing one set of scientific 
conclusions, such as the safety evaluations produced by industry, against those presented 
by environmentally focussed or publicly based scientific alternatives. As a senior 
scientist involved in the risk evaluation of growing GM crops on the environment 
argued, if ministers feel there are factors, other than scientific advice, which would 
change the conclusions that they come to, "then they have to make the decision to do 
that" (Participant R). The responsibility for the consequences of any decisions is thus 
placed squarely on the shoulders of the politicians. As the comment below outlines, 
some participants felt it was unfair to blame scientists, or the limitations of the scientific 
epistemology, for the mishandling of events, such as BSE. Reticent to accept any 
accountability for the risks to which the British public were exposed during the BSE 
scandal, a pro-GM plant ecologist offers the following statement: 
"I have gotten increasingly annoyed with the way that scientists have been 
accused and blamed for so many evils, in the wake ofthings like BSE, Foot 
and Mouth, etc. Whereas I think it's predominantly the media and 
politicians' fault in the sense that what science can do is offer you the 
information, but the actual decisions need to be made by politicians and 
regulators. I think it is very unfair of them to tum around to you as a 
scientist and say "What should you do 7" What scientists can do, is offer 
their scientific opinion and offer the facts and figures. The actual political 
decision needs to be firmly in the hands of the politician, and they're 
basically not doing their job if they don't do so."(Participant S) 
As these comments suggest, participants sought to reassert the autonomy of 
science, freeing it from any political entanglements with governance. In reading these 
statements, it is important to recall that in theorizing the relationship between science 
and governance, a technocracy was not delimited solely in terms of the undue influence 
of scientific expertise in government. In addition, the theory dictated that the influence 
of scientific authority on regulatory processes stemmed from an ability to project science 
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as an unbiased fonn of knowledge. In other words, it is precisely because of its ability to 
project its knowledge as factual and apolitical, that science gained its authority in 
decision making. The above comments can therefore be read as a denial of the direct 
role and responsibility of science in governance, but also as a reaffirmation of the basis 
of scientific authority. For some participants in the science community this meant that 
although they could accept the admission of alternative types of evaluation to 
governance, they still felt that an apolitical objective science should be given priority. 
Let the "facts come through," as one participant said (Participant 0). The following 
excerpt from an interview with a representative of the crop protection industry underlines 
the move to fall back on scientific authority: 
"[W]e are very much a science-based industry. All our products are 
discovered and developed, using scientific techniques and processes. We are 
required, whether you are talking chemistry or biotechnology, to submit data 
packages to regulatory authorities to satisfy them and to satisfy ourselves 
about safety and so on. So, what the industry is saying is that it expects 
those scientific data to be assessed on a scientific basis... If we are 
developing new products and we do the scientific research, we want that 
scientific research t.o be judged according to sound science and not a 
political judgement. Having said that, the industry now recognizes that 
science is not enough. That we have to fulfill other needs and obligations 
beyond science if we are going to get acceptance of new technologies... I 
think we recognize that it is a combination of science and other factors. But, 
we still feel that the fundamental assessment of a new chemical or 
technology should be based on science." (Participant B) 
Stated directly, although denying the technocratic accusations made against 
science and adopting a language of openness, many participants sought to reaffirm the 
traditional foundations of science's power in society. Willing to accept the possibility of 
including alternative knowledge and fielding public concerns about new agricultural 
technologies, science remains separated from these alternatives and outside of the 
political milieu. As Richardson et al. (1993: p. 16) have pointed out, the danger of this 
approach is that by seeking to reassert the autonomy of scientific knowledge, science 
enters into a potentially adversarial and hierarchical relationship with the public. 
Therefore, without seeing science as a social enterprise which is itself entangled in the 
politics of new agricultural technologies, scientists can offer little in the way of 
contending with public scepticism about the authority of science. In other words, 
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participants who agreed it was necessary to acknowledge alternative forms of expertise 
in decision making, but who continued to hold onto a belief in the certainty of scientific 
knowledge, might be accused of trying to have their cake and eat it too. 
Summary 
This section of the chapter has looked at the ways in which the debate over 
agricultural biotechnology is intertwined with debates about the role of science in 
governance. Participants, several of whom were opposed to the use -of genetics in 
agriculture, expressed a deep distrust of scientists and the role of scientific knowledge in 
formulating government policy concerning the regulation of GM crops and foods. As a 
consequence of this degradation in trust, participants argued that public expectations 
about the way in which risks can be handled by society are changing. Instead of relying 
on scientific expertise, participants asserted that the public should be given greater 
control and responsibility in directing the future of agricultural biotechnology at all 
points during its development and regulation. 
Responding to these criticisms, several pro-GM scientists argued that public 
distrust in science was unfounded. Denying the existence of technocratic practices of 
governance, they shifted the blame for past errors in contending with risk, along with the 
responsibility for making appropriate decisions about the future of agricultural 
biotechnology, on the shoulders of the Government. It was argued that scientists don't 
make decisions, but only offer advice. It follows that it is up to the politicians and 
legislators to apply scientific expertise as they see fit. From this basis, some of the 
scientists interviewed were also able to envision a potential role for other forms of 
expertise alongside science in the regulation of new agricultural technologies. However, 
in some cases this awareness was undermined by attempts to reassert the autonomy of 
scientific knowledge. By seeking to place science's contribution to governance outside 
of the socio-political milieu surrounding genetic technologies, the reassertion of 
scientific autonomy potentially undermines attempts to rebuild trust between science and 
the pUblic. 
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In summary, opponents and proponents of agricultural biotechnology presented 
two different visions of the role of science in society. Those concerned about the risks of 
agricultural biotechnology, and the Government's ability to prevent and manage these 
potential risks, required a fundamental rethinking of the interaction between expertise 
and governance. Proponents of agricultural biotechnology, particularly from within the 
corporate-scientific community, presented a more traditional model of scientific 
knowledge based on its ability to produce objective knowledge about risks. In this way, 
despite their sometimes conciliatory tone, these participants have sought to hold on to 
the ability to speak authoritatively about issues of risk and safety. 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to address the ways in which the political controversies 
pervading the development of new agricultural technologies relate to contestations over 
the role of science in society. Through a discussion of the arguments advanced by 
participants actively involved in the debate, three conclusions can be drawn from the 
research data. 
Firstly, in contesting the role of science in society, the comments of participants 
reaffirmed theories of risk which argue that public trust in the progressive ideologies of 
science, and its ability to protect society from technological hazards, has waned 
considerably in recent years. However, participants did not outrightly reject the role of 
science and scientific authority in society. Rather, in response to concerns about the 
robustness of science in society, participants presented multiple versions of scientific 
innovation. For example, both environmentally sustainable and publically directed 
models of scientific practice were advanced as alternatives to the perceived dominance 
of corporate science. Moreover, within these categories, participants from across the 
debate offered multiple and contested versions of how these alternatives could be 
demarcated. Similarly, in discussing the relationship between science and governance, 
participants did not seek to displace scientific authority, but put forward the need for 
public forms of expertise to supplement the contributions of scientists. 
-158-
Secondly, in debating the values of different types of science, participants tied 
contestations over the role of science in society to normative contestations over the value 
of certain types of social relationships. For example, in discussing alternative visions of 
sustainable development in agriculture, participants contested what acceptable social 
relationships between agricultural development and the environment should entail. 
Likewise, in demarcating various versions of public science participants debated the role 
of industry and corporate values in directing innovation and change in society. Finally, 
participants debated how, and to what degree, governments should democratize 
participation in decision making and open up the types of knowledge involved in the 
regulation of new agricultural technologies. 
Thirdly, public engagement with science arid new agricultural technologies 
comprised a repeated theme throughout this chapter. Debating the role of science in 
society, in other words, implied debating the role of society - the public - in science. 
Most directly, participants engaged in attempts to democratize citizen-science-
government relations. Reflecting research in the public understanding of science, 
discussed in Chapter Two, participants argued that public values and experiences could 
play an important role in weighing the risks and benefits of new agricultural 
technologies. However, public engagement was not only sought in relation to the 
governance of agricultural biotechnology, but at all points in its innovation and 
development. For example, some participants argued that science needed to be able to 
take better account of public needs and knowledge if it were to playa trustworthy and 
beneficial role in the development of agriculture. 
In conclusion, debates over the risks and benefits of new agricultural 
technologies need to be understood within a social context in which traditional forms of 
scientific authority are being openly challenged. These challenges have opened up 
important avenues for allowing society to reevaluate the way it conceptualizes and 
manages risk. Thus, instead of seeing the loss of scientific authority as decreasing 
society's ability to contend with risk, contestations over the role of science in society 
provide an opportunity to address risks in a more socially robust and democratic fashion. 
Building on the discussions above, this thesis now turns attention towards a more 
detailed analysis of the ability, and willingness, of Governments to take up this 
-159-
opportunity in regulating risks and making decisions about the future of new agricultural 
technologies. 
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PARTTHREE:GOVERNANCE 
"From our perspective, public participation in what have been treated as 
exclusively expert deliberations and decision processes is about making prior 
framing assumptions, including technical ones, open to questions and 
accountable answers. Public participation is not simply about adding on 
'extra-scientific' dimensions to decision making, as irall scientific issues 
were settled." 
- The PABE Report (Marris et aI, 2001: p. 93) 
"There is a priority in being open to the idea that it's legitimate to hear, 
digest and act on the views of all the diversity of stakeholders. Government 
should not feel threatened by that, but to see it as a strength. They should be 
more open about uncertainties. You'll find that governments don't need to 
know everything. They don't have to get up and say, 'it's all perfectly safe.' 
The world will not fall apart if we're treated as adults and [government] 
explains to us that 'no we do not know everything, but this is what we do 
know, and this is what we don't know.' [Government] should feel 
comfortable to say, 'we would like to talk to you about this and then figure 
out how, as a society, we deal with it. ", 
- A consumer advocate concerned about the 
regulation of GM crops and foods. (Participant D) 
I 
CHAPTER SEVEN: BSE, PHILLIPS AND THE UPTAKE OF RISK 1 
Introduction 
Throughout the first two sections of this thesis the politics of new agricultural 
technologies have been described in a way which has placed technological controversies 
concerning risk in a social context. In particular, uncertainties pertaining to the 
potentially negative environmental and health consequences of GM crops and foods have 
been tied to participants' concerns about the role of industry and science in British 
society. Over the next three chapters this thesis shifts its focus to address the ways in 
which the Government is able to accommodate these politics in contending with the 
potential risks of GM crops and foods and in making a decision about the future of these 
technologies. 
As suggested at points throughout the previous chapters, the governance of risk is 
not a novel issue in relation to the development of new agricultural technologies, but 
over the last decade has become a prevalent feature of the British political arena. The 
Government, at the forefront of the need to contend with risk and uncertainty in 
agriculture, finds itself facing a dual challenge. Firstly, in a climate of increasing 
industrialization and technological innovation, the Government is expected to make 
sound regulatory decisions within a context in which scientific advice is perceived as 
inconclusive and the potentials for hazard ever present. Secondly, there is an increasing 
awareness that governments cannot rely on science alone in making these decisions, but 
must furthermore come to terms with the social context in which technological 
Versions of this Chapter have been published in the Canadian Journal of Sociology (Jones, 2001) and in 
an edited collection of essays concerning the Governance of Knowledge (Jones, 2003). 
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controversies take place. Trust in government, science, and industry, changing 
definitions of expertise and the weighing of the potential benefits of new agricultural 
technologies with their potential hazards are all key elements of the context in which risk 
controversies are enacted. Risk, understood in relation to this dual challenge, is revealed 
not simply as a technical and regulatory problem, but more broadly as a challenge to 
governance and institutional credibility. The politics of risk, in other words, are also the 
politics of knowledge, consent and of contingency. 
The two-decade-long history ofBSE and the Government's response to the 
disease, therefore,-provides an important case study of how British social institutions 
have been able to cope with risk and uncertainty. In this sense, the lessons learned from 
the mishandling ofBSE have challenged Government to rethink the ways in which it 
approaches the risks and regulation of agricultural biotechnology (e.g. ABBC, 2001). In 
particular, Lord Phillips' report (Phillips et aI., 2000a) from the BSE Inquiry, submitted 
to the House of Commons in October 2000, sets the tone for Government to follow. The 
task of the Inquiry was to review the emergence and identification ofBSE and vCJD in 
the United Kingdom, along with the adequacy of the actions taken by the Government in 
response to these diseases. 
This chapter presents an account of the strengths and weaknesses of the Phillips 
report with the intention of beginning a critical dialogue about how the Government is 
able to contend with ideas of risk and uncertainty. This involves re-evaluating not only 
how these terms are applied, but also how we treat them theoretically. By contrasting 
theories of the risk society with more contextual, or cultural, accounts of risk, a clear 
need to move beyond technical, scientific, and managerial approaches to risk is 
exemplified within the limitations of the Phillips report. It argues that Government must 
move towards an understanding of risk that can be linked to broader cultural and 
political processes, such as those identified in previous chapters, if it is to learn from the 
BSE crises in directing an approach to the governance of new agricultural technologies. 
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BSE: An Overview 
The history ofBSE, or "mad-cow" disease as it became popularly known, is 
simultaneously a scientific and a social story. Neither story encapsulates the history of 
BSE on its own. Instead, it is in the interplay between the science ofBSE and the social 
response to BSE that we find the heart of the controversy and that which is of the 
greatest consequence for how we move forward in contending with risk issues in 
agriculture in the future. This section provides a very brief overview of the primary 
elements of this story. 
The origins of the scientific history ofBSE go back to 19852 when veterinarians 
from the then Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Foods (MAFF) investigated the 
unusual death of a cow on a farm in Kent. Scientists later diagnosed that the cow had 
died as the result of contracting a type of disease known as a transmissible spongiform 
encephalopathy (TSE). TSEs are neuro-degenerative diseases that cause the rapid 
degeneration of brain cells in the victim. In cattle, animals afflicted with the disease 
display symptoms of extreme nervousness, hypersensitivity to touch, and loss of balance. 
Television news footage of cows stumbling, falling over, and being unable to get to their 
feet became one of the iconic images of the disease (Ford, 1996: p. 18). "Mad cows" 
were not seen as angry, as connoted by the North American usage of the term 'mad,' but 
as mentally deranged, insane, and as we will see shortly, as dangerous (Leach, 1998: pp. 
126-7). BSE is a disease that progresses quickly, induces considerable suffering on the 
animal, and is invariably fatal (Ridley and Baker, 1998). 
At the time, as remains the case today, scientific knowledge about TSEs was 
fragmented and contested. Uncertainty about these types of diseases was compounded 
by the fact that the veterinary community had not previously encountered TSEs in cattle. 
Veterinary science did have some experience with TSEs in agriculture as scrapie - the 
ovine form of the disease - has long been present in British sheep populations. 
The Phillips report (2000b: xviii) now speculates that BSE probably fIrst surfaced in the 1970s: Thus, . 
although the offIcial history of the disease begins in 1985, its origins are somewhat older. Th~ ImplicatIOn 
of which is that BSE infected material would have entered the nation's food supply around thIS same time, 
although it is not possible to speculate to what extent this was the case. 
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However, despite this familiarity, science, industry, and Government were essentially 
facing a novel veterinary disease of which they had little certain scientific know ledge. 
Although some scientists speculated that there was a direct link between scrapie and 
BSE (later proven incorrect), it was unknown why the disease had suddenly developed in 
cattle and there existed little accurate knowledge to explain how the disease could be 
transmitted amongst the cattle population. 
If the science of BSE was uncertain, the potential hazards the disease posed for 
human health were even more poorly understood. Scientists in the 1980s had no idea of 
whether or not BS-E would be pathogenic to humans. Veterinary science's experience 
with scrapie appeared to suggest that the risks posed to humans would be minimal. In the 
250 years society has known about scrapie there is no evidence to suggest the disease 
was ever transmitted to humans by means of the food chain or directly linked to a human 
form ofTSE (Narang, 1997: p. 3). However, scientists did know that it was at least 
possible for TSEs to jump species barriers, possibly from sheep to cows, or from cows to 
humans. Scientists further postulated that even if scrapie had jumped into the cattle 
popUlation, there was still no way of knowing what properties the disease would develop 
in cattle, or whether the disease would even exhibit attributes similar to those of scrapie 
(Millstone and Zwanenberg, 2001: p. 102). It is upon these shaky foundations that early 
appraisals of the minimal risk ofBSE to humans were generated; appraisals now know 
to be ill-conceived. Much of the BSE story, therefore, pertains to the question of why 
the Government proceeded to act on these misguided assumptions for almost the entirety 
of the disease's history (Phillips et aI., 2000c: para. 11)3. 
In the mid 1990s it became clear that BSE indeed posed a health hazard to the 
British consumer. A full decade after identifying the disease in cattle, the Government 
announced in March 1996 that scientists had diagnosed a new variant of 
Creutzfeldt-Jacobs Disease (CJD) in ten young people and that the disease was strongly 
linked to BSE. Despite the rarity of CJD, medicine had been actively treating those with 
The Government's position on the human health risks of BSE come largely from the fmdings of the 
Southwood Working Party-an ad hoc expert panel create~ in 1988 to advise ~inister,~ on the p~tentlal 
ramifications of BSE. The subsequent report of the Workmg Party stated that It was most unlikely that 
BSE would have any implications for human health" (cited in Phillips et al., 2000b: p. xx). 
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the disease since it was first identified in the 1920s. However, the new variant of the 
disease (vCJD) was markedly different from CJD. Those inflicted with vCJD are 
significantly younger, display psychiatric symptoms much earlier and suffer a longer 
duration of illness than those suffering from traditional CJD (Phillips et aI., 2000d: 
paragraph 6.1). Pathologically, those suffering from vCJD display symptoms very 
similar to cattle suffering from BSE. The first signs of the disease are seen in changes in 
behaviour and mood (e.g., depression). Often, at the early stage of the disease, victims 
with these symptoms were diagnosed incorrectly and referred to psychiatric treatment 
(Phillips et aI., 20QOd: para. 6). As the disease progresses victims suffer from 
debilitations in movement and from loss of memory (Narang, 1997: p. 222). vCJD, like 
BSE, is fatal without exception. 
The 1996 announcement brought public anger over BSE to a head. Media 
coverage, which had lulled in the early 1990s, exploded and BSE and vCJD again 
dominated the newspapers and TV news programming (Kitzinger and Reilly, 1997: pp. 
343-4). Many in the public, with their fears over the safety of British beef now 
confirmed, stopped buying beef or went further and joined the swelling ranks of British 
vegetarians. Industry, already suffering from this sudden loss of domestic confidence in 
British beef, suffered a further blow on March 1997 when the Commission of the 
European Union banned the export of all British bovine products (European 
Commission, 1996). Facing an angry citizenry, the potential downfall of the British 
livestock industry and European sanctions, the Government came under increasing 
pressure to halt the disease and restore faith in British industry and in government 
institutions, policy and regulation. 
Phillips and Risk 
Almost two years after the Go~ernment's announcement linking vCJD and BSE, 
and within a context of public anger and mistrust, Agriculture Minister Jack 
Cunningham announced the establishment of the BSE Inquiry to the Parliament in 
December 1997. Chaired by Lord Justice Phillips, the BSE Inquiry was given the 
following mandate: 
-166-
"To establish and review the history of the emergence and identification of 
BSE and variant ClD in the United Kingdom and of the action taken in 
response to it up t? 2~ March 1996; to reach conclusions on the adequacy of 
that response, takIng mto account the state of knowledge at the time; and to 
report on these matters to the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 
the Secretary of State for Health and the Secretaries of State for Scotland 
, 
Wales and Northern Ireland." (Phillips et aI., 2000b: p. xvii) 
The Inquiry was asked for a step by step account of why it took Government and 
industry so long to gain control over the disease in cattle and acknowledge the potential 
hazards it posed to humans. However, in producing a response to this rather 
straightforward, afthough difficult, task the Inquiry ran up against so-me persistent and 
much less straightforward questions about the ability of social institutions, and 
governments in particular, to contend with the complexity of modem society. This 
included an interrogation of the ability of government and industry to react to the 
potential hazards proposed by complex technical and industrial systems of production 
that are increasingly characteristic of modem agriculture in Britain. Phillips recognizes 
that this matter is further complicated by the fact that we are seldom fully, if at all, aware 
of the dangers we face from these systems. When the mandate refers to the "state of 
knowledge [about BSE and vClD] at the time," it refers not only to what scientists knew 
and did not know about BSE and vClD. The mandate also might be read as the need to 
take account of the Government response to BSE according to what science could not be 
expected to know or may not even be able to know; the "unknown unknowns" as 
Grove-White (2001) refers to them. 
In addressing this mandate and conveying the outcomes of the BSE Inquiry to the 
public, the Phillips report relies heavily on concepts of risk and uncertainty. In doing so, 
the report most closely reflects notions of risk associated with the work of Ulrich Beck 
(1992) and Anthony Giddens (1990). To recall from Chapter Two, risk according to 
these authors is a catch-all term that characterizes the rapid and profound changes society 
is undergoing as it is transformed from one stage of modernity to the next. Hence, the 
authors propose that we are now living in a "risk society." A reality that both authors 
suggest has been epitomized by the BSE story (Beck, 1998; Giddens, 1998). I do not 
wish to argue that Phillips has full-heartedly embraced ideas of the "risk society" in 
reporting the outcomes of the BSE Inquiry. However, terms such as 'risk' and 
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'uncertainty' become overarching themes throughout the report, and although Beck and 
Giddens in no way hold a monopoly on the use of the tenns, Phillips does appear to 
tentatively approach several of the key tenets of their theories4. Specifically, he takes up 
a perception of the inconclusiveness and fallibility of science, the culpability of human 
actions in creating risks and the need for novel fonns of governance in coping with risks. 
The Cause and Spread of BSE in Cattle 
To recall, when BSE was first identified in 1986 the veterinary sciences were 
faced with a novel disease in cattle and knowledge about the nature of the disease was 
sketchy at best. Although familiar with the family of diseases of which BSE is a part 
(TSEs), certainty about the cause of the disease and why it suddenly appeared in cattle 
continues to elude science. Early in the BSE story there were several theories that 
sought to explain where the disease had come from. Some suspected BSE entered the 
UK through the importation of cattle, others pointed the finger at the use of veterinary 
vaccines and phannaceuticals, and yet others blamed some sort ofBSE virus (Ford, 
1996: pp. 153-73). Early on the theory that gained the greatest acceptance assumed that 
the source ofBSE was ovine scrapie and that the disease had somehow jumped the 
species barrier between sheep and cattle. Yet, all these theories are now believed to be 
spurious and the Phillips report instead categorizes the cause ofBSE as "unknown," and 
acknowledges that TSEs may develop sporadically (randomly and without explanation) 
in species in which they have not been identified previously (Phillips et al., 2000b: pp. 
249-50)5. 
The fact that Phillips adopts many of the tenets of the sociology of risk is not particularly surprising. The 
relationship between New Labour's presentation of Third Way politics and Giddens' proclamations about 
the nature of 'late modern' British society are clearly interwoven. Whether taken as the serious attempt by 
a government to better understand the social and economic relations that are shaping modern Britain, or as 
simply a tool with which to theoretically justify government decisions, risk theory has become diffused 
throughout the current political culture. Refer to Wheen "Please, enough of the guff' The Guardian Nov. 
24, 1999. 
Despite making this acknowledgement of uncertainty, the report would appear to argue that the 
limitations of science are only temporary. In particular, the report cites recent developments ill molecular 
biology as holding the key to providing the sense of scientific certainty that was so conspicuously absent 
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However, if the cause ofBSE is recognized as uncertain, or potentially even 
unknowable, the report is far more certain in the ascription of a cause to the persistent 
and widespread transmission of the disease throughout the British beef industry. As 
early as 1988, this epidemic side of the BSE story was attributed to the use of 
high-protein animal feeds containing meat and bone meal derived from infected cattle. 
Intensive agriculture, it turns out, had turned cows into carnivores and cannibals. This 
practice, unregulated for several decades, constituted what Phillips refers to as "a recipe 
for disaster" (Phillips et aI., 2000b: p. xvii). 
So, if the pathway of infection was known early in the BSE story, why was the 
disease not properly contained for a further decade? For Phillips the answer is clear. 
The Government made mistakes in ascertaining the extent of the problem and in 
expressing the resolve necessary to deal with it. These mistakes are attributable to the 
Government's tendency to rely on putative knowledge about the transmission of the 
disease when 'facts,' as such, were unavailable. In other words, politicians and 
government regulators continued to seek to operate on the basis of certainty within a 
context of uncertainty. Yes, they knew the pathway through which the disease was being 
transmitted, but the actions taken to stop the disease were based upon several false 
assumptions about the pathway's operation. 
In particular, Phillips is critical of the Government's over-reliance on the 
implementation of a ban on the use of recycled ruminant proteins in ruminant feed, put 
in place in 1988. The logic behind the ban seemed straightforward. IfBSE was being 
transmitted through the use of protein feeds, and possibly even linked to feeds consisting 
of material from scrapie-infected sheep, then the solution lay in cutting these feeds out of 
the food chain. However, we now know that the original feed ban was a spectacular 
failure. At the heart of the problem was an assumption that a relatively large amount of 
during the BSE story. Termed the "rogue prion" hypothesis (Ridley and Baker, 1998; see also Prusiner 
(1999), it is argued that TSEs result from the presence of prions (transmitted or inherited) that for~e . 
benign molecules to change their shape, thus converting normal proteins into dangerous ones. ThIS thesIS. 
challenges many of the taken-for-granted assumptions about molecular biology, including the primacy of 
genetic material, such as DNA and RNA, in the transmission of diseases (Prusiner, 1995: p. 531). 
Irrespective of this controversy, the report continues to look to the promise of factuality and the progress 
of science as the primary tools in contending with BSE and uncertainties of knowledge in the future 
(Phillips et aI., 2000e). 
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infected material needed to be consumed by a cow in order to contract the infection. 
Consequently, the ban failed to address the perpetuation ofBSE that was occurring in 
feed lots as a result of the cross-contamination. Pig and poultry feeds were not addressed 
in the ban and were still being produced with material derived from sheep and cattle. 
Small quantities of these feeds were inadvertently being mixed with cattle feed that 
, 
under the ban, were supposed to be free of all ruminant proteins. At the time of the ban 
, 
because of the belief that the disease could not be transmitted through the consumption 
of small amounts of infected material, cross-contamination was perceived as constituting 
a minuscule risk and therefore discounted. What in effect the Government was doing 
was employing regulatory measures on the basis of unproven beliefs about the nature of 
the disease without acknowledging the uncertainty of these assumptions (Phillips et aI., 
2000b: pp. xxi-xxii, p.IS, p. 255). 
It should be noted that, although Lord Phillips is decidedly uncritical in his 
investigation of the role of industry influence in the Government's production of 
regulatory measures, the decision not to extend the ruminant feed ban to pig and poultry 
feeds did not take place in a political vacuum. Instead, as Millstone and Zwanenberg 
(2001) note, significant pressure was being felt by the Government to avoid making 
regulatory decisions that would damage industry concerns. There was no awareness of 
the consequences of feeding pigs and chickens infected bovine material and, therefore, 
the extent of the problems being created by cross-contamination was not foreseen by 
science. However, when advice was put forward that did acknowledge the uncertainties 
presented by the disease, and that favoured precautionary action over inaction, Millstone 
and Zwanenberg argue that the Government ignored or suppressed this advice. When 
the Southwood Working Party, established to advise the Government in the early stages 
of the BSE story, seemed on the verge of calling for a total ban on ruminant feeds, 
Southwood has been accused of losing his nerve. The recommendation to extend the ban 
was dropped in favour of what has been cited as an attempt to preserve the rendering 
industry's principal market - chicken and pig feed6. Uncertainty not only led the 
This conflict of interest between protecting consumer and industry interests was one that was structurally 
imbedded. MAFF, the lead agency in charge of the handling ofBSE, was simultaneously the primary food 
safety regulator in the United Kingdom and tasked with the development of the agriculture and food 
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Government to fail to acknowledge the unknown risks posed by BSE, but also provided 
potential justifications for avoiding making decisions that would have gone against the 
economic interests of the animal processing industry (ibid.: p. 105; Little 2001). 
When, in late September 1990, responses to cross-contamination were put in 
place (e.g., a ban on the use of specific bovine offal, or SBO, in all animal feeds), the 
transmission ofBSE continued on the back of further misguided assumptions about the 
disease. Materials that were wrongly assumed to be noninfectious, such as eyes and 
lymph nodes, remained outside the ban. In the abattoirs, the supposition that a large 
amount of material was needed to transmit the disease persisted, resulting in a 
lackadaisical attitude toward the identification and separation of SBO during the 
slaughter of an animal. Furthermore, the Government lacked a clear mandate and 
structure to inspect slaughterhouses and trusted industry to self-police regulatory 
directives7• With no external enforcement of the SBO ban, industry intentionally passed 
contaminated material off as "clean" in several instances (Phillips et aI., 2000f: para. 4b). 
In general, Phillips states that these problems stemmed from a prevailing lack of 
appreciation of the potential risks created by BSE and of the importance of the measures 
being prescribed. It was not until almost a decade after the source of the BSE epidemic 
had been identified that the Government finally introduced further measures to shore up 
these problems and contain the disease. 
However, if the cause and spread of BSE were characterized by scientific 
lllcertainty and the inability of government to take appropriate regulatory action within 
this context, what of the circumstances leading to the appearance of the disease itself? 
The Phillips report is very direct in answering this question, attributing the source of the 
disease to human innovation and industrial processes. In this light, Phillips identifies 
intensive farming practices and industrial models of production as the causes of the BSE 
industries. For a good discussion of this conflict mandate please refer to Little (2001). 
Miller (1999: pp. 1242-3) demonstrates that such failures are contextual. In particular, he reminds us that 
the BSE story took place during a time in which consecutive Conservative governments held . 
power-governments that were characterized by deregulation, privatization, and a general "concerted tIlt to 
the market in government policy." The emphasis of the government was not on saf~ty, bU,t on allOWIng 
industry to best determine how to increase productivity and profits. The use of rummant teeds developed 
out of this context. 
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epidemic (Phillips et aI., 2001 b: p. xvii). Foremost amongst these practices was the 
necessity of using recycled animal proteins in livestock feed to nourish higher-producing 
animals, with very little consideration of the consequences of these actions. Uncertainty, 
in this sense, is not understood solely as a limitation of knowledge, but as the source of 
potential hazards, or risks, that are the yet unknown products of increased complexity 
and technological development that characterize modem agriculture. In making this 
conclusion Phillips' report appears to agree with Beck and Giddens' descriptions of the 
risk society and late modernity: "In a primitive society, the major hazards are those 
posed by nature. In a complex modem society the acts of individuals or corporate bodies 
may also involve serious hazards to other members of society" (Phillips et aI., 2000b: p. 
31). 
In this statement, Phillips makes a move to tie the scientific uncertainty 
surrounding the disease and the uncertain actions of the Government with some broader 
notion of what we might consider the 'risk society.' 
The Transmission of BSE to Humans 
The Government's ability to contend with uncertainty and risk also dominates the 
Phillips report's treatment of the link between BSE and vClD. Like the above discussion 
of the handling of the BSE epidemic, the Phillips report is critical of the Government's 
lack of a serious engagement with the human health risks posed by BSE and the 
tendency to rely on false certainties in guiding its response. Here the role of the 
Southwood Working Party and the Government's handling of expert advice comprise key 
themes pertaining to the human health side of the BSE story. 
Jointly responsible to MAFF and the Department of Health (DH), the Southwood 
Working Party ~as established in May 1988. Chaired by Richard Southwood, professor 
of zoology at Oxford, the committee was composed of a collection of scientists who 
were both academically well-regarded and had considerable experience working in 
advisory capacities. The committee was given the broad task of examining the 
implications of BSE for both animal and human health and was expected to provide both 
scientific and policy advice to the Government (Millstone and Zwanenberg, 2001: p. 
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104). Over the course of the BSE story the committee produced a series of interim 
recommendations. These advisements, which were subsequently implemented by 
Government, included the compulsory slaughter and destruction of all cattle showing 
infection and a ban on the use of "specified offal" (e.g., brain and spinal cord) in human 
food. The committee produced a controversial final report in February 1989 that 
concluded that in its estimation, although the transmission ofBSE to humans was 
possible, it was only remotely so (Phillips et aI., 2000b: pp. 50-55). 
The majority of the criticisms made against the Southwood Working Party, 
concern the GoveRlffient's handling of the committee's advice, rather than the work of 
the committee itself. In particular, Phillips lambasts the Government's blind acceptance 
of Southwood's conclusion that BSE posed only a minimal risk to human health and the 
Government's tendency to cite this conclusion as constituting a scientific risk appraisal 
(ibid.). The Government forged a rigid position that argued that no further precautions 
were needed. As the Phillips report accounts, "the conclusions of the Southwood 
Working Party were not reviewed. Their recommendations were treated not as advice, 
but as definitive of the precautionary measures which did, and did not require to be 
taken" (ibid.: p. 1221). Moreover, the Government repeatedly used the Southwood 
findings to discredit and deride the opinions of dissident scientists, thus polarizing 
debates over the human health risks ofBSE and further hardening the Government's 
position (ibid.: para. 1182; Phillips et aI., 2000g: sec. 5). Furthermore, the Government 
outwardly held up the objective truthfulness of scientific certainty, while simultaneously 
exerting pressure to determine what these certainties would be. The Southwood 
Working Party was cast as the voice of scientific certainty, but was repeatedly advised 
by members of the Government and civil service to be cautious in its advice and wary of 
the consequences its decisions would have on the beef market. In summary, what was 
considered scientific and what was considered risky had become the stakes of a highly 
politicized engagement between the Government, industry, and the expert working party 
(Millstone and Zwanenberg, 2001). This approach to the committee's advice continued 
long after serious doubts had compromised many of the assumptions about the hazards 
posed by the disease (Phillips et aI., 2000b: paras. 1209, 1221). 
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Foremost amongst these assumptions was the perceived relationship between 
scrapie, BSE and CID. Simply, it was believed that because scrapie had such a long 
history in the UK and could not be directly linked to CID in humans, BSE would act in a 
similar manner and therefore was not likely to pose any serious hazards for human 
health. In reply to a letter from a neuropathologist who had raised concerns about the 
Southwood report's handling of the human health risks posed by BSE, Sir Richard 
Southwood put it this way: 
"As you can imagine, in this report it was extremely difficult to steer the 
proper co~~se between causing excessive alarm and undue complacency. 
The evidence to date seems to indicate that the BSE agent is very similar to 
scrapie, and of course we have lived with scrapie for two hundred years, and 
most of us have at some time or other eaten sheep offal-though the incidence 
of CID remains low. It was this line of argument that finally convinced us 
not to press the point that you have made in your letter any more strongly." 
(Phillips et aI., 2000c: p. 56) 
A sense of apathy grew out of Sir Richard's speculations about the link between 
BSE and scrapie, and like the circumstances surrounding the spread ofBSE amongst 
cattle, little was done to investigate the possible sources of risk to human health. Once 
again it was assumed that, even if the disease was theoretically able to jump species, a 
relatively large amount of infected material would need to be consumed to do so. 
Likewise, legislation banning the use of SBO in human foods was considered more than 
sufficient. Phillips (2000b) laments, that not enough concern was given to whether 
industry would effectively police the ban, or whether these materials could physically be 
separated without contaminating human foods in the first place. We now know that 
scrapie and BSE are not directly linked and that the regulations put in place to prevent 
contaminated material from getting into the human food chain were fully inadequate. 
The consequences of these failures were dramatic. Between 1989 and 1996, the 
British public was exposed to a deadly disease, attributable to the Government and 
industry'S inability to effectively contend with scientific uncertainty. To date, more than 
100 Britons have died ofvCJD. Furthermore, the widespread infection of the cattle 
popUlation and intense public anger over mishandling of the disease had progressed to 
such an extent that those in office felt it necessary to take dramatic steps to cleanse 'mad-
cow' disease from Britain. Between March 1996 and the end of 1999, Phillips reports 
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that more than 3.3 million cattle were prematurely slaughtered in the United Kingdom 
(Phillips et aI., 2000b: p. 21). On top the human and animal suffering, the agricultural 
industry has also suffered as a result of the taint created by the BSE scandal. The 
livelihoods of farmers, the sustainability of the agricultural industry, and the welfare of 
the British countryside have all been tainted by a disease that was allowed to progress 
unchecked (Woods, 1998). 
In concluding this section, Phillips is decisive in stating that the human health 
tragedy ofBSE was not directly attributable to the uncertainty of the science ofBSE and 
veJD, but to the Government's mishandling of this uncertainty. By relying on a series of 
false assumptions it produced an unstable and dangerous platform on which it made, or 
failed to make, the regulatory decisions necessary to avoid disaster. Gavin Little offers 
us this concise summary of the situation: 
"The end result ... was a collective failure over the period 1989-1996 to give 
enough weight to the possibility that, given the lack of knowledge about 
BSE, scientific proof of its ability to 'jump species' to humans might only 
emerge once consumers were infected, which is too late for effective 
regulation. Against a backdrop of political and commercial pressures, there 
was ... insufficient appreciation on the part of government and scientific 
advisers of the complex ... nature of the risks posed by BSE, or ofthe 'built 
in ignorance of science towards its own limiting commitments and 
assumptions. ' Regulatory action was therefore taken on the basis of a 
deferential, non-precautionary reliance on what was erroneously taken to be 
an authoritative, objective and definitive scientific risk assessment." (Little, 
2001: p. 747) 
Trust as a Casualty of BSE 
The Government's failure to create effective regulatory decisions within a context 
of risk and uncertainty is also mirrored in its relationship with the British public. Trust 
in government, science, and industry were all severely challenged by BSE and resulted 
in a breakdown in relations between these institutions and the broader public. As the 
Phillips report put it, "trust" became another casualty of the BSE story (Phillips et aI., 
2000b: p. xviii). 
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Although not wishing to fault individuals, Lord Phillips is highly critical of what 
he describes as the undertaking of a "campaign of reassurance" in the communication of 
risk to the public (Phillips et a!., 2000a: p. 261). Beef, the British public was routinely 
assured, was not only safe, but good for you as well. When coupled with a reliance on 
false scientific certainties about BSE and eJD, such assurances were made with a clear 
conscience and allowed government officials to cling to a belief in the validity of their 
decisions and the decision-making process. Such confidence led the Government to go 
to absurd lengths in defending its decisions to the public. One image that stands out as 
representative of this approach is that of former Agriculture Minister John Gummer 
feeding his daughter a hamburger on national television as part of a much maligned 
attempt to quell public "hysteria" over BSE8. Guminer explains the rationale behind his 
actions in the following terms: 
"In matters as important as these it is essential to have a personal benchmark 
to be applied to decisions wherever appropriate. In such circumstances I 
applied the test: "Would I be entirely happy for my children to eat this?" 
That seemed to me to be the proper question for a non-expert to ask when 
assessing the views of experts. At all times I saw my primary role as 
protecting the public." (BSE Inquiry, 1998: para .. 13) 
However, Phillips goes further than critiquing the Government's tendency to over 
rely on false certainties when communicating risk to the public. The BSE Inquiry also 
found that communication between the Government and the public was guided by a 
pervasive fear that an anxious and potentially hysterical public would respond 
irrationally to the risks posed by BSE. Politicians and government officials feared that 
speaking about potential risks - the unknown unknowns - would lead the public to blow 
these risks out of proportion and cease to purchase British meat products. The report 
does not propose that there was an attempt to cover up the hazards posed by BSE in 
order to protect the beef industry, as might be suggested by more cynical observers of the 
BSE story. Instead, Lord Phillips documents that scientists, government officials, and 
industry representatives, when faced with uncertainty about the disease and intense 
public pres,sure, routinely resorted to more familiar statements of certainty and 
For a further discussion of BSE and the language of hysteria that characterized the Government's 
relationship with the public please refer to the work of Bob Hodge and Robert Woog (1999). 
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reassurance (Phillips et aI., 2000b: pp. 232-5). As one witness testified to the Inquiry; 
"Given the strength of public debate on the matter at the time one was aware 
ofslight~y lean~ng i~to the wind. You could not just stand upright and gi\'e 
a totally Impartlal VIew of what was the situation. There was a strong danger 
of being misinterpreted one way or the other, and we tended to make more 
reassuring sounding statements than might ideally have been said." (Phillips 
et aI., 2000b: p. 265) 
In summary, several themes have emerged from Phillips' critique of the 
Government's handling of the spread ofBSE amongst cattle, its link to vcrn and human 
health risks, and t~~ communication of risk and uncertainty to the public. These are 
themes I have suggested that closely reflect several of the tenets set out by the sociology 
of the 'risk society.' Phillips has told the BSE story as a tale of uncertain knowledge and 
risks. Risks, the report identifies, although somewhat circumspectly, as the 
consequences of the complexities of modem agriculture and intensive agricultural 
systems. Above all, Phillips argues that BSE is the failure of government to work within 
a context of risk and uncertainty to protect society from the diverse hazards posed by the 
disease. 
"Lessons Learned" - Risk Management and Communicating Uncertainty 
The overarching priority, or 'lesson learned,' that comes out of the Phillips report, 
is the necessity for social institutions to be better prepared to contend with risk and 
uncertainty. Two points stand out as particularly relevant to this discussion ofBSE and 
permeate the majority of the report's findings. The first makes the identification and 
management of risk the priority in contending with future uncertainties. The second 
pertains to the need for governments to be able to openly and effectively communicate 
uncertainty to the pUblic. 
Managing Risk 
At the base of the first of these priorities, what I refer to as the management of 
risk, is the basic insight that "uncertainty Cal) justify action" (Phillips et aI., 2000b: p. 
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254). The report is emphatic that social institutions can no longer remain complacent 
about the potential risks associated with the application of modern science and 
technology, even though these risks may often appear remote. Instead, science, 
government, and industry must each ensure that all necessary precautions are taken to 
both identify and contend with hazards regardless of their assumed probabilities. 
Thus, although lauding the individuals who first identified BSE and linked the 
disease to human health risks, the report strongly asserts that organizational 
improvements are still needed to better identify future sources of risk to British society. 
On one hand, this means increasing cooperation between government and industry in 
orderto improve the nation's animal disease surveillance systems (ibid.: pp. 251-2). On 
the other hand, it also means redressing deficiencies in the standards and availability of 
the scientific expertise needed to expeditiously recognize and track potentially dangerous 
veterinary diseases (ibid.: p. 225). 
The Phillips report, furthermore, suggests that contending with uncertainty also 
means ameliorating the way in which government, science, and industry work together 
to address risks once they have been identified. Specifically, the report asserts that 
communication and cooperation between these institutions must be improved if effective 
and timely actions are to be taken in the future. This includes a reevaluation of relations 
within government, between government and science, and between government and 
industry. 
Within government specifically, the Phillips Report foregrounds the need to 
promote greater intergovernmental communication and cooperation. This necessity is 
highlighted by the failure ofMAFF and the DR to work together to recognize that BSE 
was not exclusively a veterinary disease, but a threat to human health as well (Phillips et 
aI., 2000b: pp. 235-6). Likewise, the report urges the Government to re-evaluate its use 
of scientific expertise. Risk management, in this context, means better management of 
science and is to be accomplished by better coordinating and funding scientific research, 
and ensuring that the Government is able to access appropriate and skilled sources of 
scientific expertise. Particular attention is paid to the Government's misuse and over 
reliance on expert committees, such as the Southwood Working Party. The report argues 
that if it is necessary to resort to the advice of external experts, then care must be taken 
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to ensure that not only their conclusions are clearly articulated to government, but their 
limitations in knowledge and assessments of risk as well. Furthermore, efforts must be 
made to avoid the temptation to consider the conclusions of expert committees as 
determinative of policy (ibid.: pp. 238-41). Finally, in response to growing concerns 
about the relationship between government and industry, Phillips asserts that 
governments must provide and enforce clear industrial regulations aimed at the 
prevention and treatment of risk. These regulations must not only address those risks 
considered to be "reasonably probable," but also address those that are considered only 
"mere possibilities ll (ibid.: pp. 266-72). 
Communicating Uncertainty 
In response to the conspicuous misrepresentation of risk that characterized the 
BSE story, the Phillips report makes it clear that providing security from risk also entails 
improving communication between social institutions and the public. Governments, 
scientific experts, and industry representatives are all urged to clearly communicate 
uncertainty and potential risks to the public. This includes the clear conveyance of the 
incomplete nature of knowledge upon which decisions about the probability of risk are 
being made, as well as the constraints these gaps imply for the ability of social 
institutions to secure society against these hazards. As a prerequisite to building this 
foundation of openness, Phillips asserts that it is necessary to first appreciate that the 
public will react rationally when provided with an honest appraisal of risk and 
uncertainty. In effect, the report is impelling government to make their practices more 
transparent and to ensure that in future the importance of precautionary measures will 
not be played down on the grounds that the risks they address are unproven. The goal of 
this openness is to regenerate public confidence in the institutions tasked with providing 
security and well-being to society. 
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Limitations of Phillips and the 'Risk Society' 
In his report from the BSE Inquiry, Lord Phillips has clearly articulated the need 
for the Government to take issues of risk and uncertainty very seriously in contending 
with agricultural controversies. The impact of his findings on shifting the culture of 
governance in regards to knowledge and expertise should not be denied. Nonetheless, 
these successes are limited by a failure to fully acknowledge the broader implications of 
risk which have been discussed throughout this thesis. In other words, the Phillips report 
socially decontextualizes risk and uncertainty. In doing so the report potentially upholds 
the status quo instead of addressing the social conditions at the heart of the BSE story, 
and which pervade the debate over GM crops and foods. Perhaps this is not particularly 
surprising given the nature of the inquiry process. Regardless, lacking an awareness of 
the social contexts in which risk claims are made, Phillips is compelled to treat BSE as a 
technical problem requiring better technical management. He offers little in the way of 
alternatives to the institutionalized authority of science or the industry processes that the 
report itself so heavily implicates in the BSE story, and which participants have 
challenged in relation to this project. 
Risk, Context and Contingency 
To recall once more, Beck and Giddens argue that risks are the outcome of 
increased social and technological complexity, stressing their uncertainty, their social 
origins and the problems they create for the institutions charged with protecting society 
from these risks. Phillips has drawn on related ideas to both describe the BSE story and 
to reach some conclusions from which government can hope to learn. However, Phillips 
does little to engage with the social backdrop that lies behind the ideas of the "risk 
society"; in this case, the state of modem agriculture and the status of science in Britain. 
One might be tempted to accept these limitations in social scope under the 
pretense that the BSE Inquiry was not the appropriate forum to address such broad social 
concerns. It could be the case that Phillips may have chosen not to delve further into 
these broader social cases in order to avoid detracting from his conclusions: the need to 
-180-
push governments to look for new ways to operate within contexts of uncertainty and to 
force them to do so in a more open and transparent manner. 
However, the failure to engage with the social context behind the creation ofBSE 
can also be related to Phillips apparent uptake of ideas of risk and uncertainty in line 
with theories of the "risk society." Particularly, identified as a limitation of "risk theory" 
in Chapter Two, the Phillips report potentially limits its political engagement with risk. 
Mindful of Miller's (1999: p.1239) critique that 'risk society' theory treats risks as the. 
"inevitable concomitants of technological and cultural developments," Phillips' 
conclusions emphasise the need to contend with risks but do not directly challenge the 
context behind their creation. The ramification of this is that Phillips hazards bounding 
concerns about risk to questions of how science, technology and risk are applied within 
society. Consequently, more contingent perspectives of risk are overlooked and the 
potential for alternatives in how we organize agriculture and society are ignored. 
BSE, Consent, and the Intensification of Agriculture 
The biggest challenge facing the BSE Inquiry was coming to terms with the 
technologies, processes, and organizations that shape modem agriculture in Britain. As 
Phillips clearly states, it is intensive and industrialized agricultural systems that are to 
blame for giving rise to BSE: "BSE developed into an epidemic as a consequence of an 
intensive farming practice - the recycling of animal protein in ruminant feed" (Phillips et 
aI., 2000b: p. xvii). Yet, despite making such a strong statement, the report does little to 
challenge these practices themselves. Instead, Lord Phillips is content to focus on how 
these practices are employed, regulated, and managed. 
Phillips' limitation in the scope of his engagement with modem agriculture can in 
part be related to the BSE Inquiry's uptake of the notions of risk and uncertainty. By 
taking modernity for granted and accepting risks as inevitable, Phillips is directed toward 
prioritizing the management of the consequences of uncertainty. As a result, he displays 
little regard to the potential for reducing the a priori social production of risk. The 
conclusions that the BSE Inquiry has produced almost always are reduced to the need to 
develop better management and regulatory strategies around technological uncertainties 
-181-
and the potential hazards they pose. 
Certainly risk management is an essential part of the governance of new 
agricultural technologies and practices, however, it also limits the critical potential 
offered to governments by conceptions of risk and uncertainty. To begin with, by 
placing risk within a management framework, Phillips has enclosed risk within 
traditional models of governance. What sets these models apart is their historical 
tendency to stress scientific and technical appraisals when regUlating agricultural 
practices and determining risks. This accentuation of the techno-scientific almost always 
is at the cost of developing a serious engagement with the social practices that 
underscore innovations in agriculture. 
As a result, instead of addressing agriculture as a social practice, Phillips 
concentrates the minute technological, scientific, and industrial processes behind the 
risks associated with BSE. One is hard-pressed to find a discussion of agriculture itself, 
and is instead presented with page after page outlining the partiCUlarities involved in the 
slaughter, rendering and distributive use of an animal. BSE, according to Phillips, is a 
story that pertains to feed cross-contamination, the failure to classify and separate 
infected from non-infected materials and the ability to create and enforce regulations to 
solve these problems. At its most mundane moments, the attention of the Inquiry is 
reduced to discussions of the different methods of splitting a carcass, dying and 
removing offal, or deboning a skull (Phillips et aI., 2000h). 
Phillips should be lauded in arguing that governments need to recognize the 
routine uncertainty associated with scientific risk assessments and technical processes. 
However, science and technique are almost exclusively presented as the means by which 
Government is best able to protect society from any future risks. Contending with risk 
and uncertainty in agriculture is confined to doing better science and better regulating 
industrial and technical processes. 
I do not wish to suggest that the conceptions of risk and uncertainty Phillips 
adopts are deterministic of these sorts of techno-scientific conclusions. Rather, by taking 
modernity for granted and treating risks as inevitable, Phillips is easily able to fit notions 
of risk into the management frameworks that prioritize scientific knowledge and expert 
systems of decision making. 
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As discussed in detail in Chapter Two, a helpful alternative to this conception of 
risk which can address the risks of BSE beyond this narrow focus can be found in the 
work of Douglas and Wildavsky. To recall, these authors define risk, as partly a problem 
of the certainty or uncertainty of knowledge (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982: p. 5), but 
more importantly link risks to issues of consent over what they describe as the "most 
desired prospects" for the future. Risks, in other words, do not simply reflect the 
complexities of modern society, but are cultural concepts around which the future of 
society is being shaped. What we choose to see as risks and what risks we ignore are 
moral and politica-I-choices. Risks are not socio-technical inevitabilities. Where 
uncertainties of knowledge suggest the need for technical solutions and further scientific 
research, there are no clear solutions for contending with uncertainties of consent. 
Instead,)ssues of consent create spaces of overt political contestations, which connect 
debates over science and technology to a broader cultural and normative context. 
With this perspective BSE can be understood as representing a broader debate 
over what we consider acceptable forms of agriculture and food production in 
contemporary Britain. Cultural conceptions of risk would suggest that the 
cross-contamination occurring in feed lots should not be understood solely in terms of 
the practical processes by which potentially infected material was being identified and 
removed from the carcass and the food chain, or in terms of the regulation of these 
practices. Rather, the contamination issue is representative of a broader concern for the 
risks posed by the practice of feeding animals to one another in the first place. Stepping 
back from techno-scientific risks allows us to see the BSE story as part of a contestation 
over the industrialization of agriculture. Public responses to BSE and vCJD on the one 
hand pertain to fears over the safety of the food supply and the Government's ability to 
protect society from these risks. On the other hand, the anger that erupted in response to 
BSE furthermore marks out a battle of consent over the increasing intensification of 
farming. This is precisely the point where the BSE Inquiry pulls up short in its 
investigation. Simply stated, if the BSE epidemic was caused by industrialized 
agriculture and intensive livestock farming, as suggested by the Phillips report, should 
attention not be granted to the values behind the employment of these practices and not 
just the processes by which they operate? These were certainly the expectations that 
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many in the United Kingdom voiced going into the BSE Inquiry and which participants 
have voiced repeatedly in describing the risks of new agricultural technologies. Emily 
Green, writing in the New Statesman, voices the expectation that with the establishment 
of the BSE Inquiry, the future of agriculture was hanging in the balance. In hindsight, 
such expectations were obviously misplaced9. 
However, if the BSE Inquiry has not been able to interrogate the broader 
connotations of risk attached to BSE, the British public has been much more capable of 
doing so. Whilst the Phillips report tells the story ofBSE within a bounded vision of 
risk, members of the general public may have been less inclined to narrate the story in 
this way and perhaps better able to extend an awareness ofBSE far beyond the 
implications and dangers of the disease itself. As several participants in this thesis have 
already commented, the risks of BSE related to exoteric reflections and overt 
contestations over the condition of contemporary British Society. For example, concerns 
raised over the condition of the national food supply were not limited to the 
contamination of beef by "rogue prions," but also included debates over developments in 
genetic engineering and the commercialization of genetically modified foods. Likewise, 
media vocalizations of a growing distrust in science pertained to much more than a 
discussion of the scientific handling of the disease itself, but more broadly evoked 
concerns about the increasing encroachment of industry into science and govemment lO • 
Similarly, vegetarianism, the ethical treatment of animals, organic farming, and the 
plight of rural Britain were all issues that the public linked to BSE but do not take up any 
significant space in the thousands of pages that comprise the Phillips report. 
Green, Emily. "In this Inquiry's Hands: The Future of Agriculture" New Statesman. January 9, 1998. 
10 
An article by Hywel Williams in The Guardian titled "Fallibility in a White coat" (Jan. 23, 200.1) ~lakes 
the provocative statement that "government grants and private sector research alike. tie in the sCientIst to " 
specific aims. Scientists are less free spirits than intellectual castrati singing for thelI table d'hote supper. 
Crace similarly reports that scientific voices had allowed themselves to be muted by go.v.ernment and 
industry interests ("Silent Witness" The Guardian. Oct. 31, 2000). In the same tone, wntmg m the 
Observer Odone reports on "Science in the dock: The white coats are looking grub~ier .after one too ~any 
scandals" (Feb. 17, 2002). All three articles suggest that in Britain scientific authonty IS now the subject 
of routine media and public scrutiny. 
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Democratizing Government-Science-Citizen Relations 
The limitations created by Phillips' managerial and technocratic focus on risk are 
also reflected in the report's approach to the communication of risk and uncertainty to the 
public. Although the report takes a positive step in promoting an open and transparent 
model of communication, it is limited by the adoption of conservative assumptions about 
the nature of knowledge and expertise. In particular, Phillips' failings can be traced to 
the separation of these terms from a clear understanding of the social application of 
power that characterizes relations between government, science and the public. In doing 
so, the report not only fails to critically challenge the way governments understand 
citizen-science relations, but risks upholding the same values that gave rise to the 
failures of communications endemic to the BSE crisis-the maintenance of science as the 
lone authoritative voice in the regulation of agriculture. 
At the centre of the Phillips report's approach to the communication of risk and 
uncertainty is an assumption that trust can be generated by simply improving 
communicative processes and developing an awareness of the rationality of the public at 
large. However, the Phillips report continues to cast science as the exclusive procurer of 
knowledge, while at the same time upholding a perception of the public as passive 
receivers. As a consequence of this asymmetrical, or monological, approach to 
communication, the public's failure to understand science and the true nature of risk 
become the predominant concern in the relationship between scientific experts and the 
pUblic. Thus, although the report recognizes that the public should not be assumed to be 
irrational, they are not recognized as significant sources of knowledge themselves. 
Instead, the public are derogated as tabula rasa-blank slates (Irwin et aI., 1996: p. 48; 
Michael, 1996: p. 109). 
Consequently, these unidirectional assumptions about the relationship between 
experts and the public potentially isolate the majority of British citizens from 
participating in social responses to risk and uncertainty. Although the report does state 
that "a lay member can playa valuable role on an expert committee" (Phillips et aI., 
2000b: p. 262), the contextual experience and knowledge that the public might bring to 
the table are for the most part ignored. For example, the initial failure of the 
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Government's ban on the inclusion of certain specified offal in animal food products is 
representative of the wider failure to consider the importance of contextual knowledge. 
Scientists and government officials knew that, in order to stop the infection of other 
animals, it was necessary to remove those parts of the animal considered most likely to 
contain the infected material. Within the laboratory and in bureaucratic offices the ban 
would seem to be a relatively straightforward matter. However, to place the ban in 
context requires that we consider it relation to the messy and chaotic character ofthe 
abattoirs in which the ban was to be effected (Irwin 1995: 116; Phillips et al. 2000h). No 
consultations were-held with either workers in the abattoirs or with other members of the 
public who were actively involved in the meat and livestock industry. Surely, these 
voices could have made an important contribution to generating effective policies that 
took account of the context in which any ban would be implemented? By failing to 
reflexively consider the limitations of their expert knowledge and acknowledge the 
potential contributions of contextual forms of knowledge, the Government allowed the 
transmission of the disease to continue unimpeded. 
The general disinterest the Phillips report displays in promoting the importance 
of non-expert knowledge causes the report to make a further mistake. Lord Phillips 
assumes that a greater understanding of government-sponsored scientific research will 
lead to the greater public acceptance of the uncertain processes through which risk is 
derived and managed. The potential for fostering trust through the promotion of public 
participation in the regulatory processes and the democratization of expertise more 
generally is largely ignored. If, as a society, we wish to be better able to contend with 
uncertainty and the potential for risk, then we need to begin to foster public 
inclusiveness both in how we define and how we structure relations of knowledge and , 
expertise (Irwin, 1995; Wynne, 1996a). Colin Tudge, writing in the New Statesman, 
(Jan. 29, 2001) cogently states the problem that Phillips has chosen to ignore: 
"Lord Phillips might also have asked why we still tie ourselves so 
complacently to the establishment. The committee that met under Sir 
Richard Southwood in 1988 to assess the unfolding of BSE was learned, 
eminent and well-intentioned. Yet it left stones unturned. Thousands of 
ordinary, intelligent people, who were neither learned nor eminent, w~uld 
have done a much better job .... They would have asked awkward questIons 
such as 'how do you know?' and 'why not?'" 
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Conclusion 
The Phillips report makes an excellent case for the need to incorporate 
sociological notions of risk into our understanding of the hazards and complexities 
involved in the BSE story and agricultural controversies. Clearly, governments need to 
move beyond expectations of scientific certainty in governing hazards, and the 
obfuscated practices that characterized the BSE story. The uptake of conceptions of risk 
and uncertainty have aided Phillips greatly in making this case. However, by enclosing 
notions of risk and-uncertainty within a framework that takes modernity for granted and 
emphasizes notions of the inevitability of risk, the Phillips report is unable to produce a 
more radical social commentary on the BSE story. -The report finds solutions to the BSE 
story in better science, practice and government. It ignores the issues of consent and the 
normative politics surrounding the use of intensive farming practices that not only 
provided the context in which the disease developed, but that are also at the heart of 
public reactions to BSE. In doing so, Phillips misses the opportunity to envision how the 
democratic inclusion of alternative forms of knowledge can respond to risk. 
In conclusion, within the context of this thesis, the BSE case and Lord Phillips' 
report offer essential starting points for examining the ongoing debates over the 
governance of new agricultural technologies. The report will hopefully compel 
Government to take issues of risk and uncertainty seriously when decisions are made 
concerning the commercial growing of GM crops and the marketing of GM food 
products. Moreover, it challenges the Government to engage in a more open relationship 
with the public in debating these risks and the benefits of the technology for society. 
However, the shortcomings of the Phillips Report's engagement with risk also 
present several more difficult challenges for Government. Overall, in order to 
understand and address the political concerns voiced by active members of the debate, 
the Government would be well-served by showing an awareness of risk and 
technological controversies in context. In one instance, this implies addressing the 
normative concerns presented by participants in Section Two, such as those which 
surround life-industry models of agricultural development, and those pertaining to issues 
of scientific authority and credibility. In other words, the BSE story challenges the 
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Government to address risk in relation to the broader social and cultural questions 
involved in debates over agricultural industrialization, sustainability, and human 
relations with the agricultural environment and the natural world. Furthermore, failing 
to hold an open and acknowledged debate on these issues risks further alienating the 
public from processes of governance and decision making. As Phillips suggests, 
communication is an essential element of creating a more open relationship with the 
public. However, as discussed in Chapter Five, Government must be careful not to talk 
at the public, but to listen to and incorporate public perceptions, experiences and 
know ledges into social networks of decision making. The challenge is, therefore, also to 
bring questions of democracy and citizen-science relations to the fore of debates over the 
governance of new agricultural technologies. 
With these comments in mind, this thesis will tum to a discussion of current 
initiatives in government which have, in part, sought to come to terms with these 
challenges. The next two chapters will look at the strengths and some of the weaknesses 
of these approaches. In Chapter Eight, the Agriculture, Environment and Biotechnology 
Commission's (ABBC's) attempt to expand the Government's engagement with risk be 
examined. In Chapter Nine, the Commission's ongoing endeavour to increase public 
engagement through a national debate on GM crops and foods will be briefly examined. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE AEBC & FSEs, WIDENING PERCEPTIONS 
OF RISK IN GOVERNANCE 
Introduction 
The Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission (AEBC) is often 
presented by the Government as an important experiment in public consultation and 
decision making. The AEBC has specifically been tasked with addressing the 
controversy surrounding the commercial regulation of agricultural biotechnology, but as 
a test case its impact may well be much wider. Observers of the AEBC will, in part, 
rate its success in terms of its ability to shed new light on the democratic processes 
involved in the governance of risk, science and technology. Such success potentially 
stems from two core aspects of the Commission. Firstly, the AEBC has taken up the 
challenge of increasing public engagement in debates over the commercialization of 
agricultural biotechnology. Engagement, as the AEBC defines it, involves creating 
spaces where the public is able to bring its concerns to the table, as well as redefining 
how publics are perceived by the Government, particularly in regard to issues of 
expertise. Secondly, the work of the AEBC may have implications for how traditional 
technocratic boundaries which delineate social processes of decision making in 
government are perceived, and potentially even redrawn. In particular, this chapter 
addresses the value of the AEBC's engagement with the meanings and consequences of 
the ongoing Farm Scale Evaluations (FSEs) as a way of opening governance to the 
social conceptions of risk discussed in previous chapters. In other words, whether the 
AEBC will be regarded as a successful experiment, relates to its ability to open the 
governance of new agricultural technologies to the transparent contestation of social 
ethics and cultural values. 
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In addressing these themes in greater detail, the chapter is divided into three 
primary sections. To begin this discussion, a brief overview of the ABBC and its 
relationship to the FSEs is provided in order to set the scene for an analysis of the 
potential contribution of the AEBC to how GM crops and foods are to be governed in 
the UK. From this foundation, the AEBC's engagement with the FSEs will be 
addressed in detail, focussing specifically on issues of risk and regulation. This 
includes a discussion of the way in which the expected results of the FSEs are being 
challenged by the Commission in terms of the meaning of the trials in detennining the 
commercial future-of agricultural biotechnology. Finally,_an examination of the 
responses prompted by the Commission's conclusions will close the Chapter, pointing 
to some of the potential shortcomings of the ABBC exercise. 
Introduction to the AEBC and the FSEs 
This section will provide an introduction to the Commission and the fann scale 
trials, with particular attention paid to their relationship to the political controversies 
surrounding the governance of new agricultural technologies. To start, a brief 
description of the AEBC and its mandate is provided. From this point, the way in 
which the AEBC has approached its mandate will be addressed in relation to the 
publication of the Commission's first key report to government entitled Crops on Trial. 
Finally, the social and political context leading up to the establishment of the FSEs are 
discussed, highlighting the important position of the trial in relation to the governance 
of new agricultural technologies. 
The AEBC - Background and Mandate 
The Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission (AEBC) was 
established in June 2000, as part of the Government's strategic framework on 
biotechnology. This framework was prompted by the political fallout ofBSE, advances 
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in controversial cloning technologies (i.e. Dolly the sheep)l, and the development of a 
vigorous and sustained public debate over GM crops and foods in the latter 1990s. 
Given the mandate to advise the Government on "biotechnology issues which impact on 
agriculture and the environment," (ABBC, 2000a) the ABBC makes up only one 
segment of a three-pronged attempt by Government to look at the implications of 
biotechnology in the UK, including how it might be regulated2. Alongside the AEBC, 
the Human Genetics Commission (HGC) was established to look into the human 
implications of genetics, and the Food Standards Agency (FSA) created with the 
mandate of examining the safety implications of GM foods and GM_animal feed. 
Although it is readily apparent that the work of these three bodies overlaps in several 
areas, a point recognized by the coordinating roles each is assigned, this chapter will 
deal specifically with the work of the AEBC. 
In establishing the ABBC and assigning its agricultural and environmental remit, 
the Government is seeking information and advice in several key areas. Firstly, it has 
asked for a review of current practices, as well as information on any prospective future 
innovations, in the scientific and commercial development of agricultural 
biotechnology. Secondly, of foremost significance for this chapter, the ABBC has been 
charged with looking at the social and ethical implications of new agricultural 
technologies. In other words, as the ABBC's terms of reference describe, the 
Commission has been asked to look beyond the science of genetics to take a broader 
approach to some of the "strategic issues" involving agricultural biotechnology (AEBC, 
2000a). The ABBC is not envisioned as an alternative, or addition, to scientific advice. 
Rather it has been asked to address its broader social mandate while keeping the , 
science of new agricultural technologies firmly in mind. Accordingly, the composition 
of the Commission's membership is such that it combines expertise from across a 
variety of different areas, including representatives from the biosciences, the social 
For further information please refer to Einsiedel et al. (2002). 
The AEBe reports jointly to the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural ~~airs.and ~he 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, as well as to ministers in the devolved adnlllllstratlOns In 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
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sciences, non-governmental organizations, industry and the fanning community 
(AEBC, 2000b)3. Thirdly, and the topic of Chapter Nine, the Commission has been 
asked to engage public opinion and public knowledge about agricultural biotechnology. 
Of enormous consequence for the success or failure of the ABBC is the manner 
in which the Commission's advice will affect the shape and actions of Government in 
detennining the future of the use of genetics in agriculture. Accordingly, this 
constitutes a repeating point of discussion in the remainder of this Chapter. As a 
preface to this discussion it is worth saying a few words about the nature and limitations 
of the AEBC's mandate in this regard. Overall, the ABBC has been_asked to carry out 
its mandate while committing to an awareness of the evolving regulatory frameworks 
these technologies are now entering. This includes-looking for gaps in the 
Government's current regulatory and advisory framework in respect to the governance 
of new agricultural technologies. The ABBC has also been tasked to investigate the 
coordination of information between expert advisory bodies and to report on any 
changes needed in the way in which the Government draws on expertise. This is a point 
of particular relevance following the problems with expert advice which surfaced during 
the BSE case. Furthermore, the Government has asked the Commission to advise and 
instruct the Government on any changes needed to the guidelines for regulatory bodies. 
One of the outcomes of this varied membership is that the politics of risk, knowledge and expertise are 
being carried out within the commission itself as well as within the wider socio-political arena. The 
following exchange with one member of the Commission provides some insight on the struggles which 
took place to produce Crops on Trial and which point to the struggle of the Commission in coming 
together to find this consensus. 
"Part of the process of engaging with the FSEs and corning to some kind of joint piece of 
work on it you had to at least test, examine, or even explain, or trying to understand where 
others were coming from." 
"Were there any key markers of what those positions were? I can think of some. 
Specifically, I am thinking of scientific versus non-scientific opinions. " 
"That was of course a very important part. Whether the public was just stupid and whether 
NGOs were just scaremongering (sic) outrageous people which just wanted to have 
organizations to pay themselves salaries with no intellectual substance to thelr argument. 
Versus the scientific elite of the country who always know what's best. I've rather 
caricatured that there, but believe me, there was some intense tension ... Some of the people 
said that they enjoyed the process. Well I didn't enjoy it at all. It was a nightmare. It was 
very tough stuff." (Participant J) 
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Absent from this regulatory mandate is any clear relationship between the 
ABBC, its remit and the Government's imminent need to make a decision about the 
commercial future of GM crops in the United Kingdom. Politically it may be the case 
that the Government may not be able to ignore the Commission's conclusions. For 
example, this may be the case if the ABBC is able to clearly bring public concerns to the 
Government. However, outside the Commission's broad consultative and advisory 
mandates the Government is in no way beholden to the ABBC's advice. This point is 
particularly relevant as government decisions are tied to current European regulatory 
legislation and practices of scientific risk evaluation and environmental impact 
assessment (DEFRA, 2001b; ABBC, 2001: Annex A). How the Government will apply 
the advice of the AEBC in regards to these other commitments is unclear. Simply, the 
relationship between the ABBC and the commercial regulation of agricultural 
biotechnology is ambiguous at best. 
Crops on Trial 
The first attempt by the AEBC to fulfill its mandate was made in its influential 
and aptly entitled pUblication Crops on Trial, submitted to Government in September 
2001. The report makes the ongoing Farm Scale Evaluations (FSEs) the focus of the 
report, and highlights the trials as a centre of the debate over new agricultural 
technologies in Britain. 
Initiated in the spring of 2000, the FSEs make up a highly ambitious scientific 
project. A research scientist participating in the trials labels them as "the biggest 
ecological experiment ever carried out in Britain, providing an enormous resource for 
ecological modellers for many years to come" (Participant R). The trials are seeking to 
address the risks GM crops pose to the environment and involve the in situ study of 
several different herbicide resistant crops and their associated management regimes on a 
variety of biodiversity indicators. They are being undertaken across a wide spectmm of 
agricultural geographies and climates in the UK, and involve approximately 250-300 
separate field trials, each between four and thirty hectares in size. 
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By underlining the importance of the FSEs, the AEBC is seeking to provide 
neither an overall appraisal of the trials, nor a critique of the scientific rationale behind 
their development. Instead the Commission deems them to be worth considered 
attention because they have become a focal point in the public debate over GM crops 
and foods. The trials have been widely covered in the media, are the focus of anti-GM 
campaigning and have generated local controversies in the communities in which they 
have been grown. Concerns have been raised about the environmental consequences of 
the trials themselves, as well as the perceived lack of information offered to the public 
regarding the testing (eg. selecting trial sites). Moreover, the publication of the data over 
the next couple of years (2003-2004) is expected to revive national interest in the debate. 
As such, the AEBC argues that the research trials are important in that they have 
coalesced public concerns about the technology and the welfare of the agricultural 
environment. The FSEs, the Commission states, have made agricultural biotechnology 
tangible to the British public: 
"[T]he FSEs have made the prospect ofGM crops real to many people in the 
UK for the first time, and the specific local issues to which the FSEs have 
given rise (like concerns over groundwater and gene flow) have served to 
bring out more fundamental worries. The majority ofthe public mayor may 
not be opposed to GM technology per se - but it is reasonable to assume that 
they do wish to be sure of the integrity and the comprehensive nature ofthe 
decision-making processes governing how these crops may be used." 
(AEBC, 2000: p.12) 
Moreover, the FSEs are often perceived to stand at the cusp of the 
commercialization of GM crops, and on this basis the AEBC recognizes the influence of 
the trials on the regulation of new agricultural technologies. In part, this involves an 
acknowledgement of the impact of the trials on the commercial regulation of the first 
generation crops being trialed - herbicide tolerant and pest resistant maize, rape seed 
and beetroot. However, the AEBC also clearly sees the FSEs as holding a great deal of 
influence in directing the future regulation of second and third generation technologies, 
as well as the Government's overall approach to the governance of risk and 
biotechnology. In other words, as the above citation suggests, the trials are not only 
important because they have attracted public interest. They are also singled out by the 
ABBC because they are perceived as a potential point of access through which a public 
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engagement with the governance of risk and new agricultural technologies might be 
engendered. 
What makes the ABBC's publication of Crops on Trial contentious, and of 
importance to debates over new agricultural technologies, is that it vigorously seeks to 
redefine the implications of the FSEs in decision making. The ABBC, in other words 
, 
takes to task perceptions that the farm scale trials provide a final scientific hurdle to be 
overcome before proceeding with the commercialization of GM crops and foods. As the 
ABBC describes below, the Government's approach to regulation, including its reliance 
on scientific models of expertise and decision making, is "immature." Or more 
precisely, it is immature in so far as the FSEs, if understood in purely scientific terms, 
are unable to contend "legitimately" with the social issues raised by the public in relation 
to the technology. As the Commission states: 
"[The use of GM technologies in agriculture has] given rise to intense 
discussion in many countries as well as our own as to the terms and 
conditions on which they might now be developed in useful and socially 
acceptable ways. This highlights a second clear fact - that the political 
arrangements needed to deal legitimately with these issues in countries like 
the UK are immature, and in immediate need of further development. This 
report makes some proposals for how these may start to be improved." 
(ABBC, 2000: p. 6; emphasis added). 
I will return to these arguments in the second section of this chapter. Before 
proceeding in this direction, it is necessary to provide a more detailed introduction to the 
FSEs, the motivations which gave rise to the trials, and the importance of the trials in the 
politics surrounding the regulation of GM crops. 
The Farm-Scale Evaluations (FSEs) - Meeting a Scientific and a Political End 
To look at the history of the FSEs, the trials have been both a scientific and a 
political construction since their conception. 
As previously discussed in Chapter Four, small-scale crop trials have been taking 
place in the UK since the late 1980s. These early trials tested any direct impacts 
genetically modified herbicide tolerant (GMHT) crops might have on the environment. 
Industry has presented these trials as the basis of their application for the commercial 
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regulation of several key GMHT crops. The corporations argue that along with tests 
confinning the lack of human safety risks associated with agricultural biotechn 1 o ogy, 
GM crops pose little threat to the environment. The strength of the scientific 
conclusions and the regulatory applications which industry presented to the Government 
meant that by the time the FSEs were conceived the crops in question - oilseed rape, 
maize, sugar beet and fodder beet - were already nearing commercial approval. Or, in 
the case of Aventis' T25 maize, the company has already received EU-wide approval to 
commercially grow the product. 
However, these early successes were eventually impeded in the late 1990s as a 
consequence of the considerable pressures placed on Government and industry by 
opposition groups and an unsupportive pUblic. Repeated calls were made for a 
precautionary approach to the evaluation of the potential environmental risks of growing 
GMHTs. In particular English Nature, one of the Government's statutory nature 
conservation agencies, argued that regulators needed to make a more detailed scientific 
analysis of the consequences of the widespread cultivation of GMHTs. This position 
was supported by ACRE (Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment) - the 
Government's own expert committee tasked with looking at the environmental 
implications of GM crops - in its report on GMHT crops issued two years earlier. 
GMHT crops are not simply novel crop types, but they involve the creation of 
novel cropping systems, including the use of the broad ranged pesticides. How these 
cropping systems would affect the agricultural environments on the fann and in the 
countryside were the questions which had been left unasked as of 1998. In particular, 
"biodiversity," as one senior bureaucrat at DEFRA (Department of Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs) remarked, "was the only unanswered question" (Participant X). The 
FSEs were consequently established to measure the effect of GMHT cropping systems 
on plant diversity and biomass as wells as on gastropod (i.e. slugs & snails), arthropod 
(i.e. caterpillars & beetles), bee and butterfly populations. Moreover, the FSEs have 
been designed to take account of biodiversity levels beyond the boundaries of the crop 
sites themselves, including studies of neighbouring fields, and birds and small mammal 
popUlations which feed on many of the species mentioned above (DEFRA, 2001a). 
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The establishment of the FSEs is, in part, an acknowledgment of the 
shortcomings of the scientific questions which were being asked as part of the 
commercial regulation of GMHTs. In other words, the trials are intended to fill in gaps 
in the scientific knowledge pertaining to the risks of agricultural biotechnology. 
However, the establishment of the FSEs also met ~ political need. As inferred above, the 
FSEs were the outcome of direct political pressure by organizations, such as English 
Nature, which held a strong and persuasive relationship with Government. 
Moreover, one of the most important aspects of the FSEs does not pertain 
directly to crop science and safety evaluations at all. Accepting that scientific gaps did 
exist in the regulatory framework, the Government and SCIMAC (Supply Chain 
Initiative on Modified Agricultural Crops)4 not only agreed to put the FSEs into practice, 
but also agreed to a voluntary moratorium on the general unrestricted cultivation of GM 
crops in the UK for the duration of the research trials5. This moratorium closely reflects 
what was being asked of the Governrnent in 1998 by groups who were making vocal 
calls for a broader moratorium. Foremost amongst these was the 'Five Year Freeze', a 
campaign coalition representing more than 120 organizations. The 'Freeze' was 
lobbying for a five-year ban on the growth of GM crops for commercial processes, the 
import of GM foods and animal feed, and the patenting of genetic resources for food and 
farm cropS6. Society, according these campaigners, is not ready to make a decision 
about the future of the technology. They argue that the science remains uncertain and 
that broader public concerns about the technology have been unacknowledged. 
Although the voluntary agreement between the Government and SCIMAC does not 
address the second and third of the Freeze's demands, it is clear that the FSEs provide 
the first. As one influential source at DEFRA unequivocally suggests, the timescale of 
SCIMAC is the organization which represents British industry interests throughout the primary supply 
chain. 
The initial agreement between the Government and SCIMAC provided for only a one year moratorium 
on the commercial growing of GM crops. This was extended in 1999 in order to take account of the time 
and scale of the FSEs. 
6http://www.fiveyearfreeze.org 
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the FSEs, combined with the voluntary moratorium, provided just what critics were 
demanding: 
"Well of course they were my idea. I thought ofthem. We thought of them 
here. They were our idea. We delivered exactly what people were askino 
us to deliver. They said they wanted a five-year freeze. There was a call fo~ 
a Five Year Freeze in the summer of 1998, Mr Meacher made the 
announcement of the FSEs on the 21 of October 1998 and the results are 
going to be made available in the summer of2003. They've got their five 
year freeze. I fixed it for them." (Participant X) 
Moreover, the FSEs answered more than the calls for a moratorium from an 
organized opposition. Because of the relatively late development ofGM agriculture as a 
topic of political controversy, the technology appeared novel and inadequately 
considered to a public who were growing sceptical in science, industry and Government. 
In this sense, the FSEs are a rejoinder to public perceptions that the Government needed 
to respond to technological advances which seemed to have suddenly appeared on the 
horizon, and which consumers had begun to react against. Thus, although the FSEs are 
concerned expressly with biodiversity on the farm and in the countryside, from the 
outset they were also intended to contend with more general public concerns over risk 
and scientific uncertainty. In describing the political rationality behind the establishment 
of the FSEs the participant cited above went on to state: 
"Part of the difficulty was that because nobody had engaged with the issue 
before, nobody realized that all these assessments had been going on. So the 
first anybody knew about GM, it was probably going to be one of our FSEs 
in their village. They didn't know that it had already been tested for 15 
years. They thought that this was the first ever test of this crop and there 
was going to be half a field of this stuff being grown. And they would say 
'we want this to be tested in greenhouses first.' And we would say yes it 
was tested in greenhouses and tested very comprehensively. And the only 
test we are doing now is in some obscure comer about farm and wildlife, 
because as far as we are concerned all the other tests had already been done. 
But, people wanted us to do it now and do it again." (Participant X) 
EU member governments were also facing similar pressures to those faced by the 
UK Government. Commercial regulation of GM crops is directed by European 
legislation, where practice dictates that different member states take the lead on 
approving different crops. Many states became hesitant to finalize the regulation of 
those crops already nearing the end of the release process and which are now the focus 
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of the FSEs. European Union legislation was in effect being used to hold up 
commercialization, and in essence had already created a virtual freeze on regulation. 
Industry was aware that given this developing context any imminent regulation 
and commercial release of GM crops in Europe was very unlikely, at least in the short-
term. Nor was industry able to project the immediate growth of a commercial market for 
their products. After the much publicized failures of Monsanto to push the technology 
onto the market by extolling its virtues, while failing to engage in a dialogue over the 
potential risks of the technology, industry saw a need to pull its head down behind the 
parapets. A moratorium against commercial regulation offered industry a chance to let 
the controversy subside and to rethink its approach to public engagement. 
The moratorium agreed between SCIMAC and Government is voluntary in that 
no legislation is forcing industry to abide by it. However, the volatile political and 
social climate which developed around GM crops and foods gave them little choice but 
to do so. Neither industry nor government, in other words, had much to lose by 
volunteering to hold back on commercialization. The AEBC cogently describes the 
situation in the following terms: 
"An assessment within the industry of the acceptability of GM technology 
in the UK was reported in 1998 to have concluded that the climate was 
inhospitable: the British public was sceptical about scientific progress, the 
collapse of public support for biotechnology and GM foods was parallelled 
by the hostility of the press, and there was disenchantment among retailers 
who supported a moratorium on GM food to give them time to clarify their 
positions. Following a vigorous anti-GM media campaign, demand for GM 
products had fallen; indeed by mid 1999 the majority of British 
supermarkets and food producers had removed ingredients from their 
products. And the industry had little to lose from agreeing to a voluntary 
moratorium since there was little chance of gaining early approval for , 
further GM crops through the ED system (which was paralysed by the 
impending revision ofthe Deliberate Release Directive and the stance ~~en 
by certain Member States to delay progress in the execution of the eXlstmg 
Directive)." (AEBC, 2001: p.47) 
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Summary 
The context in which the ABBC has engaged with the FSEs is one which is 
inherently political from the outset. Both the Commission and the trials can be 
understood as the consequences of the public controversy and concerted opposition 
which developed around new agricultural technologies in Britain. Furthermore, the 
ABBC, by taking on the FSEs as the object of its remit, is itself engaging and 
contributing to this political context. Together the AEBC and the FSEs comprise a 
central location in-which the Government is having to come to terms with public 
attitudes pertaining to new agricultural technologies, specifically as relate to the 
governance and regulation of GM crops. 
Putting the FSEs in Context 
One of the arguments running throughout this thesis is that, in order to 
understand the politics of GM crops, these technologies, along with their potential risks, 
must be viewed in their socio-political context. Moreover, it was suggested in the 
preceding chapter that governments would be well-served by also adopting this approach 
and taking social and cultural concerns into account when regUlating and managing risk. 
The following discussion addresses the way in which the AEBC's engagement with the 
FSEs can be understood as an attempt to place the science of the trials and their 
implication for the governance of new agricultural technologies within a social context. 
It is in this regard that the establishment of the ABBC can be seen as a potentially 
innovative and important exercise which contributes to the Government's approach to 
the regulation of new agricultural technologies. This prospect is a consequence of the 
Commission's willingness to engage in a political struggle which seeks to do more than 
contest the application of science in regulating GM crops; for example contesting the 
validity or objectivity of the FSE results. Moreover, the Commission uses Crops on 
Trial as a means of actively politicizing the knowledge and authority of the FSEs. It 
contests the meaning of the trials and the authority of scientific safety evaluations in 
decision making, by advocating the need for governments to adopt a more socially in 
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tune understanding of ideas of risk and uncertainty7. The AEBC, in other words, 
engages the FSEs in a way which may begin to address many of the issues of concern 
voiced by participants in previous chapters. 
The AEBC 's Advice to Government 
Crops on Trial presents Government with ten far-reaching proposals with which 
the AEBC challenges the role and meanings of the FSEs for the governance of new 
agricultural techno-Iogies (AEBC, 2001). Without defining each of these in detail, the 
following discussion outlines three overarching themes which frame the advice the 
Commission offers. Overall, the report advances the need to place science and expert 
knowledge alongside broader social concerns in regulating new agricultural 
technologies. Importantly, the AEBC does not solely present these broader concerns as 
additions to scientific expertise, but also as crucial factors in giving meaning to that 
knowledge and appraising its value. 
It should be noted that the AEBC's use of ideas of risk and uncertainty reflects the growing influence of 
risk theory in governance and UK agricultural controversies. Asked from where ideas of risk were 
surfacing from in the debate, the response of one committee member demonstrates the growing 
synonymity between social theories of risk and "real life" experiences: 
"Where did you first come into contact with ideas of risk and public participation?" 
"I suppose they came from the precautionary principle, which was very EU driven. Risk, 
as a social construct. There is a lot of academic work that we are very close to ... Also, in 
dealing with the corporate side of things and how subjects like [risk] and the social 
reception of GM effects their business. They see it as risk, in a particular corporate sense; 
risk to their business. But they also see it as people talk to them about risk and how the 
public interprets risk. There seems to be a lot of Ulrich Beck running through all this, who 
seems academically to be tremendously influential. A lot of people are talking about the 
risk society and those sorts of terms. And I suppose, big governmental events such as BSE, 
and the government / science / policy interface and public perception of all that. The BSE 
risk argument have loomed very large. All the way through the handling ofBSE from the 
start, trust fell apart very early. How the government thinks about risk is heavIly 
conditioned by all those issues about how the Government uses scientific advice. Couldn.'t 
pin down one thing. In the UK there has been a gradual coming together of the academIc 
theories of risk with the real life examples." (Participant J) 
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Firstly, the ABBC is very clear that it does not wish to undermine the FSEs. The 
Commission strongly declares the need to continue with the trials and underlines the 
importance of the scientific knowledge the trials will hopefully yield. Howe\'er, in its 
report, the Commission is adamant that in moving ahead with the FSEs that the 
Government should rectify derelictions in the process to date. Of primary concern to the 
ABBC are a series of failures in communicating with the public. This includes nealect 
o 
in clearly outlining the objectives and limitations of the trials, in adequately consulting 
with local communities about the selection of test sites, and in committing to a clear 
framework through which the outcomes of the trials will be released. 
Secondly, the ABBe asks government to clarify policies dictating the manner in 
which the results of the FSEs will be used in decisions over the future of agricultural 
biotechnology and the potential commercialization of the GM crops being investigated. 
Essentially, the ABBC is challenging the Government to commit to an open and 
expanded process of decision making. As the Commission states in Crops on Trial, the 
impetus for Government is to make any decisions pertaining to "whether the GM crops 
being grown in the FSEs should be commercialised, within a framework which extends 
to broader questions" (ABBe, 2001: p.19). By "broader questions" the AEBe is 
referring to two things. Firstly, the ABBC is anxious for Government to outline how it 
will use the FSE results in conjunction with other scientific studies (ibid.: p. 18). More 
importantly for this thesis, the Commission would like the Government to clarify the 
way in which the results of the farm-scale trials will be applied in relation to the wider 
moral and ethical concerns being voiced by the public. In particular, the AEBe is 
interested in research conducted in the social sciences which has provided in-depth 
accounts of public attitudes towards GM crops and foods (Maris et al., 2001; Grove-
White et al., 2000; Grove-White et al., 1997). 
Finally, Crops on Trial seeks to further expand the Government's approach to 
the FSEs by linking the evaluation of GM crop technologies to British agricultural 
policy. Here the commission appears eager to establish a relationship with the Policy 
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Commission on the Future of Fanning and Food (PCFFFl For example, the AEBC 
argues that the Government needs to consider, in detail, the possible impact of 
commercially growing GM crops on the rapidly evolving organic food industry. 
Specifically, the Commission is calling attention to the potential problems associated 
with horizontal gene transference9 and the lack of clear guidelines defining adequate 
separation distances between GM and organic crops. In part, the Commission is 
concerned that the ability of fanners to declare their products as 'organic' could be 
compromised by release of GM crops into the nearby agricultural environment. 
Additionally, the ability of consumers to choose organic products over OM foods is also 
perceived as under threat. In this sense, the ABBC is arguing that the regulation of 
agricultural biotechnology must account for the types of agricultural system desired by 
British fanners and consumers. 
Uniting each of these themes is an argument about the relationship between 
science and alternative fonns of knowledge in directing official decision making 
processes. The AEBC is adamant that regulatory decisions cannot be taken on the basis 
of science alone. The following two citations vigorously state this case. The first 
quotation is drawn from Crops on Trial. The second quotation is an excerpt from a 
member of the Commission: 
"It will not be possible to base socially robust judgements about the 
significance of impact [of GM crops on the environment] on the scientific 
data alone; decisions will ultimately have to rest on a combination of 
scientific and social values." (ABBC, 2001: par. 42) 
"The FSEs are the tip of the iceberg in terms of the way people are looking 
at them. The regulatory system saw them as the last piece of the jigsaw, 
where as most people have experienced them as the first contact with 
something which opens up much wider issues. Just that data isn't going to 
answer the questions. That seems fairly clear." (Participant J) 
For more information on the PCFFF please refer to the Commissions publication, entitled "Farming & 
Food, a sustainable future," released following the FMD outbreak in 2002. 
To recall, horizontal gene transference is defined as the conveyance of genetic modifications in 
commercial GM crops to native landraces of the same species through the spread of pollen. 
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Advancing a Widened Perception of Risk 
In offering this advice to Government, the ABBC is involved in an overarching 
attempt to widen the Government's perception and application of ideas of risk and 
uncertainty. In effect, the ABBC is exhorting the Government to address the results of 
the farm scale evaluations with an awareness of the previous mistakes it has made in 
contending with risk and uncertainty. To this end, the ABBC underlines the important 
contributions provided by Lord Phillips' Report from the BSE inquiry (Phillips et aI., 
2000a). To recall,--Phillips emphasized the need for governments to approach risk with 
an awareness of the routine uncertainty of knowledge, including that provided by 
experts, along with the need to communicate potential hazards openly with the public. 
As noted in Chapter Seven, although Phillips' contributions certainly hold 
considerable value for ameliorating the governance of risk, the report's conclusions fell 
short of linking technological ideas of risk with the types normative concerns 
highlighted in this thesis. It is precisely at this point where Crops on Trial is most 
innovative in its approach to the FSEs and is able to offer a wider understanding of risk 
in governance. In effect, the Commission can be understood to be involved in a process 
of social shaping in which it is actively trying to construct the meanings and values of 
the FSEs. Consequently, the ABBC seldom engages with the scientific practices 
conducted in the trials, but attempts to influence perceptions about what the results of 
the FSEs may tell government about risk. It is not the number of nematodes which the 
AEBC is interested in, but the meaning ascribed to those numbers and in what 
circumstances those numbers should, or should not, be deemed important. 
In adopting the FSEs and issues of commercial regulation as the subject of its 
remit, the Commission is challenging the conventional processes of risk assessment 
which have dominated bureaucratic thinking within the Government of the United 
Kingdom. Such risk assessment models set requirements for giving approval to a 
technology based on whether it meets certain scientific criteria and codes of practice. 
For example, in order to gain consent to release GMHT fodder beet into the environment 
as part of the FSEs, Monsanto was required to demonstrate that the crop met 
predetermined standards of safety and efficacy. This included providing scientific data 
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showing that the crops posed no substantial risk to humans animals 0 th . 
, r e ennronment. 
outside of the risks already associated with the cultivation of equivalent non-G.\I 
varietiesIO. A brief glance at Monsanto's application sees risk discussed in purely 
technical terms. The document details acceptable human exposure levels to beet 
proteins, appropriate separation distance between GM and non-GM crops, and outlines 
techniques designed to ensure that genetic materials remain isolated to the test site. So 
long as these criteria are met, which they were in this instance, then regulators are 
required to offer a consent (DETR and MAFF, 2000). 
Examining-this model, the AEBC is uneasy about the perceptions of 
conclusiveness scientific expertise affixes to risk issues. As McNally puts it, a risk 
assessment can often be a '''rite of passage' for achieving closure on debate about 
'technological risk'" (Prior et aI., 2000: p. 113). The Commission is concerned that a 
purely scientific evaluation of the FSEs may be taken up by Government as the 
exclusive means of regulating GM crops, regardless of public opposition. Traditional 
approaches to risk evaluation, the ABBC argues, must give way to ideas of risk which 
link uncertainty to wider public uncertainties about agricultural and social development. 
Attention is directed away from scientific expertise as the exclusive factor in identifying 
and contending with risk, and as the final adjudicator in political controversies over the 
technology. Instead the perception of risk the ABBC associates with agricultural 
biotechnology consciously opens up a space in which the need to address more 
normative strategies of contending with risk are brought to the fore. Referring explicitly 
to normative concerns about the relationship GM crops imply between society and 
nature, the Commission states the argument as follows: 
"The FSEs address narrow issues of risk, not broader issues about the public 
acceptability ofpotentially irreversible changes. Many people are concerned 
that the decision-making framework, based on a risk assessment approach, 
does the same... The risk assessment approach does not address many 
people's wider philosophical or ethical concerns about what they perceive 
as a major manipUlation of nature ... We identify a particular need to explore 
the different kinds of uncertainty involved in the applications of 
biotechnology and how they might be explicitly handled in the policy 
process." (ABBC, 2001: pp. 20-21) 
10 
This protocol for evaluating risk is often termed 'substantial equivalence.' 
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However, if Crops on Trial clearly makes the case for the Government to adopt a 
wider approach to risk and the regulation of new agricultural technologies, the report 
remains vague in determining precisely how this can be achieved. For example, the 
committee suggests that the delineation of what they indistinctly describe as the "wider 
philosophical or ethical concerns," may be understood in relation to public anxieties over 
what are just as loosely described as a perception of biotechnology as a "major human 
manipulation of nature" (ABBC, 2001: p.20). What constitutes an 'ethical concern.' and 
how they can be incorporated into the FSEs and governance, is a question which the 
AEBC fails to directly address in Crops on Trial. 
For these reasons Crops on Trial is better seen as a challenge, and not as a 
prescription, for how government can incorporate risk into the regulatory decisions 
concerning GM crops. In introducing the ABBC and its engagement with the FSEs, it 
was suggested that the Commission had been motivated by a desire to engender a 
legitimate approach to the commercial regulation of agricultural biotechnology. It is this 
impetus which continues to run through the Commission's perspective of risk and the 
challenge it puts to Government. A broadened perspective of risk may contribute to the 
better understanding and management of the potentially detrimental consequences of 
GM crops, but just as importantly for the ABBC, it offers the chance of encouraging 
political accountability in decision making. The following passages from the AEBC 
clearly elucidate the role of a broadened notion of risk in regenerating accountability and 
public trust in the governance of GM crops and foods: 
"We identify a particular need to explore the different kinds of uncertainty 
involved in the applications of biotechnology and how they might be 
explicitly handled in the policy process... The processes of defining and 
understanding uncertainty are central to the science itself, but they need to 
be properly communicated and understood in a regulatory process that is 
politically accountable." (ABBC, 2001: p.2l). (my emphasis) 
"It seems to us that even criticisms appearing to be narrowly addressed to 
the FSEs themselves, or apparently couched in imprecise scientific terms, 
often reflect deeper concerns. References in the evidence we received to the 
impact of the trials on bee-keeping, earthworms or gene flow, or .to the 
possible effects ofGM technology on people's children and grandchtl~ren, 
were sincere in themselves, but we suggest that they may also sometImes 
been ways of expressing wider, analytically more elusive ethical concerns. 
Such concerns are fundamental in determining how people react and 
-206-
respond to a new technology, which is not fully understood and which the\' 
may not be inclined to accept. They make it crucial - as well as hard - t~ 
build trust in how the technology is being promoted and supervised." 
(AEBC, 2001: p.29) (my emphasis). 
These arguments were further underlined in interviews with two members of the 
AEBC (Participants J & N). Each not only argued that it was necessary to engage 
alternative forms of expertise and ethical considerations in governing risk, but that it \\/as 
necessary precisely because it gave "official" recognition to public concerns in the 
regulatory process. Asked what her/his expectations were going into the ABBC, one of 
these participants suggested that whether s/he would be able to see the Commission as a 
successful exercise hinged precisely on these matters. S/he states: 
"What were your feelings going into the AEBC? Were they generally 
positive, or did you have any apprehensions? " 
"A mixture of both really. First of all, one doesn't do these things unless 
you think they are potentially worthwhile. You have to have some degree 
or optimism. It was an obvious body which was going to potentially give 
those broader areas of risk which we had always argued were relevant, 
legitimate and important... It was actually going to give them space and 
voice, if you like, to allow them to become officiaL." 
"You would hope, and of course you can never be certain that you are going 
to get everything right, that you get a landscape of risk assessment that 
would be more broadly agreed upon. You would bring in a broader range 
of know ledges. You may then, as a consequence, hopefully get a decision 
that commands better respect and confidence. It would be more robust and 
not so flaky." (Participant N) 
Summary 
In its focus on the Farm Scale Evaluations and the commercial regulation of GM 
crops, the ABBC has involved itself in a political struggle over ideas of risk and 
processes of governance. This is a constructive form of politics in so far as it seeks to 
redefine how technological risks are interpreted and applied in evaluating the safety of 
GM crops and in deciding on whether to grant commercial approval to these crops, or 
not. Crops on Trial critiques a model of risk based on assessment practices which infer 
closure to debates over risk and uncertainty through a discourse of scientific expertise. 
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This model is contrasted with a more normatively attuned definition of risk in order to 
address limitations in scientific knowledge and the routinization of uncertainty. The 
Commission, alternatively, proposes an understanding of risk which seeks to tie together 
scientific and ethical evaluations of the hazards of GM crops. The challenge being made 
to Government is to address the FSEs, the commercialization ofGM crops and public 
perceptions of risk in a manner which engenders more politically accountable forms of 
decision making. 
Responses to the ABBC - Enduring Contestations over Science in Society 
Whether, or not, the ABBC will be successful in its project is anything but a 
foregone conclusion. Looking at some of the responses Crops on Trial has provoked 
from within and outside of government is beneficial in identifying the struggles the 
AEBC faces in achieving its aims as outlined above. This will be the subject of the third 
and final section of this chapter. Firstly, although the ABBC's conclusions were seen as 
a positive contribution to the debate by most research participants, Crops on Trial also 
elicited derision from those who were either involved in the FSEs, or supportive of the 
commercial growing ofGM crops. Secondly, the Government's official response to the 
report, although supportive in tone, presents some serious stumbling blocks for the 
ABBC. In both cases, the responses made to the report can be seen as defending the 
authority of scientific knowledge and its position in governance. 
A View from Science and Industry 
Crops on Trial has been widely read in debate circles and is increasingly cited in 
policy documents and academic articles pertaining the controversy over new agricultural 
technologies. It has likewise been subject to many different interpretations. Released in 
the weeks prior to conducting interviews for this thesis, the Commission's report was a 
hot topic point for some participants who had already read it and formed an opinion of 
its conclusions. In particular, participants who were generally supportive of agricultural 
biotechnology, from government, industry and science, expressed concern about the 
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ABBC's expanded approach to the FSEs. These participants, although expressing 
support for some form of public engagement, were unhappy that the trials had been 
targeted by the ABBC, arguing that their scientific merit was potentially being 
compromised. In reacting to the ABBC's attempt to reconstruct ideas of risk in 
governance, participants made arguments which sought to re-establish the FSEs as a 
purely scientific enterprise. 
In Chapter Six several participants from the scientific community were shown to 
be attempting to reconstruct the boundary between science / nature and politics / society. 
This boundary, as_risk theorists have posited, was perceived to have_eroded as a 
consequence of an increasing social preoccupation with hazards and the negative 
impacts of techno-scientific development. Attempts to reconstitute the autonomy and 
authority of science were also expressed in response to the AEBC, and in contesting the 
role of the FSEs in producing expert advice to government. The following statement 
comes from a scientist who is a frequent member of expert advisory panels and currently 
involved in carrying out the farm scale trials. Responding to a question pertaining to 
whether alternative forms of expertise could playa contributing role in presenting the 
findings of the FSEs to government, the participant offered the following response. S/he 
identifies expert advice as the province of science and suggests that political and social 
concerns are better left to the politicians. S/he states her/his opinion in no uncertain 
terms: 
"I can say to ministers that as a result ofthe farm scale trials we conclude X. 
A Minister can then say, 'despite that, because ofY I am going to do this.' 
If it turns out afterwards that he was wrong it's his problem, not mine. I 
think there are quite considerable dangers about expecting scientists to be 
not only expert witnesses in key areas, but also to then put a social spin on 
this. One of my current concerns is that the criteria for the way in which 
expert committees advise government are slowly and inexorably being 
modulated to take account ofthese other factors. The words, 'over my dead 
body,' spring to mind." (Participant R) 
In making this argument, the participant is further anxious to distance the FSEs 
from the debate over genetically modified crops and foods as a whole. In outlining the 
pUrpose of the trials s/he seeks to limit the nature of the questions being addressed by the 
FSEs in a manner which is diametrically opposed to the perspective advanced by the 
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ABBe. The FSEs are solely a scientific task involving the empI'n'cal b . f 
o sen'atIOn 0 the 
effects of different cropping systems on environmental biodiversl'ty Th . h 
. e separatIOn t e 
participant seeks to place between the FSEs and the political contrO\"ersy is perhaps best 
seen in her/his repeated inference that the field trials have actually little to do with 
agricultural biotechnology at all. The trials are perceived in scientific terms as a struggle 
over fixed carbon resources between agriculture and the natural environment. 
Furthermore, if the FSEs have become entangled with the politics of the controversy, 
and other broader issues of risk attached to the trial, s/he hints that this is a result of the 
questionable motivations of those parties interested in derailing the commercial 
regulation of GM crops. S/he states: 
"People point to the FSEs as some sort of point-aI-passage in the debate. 
People are anxiously waitingfor the outcomes ... " 
"Except that none of that has ever come from the scientific steering 
committee. That set of views has been promUlgated by a range of different 
people with a range of different aims and objectives in this debate ... The 
question which was asked, to which there was no really good answer, was 
whether we knew what effect changing cropping systems are going to have 
on agriculture. It's not so much GM itself, but the cropping system in which 
it is used. The answer is no. We don't have any idea ... " 
"I think you can make a compelling case for agriculture, ever since its 
inception, being a battle between the natural environment and the 
agricultural environment for which gets the bigger share of the carbon that 
is fixed. It's been a fairly open battle until recently. Since the war the 
farmers are winning to the detriment to wildlife. I, therefore, think it is quite 
a legitimate question to say, 'Ok is this new technology going to make 
matters worse or better, or have no effect at all. This is what the 
experiments are set up for. The experiments actually have nothing to do 
with GM at all. You don't see that written down very often because it suits 
various other people not to write it that way." (Participant R) 
This argument was repeated by a research scientist and industry representative 
who is involved in the attempt to commercialize some of the GM cropping systems 
being trialed. Again, it is stated that it was legitimate for opposition groups to demand 
answers about how the widespread commercial growing of GM crops could affect rural 
wildlife and biodiversity. However, the participant clearly sees the move by the AEBC 
to understand this relationship in wider terms as unacceptable. With subtlety, the 
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participant argues that ABBC is guilty of confusing the issue and misrepresenting the 
issue to the pUblic. Confident in the safety of the crops, the overarching message s/he 
advances is that the FSEs must be allowed to speak authoritatively about the risks of 
growing GM crops and to not confuse these issues with any outside political concerns: 
"In terms of regulation, such as addressed by the FSEs, it seems that the 
questions surrounding them won't be solved by the science alone. " 
"The FSEs themselves do not involve a whole lot of other things. The 
decision of whether to approve crops for commercial cultivation in the UK 
does involve a lot of other things. I was disappointed that the ABBC chose 
to do a re-haul over the process of establishing the trials, because the trials 
themselves were established in such a method where we had the greatest 
ever internal debate between the middle ground environmental groups like 
English Nature and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, 
government and industry than we have ever had about a new technological 
development. The trials were specifically tied to one particular question. 
Does biodiversity get influenced when something that has been tested to 
exhaustion at a small scale is scaled up? Now the fact that this was one area 
in the regulatory framework that did not seem to have been addressed by the 
existing regulations meant that industry and the Government and the 
environmental groups were able to agree that would be something useful to 
work on... This whole question of a broader debate, which is not actually 
about the outcomes ofthe FSEs, is about other issues of people's feelings of 
various views of ethics and all sorts of peripheral issues, and is not about the 
safety ofthe crops or their cultivation themselves. They have been rolled in 
and confused in the minds of the public and the media as to what the FSEs 
are actually about." (Participant 0) 
The Response of Government 
In early 2002, the Government responded to Crops on Trial, offering the ABBe 
a general statement of interest and acceptance I I. In this response, the Commission is 
congratulated on the publication of its report and in taking account of the "broader" 
II 
Of the three devolved UK Governments, only the Welsh National Assembly chose not to sign onto the 
general statement, offering its own letter of response to Crops on Trial. In it, the Welsh Government 
. . . I d th' . hon of the strongest restnctlOnS reasserts Its call for a moratOrIum on all GM crop trIa s an e ImpOSILl . _ 
against future GM developments. This position stands in opposition to the primary conclUSIOn at the . 
" d" r "th "th nnclp1ed AEBC which was that the the FSEs should continue. This stance IS put forwar III me WI e p " 
concerns of the National Assembly for Wales as a whole about the impact ofG~l planting on organic and 
conventional farming" (National Assembly for Wales, 2002). 
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issues related to the FSEs. In particular, the Government sees the work of the 
Commission as an important contribution to the understandl'ng of pub I" b IC concerns a out 
agricultural biotechnology. Advancing its general response to the Crops on Trial report, 
the Government states: 
"We welcome the Commission's detailed analysis of the context in which 
the ~SE . programme is be~ng conducted as well as the thorough 
consIderatIOn of the broader Issues raised by the intense interest in the 
evaluations. The report ~s a positive contribution to the debate surrounding 
GM crops. We agree WIth the Commission's view that the report can help 
illuminate public discussion ofthe issues surrounding GM crops." (DEFRA, 
2002a: paL- 7) 
However, despite voicing its overall approval of the report, the Government's 
tone is much less embracing and a great deal more cautious in its detailed response to the 
report's recommendations. Specifically, the Government is anxious to distance itself 
from the Commission's advice concerning the commercial regulation of agricultural 
biotechnology. In this regard, the Government's response can be seen as an attempt to 
reassert its control and authority over these matters. For example, although the 
Government is happy to recommit to a voluntary moratorium on the commercialization 
ofGM crops until the FSEs are complete, it is wary of committing to how it will apply 
the results ofFSEs in regUlating these technologies. Of notable significance is the 
Government's hesitation to make any commitments which would tie regulation to any 
expanded criteria, or broadened conception and engagement with risk and expertise. 
Instead, the Government's response emphasizes commitments to scientific risk 
evaluations which comprise the cornerstones of decision making as interpreted in 
European legislation. Take, for example, the following statement: 
"Decisions must be taken with reference to the science-based criteria set 
down in the European legislation, but will be based on more than an analysis 
of the FSE results. Although general ethical and socio-economic 
implications of the marketing of GMOs may be taken into account in 
reviewing the operation of this legislation, the criterion for taking decisions 
on individual applications is the avoidance of adverse effects on human 
health and the environment." (DEFRA, 2002a: par. 13) 
While directing the AEBC away from issues of governance, the Government also 
attempts to refocus the Commission's attention on establishing an engagement with the 
public. In fact, the general tone of the Government's response exhibits a degree of 
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impatience with the ABBC for not already having made significant strides towards 
accomplishing this in the time preceding the publication of Crops on Trial. Bel) ing the 
congenial tone of the Government response, a participant who is involved in the 
establishment of the ABBC expressed frustration that the Commission had not alreadv 
given serious attention to these tasks. Interviewed shortly after the Government 
published its response, the participant offered the following caustic comment in response 
to a question about how it is possible to involve the public in governance: 
"How then, do public voices get into the debate?" 
"That's wliat the ABBC is going to tell us. That is why we set them up to 
do. We are waiting for their advice with interest." (Participant X) 
In direct terms, the Government response can be read as asking the AEBC to get on with 
this aspect of its mandate. Specifically, the Government is anxious for the AEBC to 
advise on how to establish a public debate on the commercialization of agricultural 
biotechnology, how to apply the results of this debate, and if possible to establish the 
conditions of public acceptability for growing GM crops (DEFRA, 2002a: par. 29-35). 
The Government's response to Crops on Trial may, therefore, be seen to contain 
a fundamental contradiction. On the one hand, the Government is critical of the AEBC 
for not getting on with its mandate to engage the public and reasserts the need for the 
Commission to dedicate itself to this task. Yet, the Government's response portrays an 
unwillingness to commit to how these consultative measures will contribute to the 
governance of the technology. Instead, alongside its calls for a public engagement is a 
reassertion of the importance of regulatory science in directing matters of commercial 
regulation. Stated differently, the Government appears to wish to tap into public opinion, 
but avoids linking the future of the technology to public attitudes or alternative 
evaluations of the risks of the technology. 
Both members of the Commission, who have already been cited above, also 
expressed these reservations. Because the Government was in no way beholden to the 
advice of the ABBC or even to take account of the conclusions of Crops on Trial report, , 
they were suspicious that the ABBC might fall subject to the whims of the British 
political system. Although this topic will be picked up again in next chapter's 
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discussion of the ABBC's attempt to hold a national debate on the commercialization of 
GM crops, the following comments are helpful in setting the context of governance in 
which the debate will be held. The first statement expresses concern that the 
Government will simply ignore the ABBC and Crops on Trial. In the second statement 
, 
another participant is worried that the Commission might not only be ignored, but could 
be applied by Government in a way which runs counter to the conclusions it has put 
forward. These comments follow on from an earlier citation in which the participant tied 
the success of the ABBC to its ability to bring a broader perspective of risk into 
governance. Conversely, the potentially negative side of the experience was that the 
ABBC could be used as a means of stifling public debate and criticism. In other words, 
s/he worries that the Government will attempt to impose closure around the debate by 
arguing that social and cultural concerns about risk and the technology have been dealt 
with by the Commission: 
"You can't judge the success of the AEBC until: a) you have seen the 
quality ofthe advice, and b) whether the Government does anything with it. 
At the end of the day we are a creature of government in the sense that we 
don't have independent powers. I would hope that it would be silly of any 
government to set up anything this visible, which may be successful in 
engaging the public and cost a lot of money, and then ignore it. But, who 
knows. The week's a long time in politics as Howard Wilson said. Whether 
the advice is taken will depend on the political imperatives of the time. 
They can often have nothing to do with the particular issue at stake." 
(Participant N) 
"The negative things... I know as well as anybody that one thing that the 
British Political system is good at doing is creating slightly new institutional 
forms, be it departments, commissions or inquiries to stifle debate, to 
capture critique and to capture the terms of the debate. Having a talking 
. shop and not having to do anything. Pointing to the ABBe as your, 'well 
we've got the AEBC ... ," 
'(t ..• and we've dealt with risk. .. '" 
"Exactly, 'we're looking at ethics ... ' It's not statutory that they have to take 
any notice." (Participant J) 
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Summary 
The responses to the ABBC of key figures involved in the FSEs, along with the 
official reply published by the Government, have suggested that the debate over the role 
of science in society will be an enduring source of controversy in British society. In 
other words, the debate is likely to continue beyond Crops on Trial and likely even the 
commercial regulation of GM crops. As one member of the AEBC observed, by seeking 
to influence government to take a wider approach to issues of risk in regulating Gt\l 
crops, the AEBC is a "tool" in a larger political debate about the democratization of 
decision making (Participant N). Simply, the AEBC is unlikely to settle the debate on 
its own. 
Of more immediate significance for the success of the AEBC is the way which 
the Government chooses to take its advice in relation to the commercial regulation of 
GM crops. The challenge of confronting enduring scientific conceptions of knowledge 
and expertise is equally evident in this regard. In other words, the high degree to which 
technocratic discourses are integrated in regulatory processes presents a serious 
stumbling block for the ABBC and its attempt to democratize expertise and governance. 
How the ABBC is able to resolve the contradiction between being asked to engage 
public concerns about agricultural biotechnology on the behalf of the Government, and 
not having any clear mandate detailing what a public debate will contribute to regulatory 
procedure, remains an important site of conflict. 
Conclusions 
As an experiment in public consultation and decision making the AEBC has been 
shown to potentially have an important role to play in debates over risk, science and 
governance. By adopting the FSEs as its focus, the Commission has strongly asked the 
Government to address the ways in which it will apply expertise in relation to public 
values in regulating the commercial future of GM crops. Moreover, the AEBC, if 
successful, may potentially have an even wider impact on issues of democratization and 
public accountability in the governance of risk and technological development. 
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It has been argued above, that the Commission's successes ar I I" d . e c ose ;. he to Its 
ability to bring widened perceptions of risk and participation into official government 
procedure, specifically in relation to the application of the FSE results. \Vhere past 
efforts to contend with risk and uncertainty have sometimes resulted in considerable 
failures, such as recorded in the case of mad-cow disease, the AEBC seeks to help 
government learn from these errors. Significantly, the Commission's potential, in this 
regard, surpasses the input put forward by Lord Phillips in his report from the BSE 
Inquiry discussed in Chapter Seven. The AEBC does so by challenging the Government 
to look beyond scientific knowledge in regUlating the commercial future of agricultural 
biotechnology, and to address public attitudes towards a broader range of social 
concerns. The AEBC, by focussing on the FSEs, not only advises the Government that a 
wider range of social and normative issues need to be taken into consideration alongside 
scientific advice, but further challenges the meaning and authority of the trial results 
themselves. 
Although the Commission does not explicitly, or in detail, describe what these 
'broader concerns' might entail, it does offer some indication of what they might 
include. For example, the Commission repeatedly refers to the public's apprehensions 
about the potentially deleterious relationship created between society and the natural 
environment as a consequence of the application of genetics in agricultural development. 
Likewise, in the above discussion, the AEBC has been shown to be keen to talk about 
issues of consumer choice, trust in industry and public accountability in science and 
governance. These have all been identified in previous chapters as common topics 
eschewed by participants, and have been seen to reflect, not only their uncertainties 
about new agricultural technologies, but also about the nature of British society. In this 
sense, the AEBC has attempted to open a space in which what this thesis identifies as the 
politics of new agricultural technologies can be accommodated in official practice and 
discourse. 
However, it has also been argued in this chapter that if such a democratic space is 
to be developed in Government that the Commission faces an enduring and uphill 
struggle to do so. As theorized in Chapter Two, the relationship between scientific 
knowledge, objectivity and governance is deeply integrated in Western societies. 
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Consequently, there remain very serious doubts about whether the AEBC will have an 
impact on the regulation of GM crops, and whether it will be able to engender the 
political accountability and legitimacy it is seeking. 
Whether the Commission is going be able to overcome these hurdles, depends 
very much on whether the Government will, or will not, feel obliged to acquiesce to the 
ABBC's advice. Moreover, this is itself tightly correlated with the ability of the AEBC 
to tap into public opinions concerning agricultural technology and its capacity to 
forcefully bring them to bear on Government. This will be the topic of the next chapter 
which addresses the AEBC's ongoing role in creating a national debate over GM crops 
and foods. 
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CHAPTER NINE: A PUBLIC DEBATE ON GM CROPS AND FOODS 
"It will be crucial for the public to be involved in the important decisions 
which need to be taken. We have to find a way to foster informed public 
discussion--of the development and application of new technologies: 
whatever decisions are ultimately reached, they will be more palatable if 
they have not been taken behind closed doors. At present, there seem to be 
no avenues for a genuine, open, influential debate with inclusive procedures, 
which does not marginalise the reasonable scepticism and wide body of 
intelligent opinion outside specialist circles. We need to harness new 
deliberative mechanisms, to develop participatory methods of public 
engagement, together with new capabilities within Government and industry 
for digesting and responding to the implications." (AEBC, 2001: p. 24) 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter the Government's Agriculture, Environment and 
Biotechnology Commission (AEBC) was presented as making a strong argument for 
democratizing the governance of new agricultural technologies. In particular, the 
Commission called on the Government to adopt a broader conception of risk. It argued 
that regulators needed to take social and ethical concerns about biotechnology into 
account when evaluating the GM crops currently under commercial review in the UK. 
The citation above, drawn from the Commission's influential Crops on Trial report, 
indicates that a central aspect of this project was to ask the Government to conduct a 
public debate on GM crops and foods. Underlining the relationship between the 
Commission's presentation of risk and the desire to have a public debate, a member of 
the ABBC interviewed states that where "there is risk on the one hand, an upshot of 
looking at risk has been looking at public participation in decision making" (Participant 
J). 
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To a large degree, whether or not the AEBC will be able to engender public 
participation, and what the Commission perceives as more publicly accountable forms of 
governance, may depend on the success of this debate. This success, as the above 
statement indicates, will be measured in terms of whether the debate can be seen to ha\'e 
provided a "genuine, open" and "influential" debate. The AEBC, in other words, 
proposes a debate which encourages the provision of a forum in which citizens are able 
to discuss the full range of concerns they have about the risks of agricultural 
biotechnology with the Government. Moreover, the AEBC will also rate the success of 
the debate in terms- of the impact public attitudes will be allowed to have on how the 
Government reaches a decision on the commercial future of GM crops in the UK. 
At the time this chapter (June 2003) is being written the AEBC's public debate is 
only just getting under way. Likewise, the scientific results of the FSEs are only starting 
to be compiled and the Government is still some time away from having to make a 
decision about the regulation of GMHT crops. This chapter, therefore, does not seek to 
provide an in-depth analysis of the debate and its immediate impact on governance. 
Instead, the following discussion is intended as an introduction to the debate and poses 
some speculative questions about what factors might be involved in impacting the 
potential success, or failure, of this debate as the AEBC envisions it. These questions 
are drawn from an analysis of the ways in which the proposal for a public engagement 
has already been contested in the lead-up to the actual debate events, due to take place 
during the summer of2003. The focus will be on the relationship between the science, 
governance and wider perceptions of risk. 
The structure of the chapter will be as follows. A brief introduction and 
backgrounding of the proposed debate is provided in the first section of this chapter. 
Secondly, from this basis, questions concerning the definition and role of the 'public' in 
this debate will be addressed. The third, and final section of this chapter, will 
speCUlatively identify some of the key barriers the ABBC is likely to face in creating a 
public debate in line with its democratic aims. Stated differently, this section will 
address those factors which may stand against the provision of a "genuine, open" and 
"influential" engagement with the Government over the commercialisation of GM crops. 
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Background to the Public Debate 
In its response to the Crops on Trial report!, the Government agreed to the 
ABBC's request2 for the need to hold a public debate, and tasked the Commission with 
providing additional advice on how the debate could be developed and conducted. The 
ABBC duly responded to this request and provided the Secretary of State with a workin o 
~ 
plan, broadly outlining the potential role and shape of a nationwide debate on 
agricultural biotechnology. Following in the footsteps of Crops on Trial, the AEBC 
focuses this debate- on the "possible commercialization of GM crops," and not just on the 
technology itself (ABBC, 2002a). The purpose of this debate, the AEBC argues, is not 
to seek to produce either a 'yes' or 'no' response to the commercialization ofGM crops. 
In other words, the debate should not be seen as referendum on the future of agricultural 
biotechnology in Britain. Rather, the debate is envisioned as an important means of 
enabling a multifaceted public to communicate its various views about the risks of 
commercialising GM crops to the Government. The Commission states the purpose of 
the debate in the following terms: 
"The principal objective of stimulating a public debate is to assess the nature 
and spectrum ofthe public's views on the possible commercialization ofGM 
crops in the United Kingdom and any conditions under which 
commercialization might or might not acceptably proceed so that the 
public's views can inform decision making." (AEBC, 2002a: par. 6) 
The Government, represented by the Environment Secretary Margaret Becket, 
accepted the advice of the AEBC and granted the Commission permission to develop a 
public debate on the behalf of the UK and its devolved adininistrations (DEFRA, 2002c). 
IPlease refer to Chapter Eight. 
2 
o 0 G t h b encouraged to hold a public AlongsIde the advice berng offered by the AEBC, the overnrnen as een 0 
o. 1 0 I ti veming the dehberate release of debate as a consequence of Its comrmtrnents to European egIS a on go _ 0 
, "d lOb I dO ective" (dIrective 90/220/EEC) It GM crops into the environment. Under the EU s e 1 erate re ease Ir 0 
o • • b C can be gIven approval to be IS mandatory for member states to hold pubhc consultatIOns elore any crop . 
• o· bl' d b t 'as seen as a way ot clearlY grown. As one member of DEFRA stated rn an rntervlew, a pu IC e a e \\ -
addressing this criterion (Participant X). 
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3 
4 
A budget of £250,000 was initially allocated for this project], and following the AEBC's 
advice, it was agreed that the debate should be managed and run by an independent 
'public debate steering board' (PDSB), operating at arm's length from the Government. 
Like the ABBe, the PDSB is composed of members representing a diversity of expertise 
and interests from all sides of the debate over agricultural biotechnologl. The PDSB is 
planning to host the debate during the summer of 2003 and the Government is looking 
for the steering board to produce its report for the Government in September of the same 
year. 
The public-debate, later labelled by the PDSB as 'GM Nation?,' is only one part 
of a three tiered government consultation on agricultural biotechnology and the 
commercialisation of GM crops. Along with the development of a public debate the 
Government has also established an economic and a scientific review, each of which has 
its own budget and management structure. The economic strand is being carried out by 
the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit and has been tasked with providing a cost-benefit 
analysis of the impact ofGM crops on the British agricultural industry. The science 
strand is responsible for providing the Government with a review of the scientific issues 
surrounding GM crops, including those which have been voiced in opposition to the 
technology. The science review is being directed by Professor Sir David King, the 
Government's chief scientific advisor. Although independent of one another, each 
strand has been directed to interact and work closely with each other (DEFRA, 2002b & 
2002d). 
Guiding the practical development of the debate has been an effort to afford the 
wider British public with the deliberative mechanisms with which to stimulate interest 
and allow citizens to become active participants in the debate. In developing these 
mechanisms a variety of methods have been considered by the PDSB. These included 
the use of focus groups, consensus conferences, media debates and the production of a 
A .. . . f th d bate this budget was later increased t the request of the steenng board dIrectmg the constructIOn 0 e e 
to £500,000. 
The PDSB is chaired by Professor Malcolm Grant who also chairs the ABBC itself. Several other 
members of the AEBC also sit on the PDSB. 
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film intended to generate national interest in the issue. Going into the debate, a 
combination of these methods has been decided upon by the steering board. The 
proposed debate is set to consist of a series of locally I community organized debates 
which will be held across the country. These debates will be framed by six larger, 
conference-style, events. Furthermore, as will be discussed below, a series of focus 
groups have already been held with the intention of allowing the public to set the tone 
for the debate itself. 
A 'Public' Debate-? 
As an experiment in public engagement thePDSB faces the obvious task of 
determining what constitutes a public debate in the first place. The idea of public 
engagement is sometimes presented by the ABBe as a straightforward means of 
generating legitimacy and public accountability in the governance of agricultural 
biotechnology. In practice, the issue is considerably more complex. As a participant and 
member of the ABBe states, determining what actually comprises an "adequate" public 
debate has been a difficult task. S/he states: 
"One of the main difficulties is the ability to promote public debate and get 
Government to take notice of its outcomes. How do you know when you 
have done that adequately? What does a public debate actually amount to? 
You can only get a certain number of people in a room. You can have a 
media ding dong about things. It's a very misused term. Would you know 
a public debate if it ran you over?" (Participant J) 
Alongside practical considerations about how the debate should be run, the 
AEBe and PDSB have had to address some more fundamental questions in coming to 
terms with the ambiguity of their task. Firstly, they have had to give considerable 
attention to what constitutes a 'public' in the first place. Furthermore, they have had to 
determine what the role of the public will be in the debate. 
What Public? 
Throughout the accounts of the controversy surrounding new agricultural 
technologies presented in this thesis, the public has repeatedly surfaced as a central 
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factor in these conflicts. The 'public,' and 'public opinion' have ofte b "1' d 
n een Utl lze as 
resources on which participants, from both sides of the debate have dra'" . d 
, Nn III or er to 
give credence to their positions. This 'public' is often used by stakeholders as a means 
of drawing strength to their political position by arguing that the attitudes of the 
democratic majority are in line with one's own arguments. For example, to return to the 
case of GM tomato puree, opponents of the technology often cite the supermarket's 
decision to pull the product from shelves as the result of overwhelming 'public' 
opposition to the technology. Likewise, proponents of the technology claim that sales of 
the paste infer 'public' acceptance of the technology. 
Part of the challenge of defining a public debate involves moving beyond these 
types of politically charged situations where stakeholders speak for the pUblic. There has 
been some concern raised by the Government that the controversy, to date, has been 
dominated by those with a direct and vested interest in the outcome, and who have 
further been accused of adopting overly rigid and polarized stances to the issue. This 
includes stakeholders from industry and science, as well as those representing the NGO 
and activist communities. Expressing dissatisfaction with the AEBC for failing to 
address the public outside of these interests in the past, a senior bureaucrat in the 
Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) makes the following 
chiding statement: 
"Are there attempts in government to bring the public further into the 
debate? " 
"Yes, the ABBe is a government project... But, they have singularly failed 
to address the public. That has been a complete and total failure. They 
know that too. They have been travelling around the country saying that 
they were engaging with th.e public. But, at their meeting in Birmingham, 
the audience consisted of twenty members of the public, and they were the 
same members that came to the London meeting and who had been to the 
Norwich meeting ... The ABBe say that they are going to engage the public, 
but the only people they engage are a handful of activists and a f~w 
academics. But, there is nothing in it for ordinary members of the public. 
What ordinary member of the public is going to give up an evening to come 
to a meeting in Birmingham?" (Participant X) 
Both the ABBe and the Government are consequently anxious to free the public 
debate from these restrictions and to rectify past failures to engage the wider British 
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Public. The ABBC, therefore, envisions 'GM Nation?' as a means f . 
. 0 accessmg and 
giving voice to as diverse a range of public views as possible The AEBC' fi '. 
. IS mn m Its 
opinion that this should not mean excluding the voices of the stakeholders which have 
dominated the debate so far. Simply, the Commission argues that in order to provide an 
open and genuine engagement with the public, a wider variety of experiences and 
knowledge must be given the space to participate in the debate alongside those of key 
stakeholders (ABBC, 2001: par. 69). This diversity is sought inclusively across all 
regions and social backgrounds throughout the United Kingdom; what the AEBC refers 
to as the "grass roots" of the British public. This is how the ABBC presents the task to 
Government: 
"We want to involve as many people as practicable, from a wide range of 
backgrounds, in ways that capture their attention. We want especially to 
draw people at grass roots level into the debate. The debate should also seek 
to gain a deep understanding of the variety and subtlety of public views 
about the issues around the possible commercialisation of GM crops." 
(AEBC, 2002a: par. 14) 
The Public-Framing of the Debate 
In seeking to encourage the participation of' grass-root' public views, the ABBC 
argues that it is further necessary to allow this public to frame the debate itself. To this 
end, the Commission has recently completed a series of public focus groups which have 
been intended to encourage public participation in the actual design of the debate from 
the outset and before any debate events are actually held. These, in effect, have been 
designed to give citizens "a blank piece of paper" to identify the issues which they 
identify as having the greatest significance in the controversy over the commercialisation 
of GM crops (ABBC, 2002a: par. 19). 
Alongside the ability to access the knowledge and experiences of a grass-roots 
public, the Commission identifies two additional benefits it hopes will be engendered by 
this process. Firstly, allowing citizens to frame the issues themselves is seen as a means 
of demonstrating to the public that the debate is not being controlled, or restricted, by the 
Government, or any other stakeholders in the debate. Public-framing is, in other words, 
envisioned as a means of engendering public trust in the overall debate process. 
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Secondly, in setting the tone for the actual debate itself the ABBe" " 
, IS anxIOUS to 
investigate those issues which are likely to be recognized by other members of the public 
in order to encourage participation in the 'GM Nation?' debate events (I"b"d " 8) 1 "" par. " 
Comments 
In attempting to generate a public debate on the commercial future of GrvI crops 
the ABBC and PDSB have produced a framework of public engagement which would 
appear to respond -to sociological criticisms concerning the lack of public engagement in 
science and governance. This includes some of those criticisms made in this thesis" 
Firstly, by seeking to address a 'grass-roots' public" in terms of the heterogeneity of 
perspectives and experiences it can bring to the debate, the 'GM Nation?' debate could 
potentially address concerns pertaining to the domination of decision making processes 
~ 
by scientific expertise. Such a public debate, therefore, potentially creates a space where 
the normative and ethical concerns of participants raised in Part One of this thesis, could 
be heard, and openly deliberated in an official context. Secondly, by allowing the public 
to frame the issues themselves, 'GM Nation?' may provide a response to critiques of the 
asymmetrical communicative relationships and didactic practices which have 
traditionally characterized science-based governance. Simply stated, the ABBC and 
PDSB have outlined a debate which operates on the basis that alternative perspectives of 
risk offer a knowledgeable contribution to the Government in making a decision about 
the commercial future of GM crops. 
In summary, whether the PDSB will be successful in engendering an open and 
inclusive public engagement with the commercialization of GM crops is likely to depend 
on the steering board's ability to translate its definition of the public, and its role in the 
debate, into practice. The remaining section of this chapter will look at some of the 
hurdles the PDSB may face in accomplishing this aim. 
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Key Issues Pertaining to the Success of 'GM Nation?' 
The ABBe and PDSB will likely need to come to tenn with some k . ey lssues. or 
barriers, in making the 'GM-Nation?' debate a successful experiment in public 
engagement. To restate the point made in the introduction to this chapter, success is 
envisioned in terms of ideas of genuineness, openness and influence. Three points have 
stood out as being of particular significance in the run-up to the debate. Firstly. the 
ability of the debate to operate in way which can overcome what are termed fact / value 
distinctions is presented as an essential challenge facing the PDSB if the debate is to be 
successful in permitting the public to frame the debate issues themselves. Secondly, it is 
suggested that whether the debate will be able to engage with wider risk perceptions is 
partially contingent upon its ability to provide citizens with the opportunity to reflexively 
critique the facts and institutions involved in the production of scientific risk evaluations. 
Finally, the success of the debate in regenerating public trust in the governance of 
agricultural biotechnology will likely be tied to whether, or in what way, the 
Government permits the debate to influence its decisions about the commercial 
regulation of GM crops. 
Distinguishing Between Fact & Value 
One of the first things the PDSB did when it was first established was to invite a 
panel of social scientists with interests in the areas of risk and public engagement to sit 
in on the board's meetings a~d to offer the board advice. During the build-up to the 
establishment of the debate the panel offered an important critique of the process as the 
social scientists saw it. They were concerned that, even though the ABBe and PDSB 
had sought to generate a broadly focussed public engagement, the Government remained 
short-sighted in its approach to the debate. Overall, the panel members argued that the 
Government had not properly grasped the potential contribution of the public to the 
understanding of the risks of GM crops, particularly as related to issues of governance. 
This, as they saw it, was a consequence of the Government's persistent failure to 
overcome artificial distinctions between facts and values in its approach to the 
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controversy. They worried, in other words, that scientists were still b . 
emg seen to speak 
about realities, where the public was seen to contribute additional perspectiYes about 
ethics and values. Thus, the panel argued further that the Government r . d bl emame una e 
to comprehend the political dimensions attached to the pretensions of objectivity and 
truth operating behind the scientific epistemology and world-view (AEBC, 2002b: 
par.6). Recall, Richardson et al.'s argument cited in Chapter Six (1993: p. 16). These 
authors argued that the danger of distinguishing between factual and public knowledge, 
is that in doing so, governments have tended to place science in a hierarchical 
relationship with the pUblic. Alternative risk perceptions are, therefore, potentially seen 
to be of lesser value than appraisals provided by science. 
Irwin (2001b) makes a similar point in his assessment of an earlier attempt by 
government to engage with the public about biotechnology. Held between 1997 and 
1999, the "Public Consultation on Developments in the Biosciences" sought to 
encourage a public debate about scientific issues, which might then be fed into policy 
processes. However, as Irwin argues in his critique of the process, these aims were 
undermined by the failure of the debate to allow the public to critically engage with the 
positions put forward under the banner of hard science and which operated under the 
pretenses of neutrality and conclusiveness. In this case, institutional assumptions about 
facts and public knowledge were built into the briefing materials given to participants to 
stimulate debate. Irwin describes the situation this way: 
"What seems especially noteworthy about the information provided is that, 
despite the advisory group's very apparent concern to maintain scientific 
accuracy, such statements inevitably combine social and scientific 
assumptions ... [ A] different approach to neutrality seems to have applied 
according to whether statements were construed as either factual (handouts) 
or non-factual (showcards). The apparent assumption within the exercise 
was that the 'hard facts' could be separated from matters of judgement and 
opinion. However, the selection of what counts as hard fact represents an 
inevitable judgement on the part of the exercise's promoters. Furthermore, 
and seen from an outside perspective, this fact/value distinction can be 
viewed as an attempt to limit rather than enhance discussion of the core 
issues. Within the exercise, there was very little scope for such hard facts to 
be exposed to critical scrutiny or contestation by more critical social groups 
outside the immediate group of advisors." (Irwin, 2001a: p.14) 
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The PDSB faces similar problems in developing the 'GM-Nation?' debate. 
Although the board has been operating on the basis that the public should be allO\\'ed to 
frame the debate themselves, this does not necessarily infer that fact/value distinctions 
are no longer relevant. 
In this regards, it is worth noting that the Government's public debate is set to 
take place almost a half decade on from the point at which the controversy over the 
commercialisation of GM crops reached its heights. As a participant from the Food 
Standards Agency (FSA) described on the basis of her/his experience, although some 
significant public -interest in the topic has been constant, since 1999 this has become 
more sporadic and disparate5 (Participant V). Consequently, alongside its mandate to 
hold a public debate, the PDSB has also been asked to stimulate this debate in the first 
instance. As the ABBC puts the case to the Government, in order to establish a public 
debate, it is first necessary to: "raise public awareness of the science and the wider issues 
around GM crops, helping people gain access to the evidence and information they want 
and need to debate the issues" (ABBC, 2002a: par. 7). 
The PDSB thus finds itself performing a balancing act between allowing the 
public to frame the debate itself and supplying the public with material to stimulate and 
in some degree to 'inform' the debate. It is around this idea of an 'informed debate,' 
where some members of the PDSB have expressed concerns, similar to those of the 
social scientific advisory panel, about the Government's perspective of the debate. For 
example, Environment Secretary Margaret Beckett, drew some criticism as a result of the 
language she used in announcing the creation of the debate to the public. She stated: "I 
believe it is crucial to have an informed and open debate about all these issues" 
(DEFRA,2002b). Concerned with the integrity of the public's ability to engage 
scientific facts critically, some members of the PDSB felt the Minister's comments 
5 The participant states the following: \ 
"There is less interest in the GM issue than there was. February 1999 was the peak for correspondence. " s 
a: division they were receiving 600 letters a week, but that has now dropped off to perhaps a dozen a month: 
" "" I" W hll s an agency conduct market maybe 20-30. The GM issue has taken a bIg dIve m pub lC concern, e Su ,a , 
" " "" GM" s· There is a significant background research and there IS always questlOn about consumer mterest m Issue . . 
interest in GM, but it isn't the peak that it was, and it is declining. The last repor~ ~robab~y had the (,\1 
concern dropping 5 or 6%, from 15-20% to 10-15% of people are interested." (Partlclpant \ ) 
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suggested a perpetuation of government assumptions about the irrationality of public 
perspectives of risk. In other words, they worried that the public debate could 
potentially contribute to the belittling of public views by the Government instead of 
giving them genuine consideration as had been the ABBC's intention from the outset. 
The following quotation from the minutes of the PDSB's first public board meeting 
gives some idea of the contentiousness of this issue: 
"Some board members were clear that the primary objective should include 
reference to the debate being 'informed'. Other members pointed out that 
while this was of course desirable, informed debate had pejorative 
connotations to some, who would understand it in the context of GM as 
signifying patronising propaganda. Drawing on the nature of the debate as 
a dynamic dialogue, members agreed to reflect in the primary objective a 
sense of information and understanding flowing in two directions as a result 
of interactions between experts and the public." (ABBC, 2002c) 
In summary, a key issue facing the PDSB in its attempt to promote a genuine and 
open public engagement on GM crops pertains to the board's ability to conduct a debate 
which is free of fact/value distinctions. The success of the exercise hinges, in part, on 
the ability of the board to provide citizens with the information required to engender a 
debate, without limiting the debate to a discussion of the' facts' of agricultural 
biotechnology. 
Presenting A Reflexive Critique of Science and Expertise 
A second point of caution, closely related to the above comments, pertains to the 
ability of the "GM-Nation?' debate to provide a space where the public can offer a 
reflexive critique of scientific and expert models of risk analysis. 
This argument is drawn from the influential P ABE report on public perceptions 
of agricultural biotechnology in Europe. To recall from Chapter Four, P ABE researchers 
sought to demonstrate that the public's concerns about GM crops and foods involved a 
broad range of moral and ethical concerns about risk, alongside those pertaining to safety 
issues. In addition, the authors of the report also posit that allowing the public to debate 
. .. .. . t . th the processes these risks in an offiCIal context Imphes allowmg CItIzens 0 engage WI 
and assumptions underlying expert risk evaluations. In other words, they suggest that 
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the public must be pennitted to critically reflect on the science of GM crops and the 
scientific evaluations which dictate current regulatory practice. The following excerpt 
from the P ABE report picks up on these arguments and concisely states the challenge 
now facing the PDSB: 
"We believe that the object~ve ofpu~lic participation should be to open up 
expert knowledge to refleXIve questIOns about its own framing - how and 
why did it come to be focussed upon a partiCUlar definition ofthe problem? 
What were the alternatives and how were these deliberated? And what other 
possible questions have thus been neglected and why? All ofthese questions 
also involve the question: what kinds of knowledge are relevant to this 
issue? Very often the only effective way to achieve this form-of reflexivity 
is by involvement of participants from outside the expert sub-cultures. This 
extended peer review may involve both lay publics and critical experts." 
(Marris et aI., 2001: par. 9.6) 
With these arguments in mind, the division of the Government's consultation on 
the commercialisation of GM crops into three strands proposes some critical questions 
for the PDSB. To recall (refer above), alongside the PDSB's remit to engage the public, 
a scientific strand and an economic strand have also been established in order to provide 
expert judgements about the potential risks of GM crops. It is, therefore, possible to 
speculate that the concerns raised about the Government's persistent reliance on fact / 
value distinctions may potentially be exacerbated by the Government's insistence on 
holding a debate in three parts. Some PDSB members have been wary of how the three 
strands will relate to each other, particularly in terms of how the Government will apply 
their advice in reaching a decision on commercialisation (ABBe, 2002c )6. 
Responding to these concerns, the Government has sought to reassure the PDSB 
by committing to an awareness of the uncertainty and variation involved in expert risk 
assessments as communicated by the science and economic strands. For example, the 
This concern was again partly sparked by the Government's emphasis of the factual nature of the debate 
in announcing the establishment of the three strands. For example, the Government states: 
"Government intends that there will be three main components to the overall programme 
of dialogue: a public debate overseen by an independent steering board, ~d other strands 
looking at the economics and science ofGM. The intention is t? create a dlal~gue betwee?, 
all strands of opinion on GM issues, in light of the fullest avaIlable factual mformatlOn. 
(DEFRA: 2002b) 
-230-
7 
Government has instructed the science strand to take account of the variety of conflicting 
scientific views about agricultural biotechnology. In the same sense that the public 
debate is not intended to provide a 'yes' or 'no' response to the issue of 
commercialization, the science strand is not intended to provide a "black or white" 
evaluation of the science of risk and GM crops. The following comments by Ross 
Finnie7, made in a letter to the PDSB on behalf of the four UK administrations 
, 
exemplifies the Government's attempt to reassure the board of its commitment to this 
position. In the letter he asserts that all three parts of the Government's consultation 
hinge on the ability to contend with, and respect, the complexity of opinions expressed in 
each area. Moreover, he argues that the decision as to whether or not to commercialize 
GM crops will not be decided by anyone strand alone, but by Ministers looking at the 
advice as a whole. He states: 
"It would be our intention to ensure that the scientific discussion is a genuine 
forum for debate where all shades of scientific opinion are exposed and 
debated. If it cannot attract the diversity of views which we are aware exist, 
then it will not have fulfilled its purpose. As with the public debate, we do 
not expect that the scientific or economic strands will draw black and white 
conclusions but will set out for Ministers the various issues which have been 
identified during the course of the exercise; issues on which there is a 
general agreement and issues where there is continuing uncertainty. It will 
be for Ministers to determine what weight to give any conflict of views 
which emerge when they consider these matters as part of the decision 
taking process." (DEFRA, 2002d) 
If these comments offer some solace to critics concerned with the fact/value 
distinctions potentially introduced by the division of the consultation process into three 
strands concerns remain about the interaction between the strands. From the outset the , 
Government has been clear that, although the strands are managed separately, they are 
intended to work in coordination with each other. Finnie, shedding further light on this 
relationship, describes this relationship as being characterized by a "cross-fertilization" 
of information (ABBe, 2002d). For example, he suggests that the public consultation 
could potentially draw on the work of science strand to inform the public's consideration 
of a particular issue. Or alternatively, the public debate could help identify the types of 
Ross Finnie is Minister of the Environment for Scotland. 
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risk issues on which the science strand should deliberate. 
This interaction thus raises some critical questions for the PDSB in terms of the 
ability of the public debate to reflexively engage with the expert knowledge being 
compiled by the science and economic strands. If the economic and scientific strands are 
intended simply to inform public discussions - to inject scientific and economic 
knowledge into the debate - little chance may be provided to critically challenge the 
expert knowledge and the rationalities behind scientific risk assessments. If, on the other 
hand, efforts are made to allow the public to challenge the factual authority and 
epistemological as-sumptionsof science and the market, along with the Government's 
reliance on these asSumptions, then the debate may offer more success in engaging 
public perceptions ofrisk8. 
Governance and the Public Debate 
Finally, the ability of the PDSB to conduct a meaningful and engaging public 
debate will also depend on how the debate is able to influence the Government's 
eventual decision on the regulation of GM crops, including those being evaluated as part 
of the FSEs. In this sense, the issues raised in Chapter Eight concerning the ABBC's 
uncertain relationship to official processes of decision making and regulation are equally 
as relevant for the PDSB in conducting the public debate. 
In giving the PDSB its mandate to develop the 'GM-Nation?' debate the 
Government is ambiguous as to how the outcomes generated by this debate will be 
applied in relation to the regulation of new agricultural technologies. More specifically, 
the relationship between the public debate and the bureaucratic regulatory system 
remains indistinct and at time appears closed to discussion. For example, although the 
Government has been active in encouraging the development of a debate on the 
Although the focus of this discussion has primarily involved the physical sciences and ~e in~uence and 
authority they hold over the determination of risk and the governance of new technologIes, thIS doe~ n?t 
mean that scientists are the only experts which can be open to this type of criticism. For example, slffillar 
concerns have been raised by members of the steering board about the "present thinking" o~ the economIC 
strand. Specifically, members of the board were wary of the use of the Cost Benefit AnalysIs (CBA) 
approach being adopted by the strand. (AEBC, 2002d: par. 21-27). 
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commercialization of GM crops, it is also adamant that the debate be clearly separated 
from any decisions pertaining to the approval of specific crops. These decisions, the 
Government argues, will be made at a later date on the basis of "an objective assessment 
of all the available evidence of the Farm Scale Evaluations, other scientific evidence and 
information about the costs and benefits to the UK." (DEFRA, 2002c). The furthest the 
Government is willing to commit to the outcomes of the public debate is to state that it 
will take the public's views into account as far as possible. Responding to the AEBC's 
initial call for a public debate, the Government states: 
"Ministers-- will have to decide, within the framework -of European 
legislation, whether the crops grown in the FSEs should be commercialized. 
Government is committed to taking public opinion into account as far as 
possible through an open decision-making process. There will be a public 
debate on the possible commercial growing ofGM crops." (DEFRA, 2002a: 
par. 29) 
The point to be highlighted here is simply that the determination of what constitutes "as 
far as possible" is a subject which is open to political interpretation. What issues are 
deemed relevant and what factors are deemed of lesser importance is a decision made 
solely by Ministers. 
The concern this point raises is that if the 'GM-Nation?' debate fails to influence 
how the Government perceives risk in regulating agricultural biotechnology, then the 
debate process potentially undermines the principles of participation it started out with. 
lfthe purpose of 'GM-Nation?' is partly about regenerating trust and legitimacy in the 
institutions and practices responsible for governing risk and technological innovation, 
what the Government does with the public's advice is central to achieving this aim. 
At points throughout this thesis, it has been argued that strategies to improve 
communication and build trust between government and the public should seek to create 
a two-way discussion between the two parties. This opposes past practices, such as 
characterized the BSE case, where the Government interpreted public concerns about 
risk as being misinformed, and hence sought to contend with these perceptions by 
communicating the scientific facts to the public. In this sense, the provision of a public 
debate is an important step in generating a dialogue between Government and the public 
which will potentially give a greater voice to citizens in evaluating risks in decision-
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making. However, it appears evident that if the public contribution is ignored, or 
undervalued, in influencing the Government's regulatory position in relation to G~1 
crops, the provision of that dialogue will be undennined. In other words, it is not 
enough to simply give a space for public voices to be heard. If the dialogue is to be 
successful then Government will have to demonstrate that it has listened and valued 
these contributions. To fail and do so could potentially alienate the public further from 
processes of decision making and generate a cynicism towards these sorts of public 
engagements in the future. The authors of the P ABE report state the case well in arguing 
that in order to engender trust, governments must demonstrate that the views of the 
public are "understood, valued, respected, and taken account by decision-makers - even 
if they cannot all be satisfied" (Maris et aI., 2001: p.88) 
A member of the AEBC reaffinns this point in her/his own evaluation of the 
success of the exercise and the difficulty of the task faced by the PDSB. In herihis 
following comments, s/he identifies some benefits to holding the debate in the first 
instance. However, s/he further argues that the debate will also need to allow people to 
feel they have genuinely participated in the decision-making processes and have played a 
role in the governance of GM crops: 
"I think we are all fairly clear that what you can do is go out and spend 
money on a very sophisticated and systematic intelligence gathering, in 
terms of asking people what they think. Asking what people think the roles 
of these crops are and what they think should go into the final decision is 
something that the Government has never tried to do, so that would be 
valuable. But in terms of debating where things are going, that is a hard 
thing to do practically. But I think ultimately the success of the public 
engagement exercise depends on whether people can tum around and say' oh 
yeah it had a good shot at getting everyone involved in what's at stake here,' 
and understanding what's at stake, and what should go into the final 
decision." (Participant J) 
In summary, the success of the 'GM-Nation?' debate is likely to involve the 
ability of the PDSB and the AEBC to convince the Government to go against prevalent 
structures and ideological assumptions about expertise and governance. It will be 
necessary to have Government accept that the outcomes of the public debate offer an 
important and meaningful contribution to the understanding and governance of the risks 
posed by GM crops. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter set out to provide a brief introduction to the ongoing development of 
a public debate over the commercialization of GM crops. Moreover, it has speculated on 
some of the factors which may potentially impact on how successful the 'GM-Nation?' 
debate will be in constructing a politically accountable and publicly legitimate exercise 
in governance. Although the overall tone of the chapter has been critical, the intention 
has not been to discount the potential benefits of this experiment in public engagement. 
Alternatively, following on from the discussion of the AEBC in the last chapter, the 
'GM-Nation?' debate provides a unique opportunity to evaluate how many of the 
concerns raised by sociologists about the governance of risk and science can be achieved 
in practice. In this sense, through the above comments, I have sought to outline some 
critical issues framing how the exercise may be evaluated going into the debate this 
summer (2003). 
Addressing the build-up to the debate, the AEBC and PDSB have had to come to 
terms with the way in which the idea of a 'public' is defined, and the role it is envisioned 
to have in the debate. More specifically, they were challenged to free the public debate 
from the rigid stakeholder politics which are seen to have dominated the controversy 
over agricultural biotechnology. The solution the AEBC and the PDSB propose to this 
challenge is to construct a debate which seeks fundamentally to access and give voice to 
the greatest variety of public attitudes as possible. A key aspect of this approach has 
been to allow citizens to frame the debate issues by themselves, without being restricted 
by the motivations of either the Government, or any of the other stakeholder groups. 
How these ideas are translated into practice during the debate itself remains an important 
issue in determining whether in fact the PDSB will be able to engender an inclusive and 
uninhibited debate about the commercialization of GM crops. 
Moreover, three further issues were put forward which may create some potential 
barriers to the PDSB achieving the genuine, open and influential debate it has 
envisioned. The first two issues raise questions about how the 'GM-Nation?' debate will 
be able to mediate the relationship between scientific expertise and public knm,vledge. 
Building on the critiques made by the PDSB' s social scientific panel, it was argued that 
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if the debate was to be truly genuine, it would be necessary to overcome fact / value 
distinctions and the hierarchical relationships they propose between science and the 
public. This implies furnishing a debate in which participants are not limited to debating 
only the facts about agricultural biotechnology, but in which citizens are able to 
interrogate factual claims to risks. In a similar vein, it was also argued that it is further 
necessary to allow participants to reflexively interrogate the scientific pretenses and 
assumptions which characterize risk evaluation and scientific governance. Finally, the 
potential influence, or lack of influence, the debate will have on the Government's 
decision whether Qr not to permit the commercial growth of GM crops presents a third 
issue determining the success of the debate. In this sense it was argued that it will be 
necessary to ensure that members of the public feel they have genuinely participated in, 
and impacted upon, the decision-making process. 
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CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSIONS 
As a case study, the controversy over new agricultural technologies has provided 
a complex and mu1tifaceted picture of the political relations surrounding issues of risk, 
science and governance in Britain. It is a debate which has risen to prominence in a 
social context in which concerns over techno-scientific development and its potential 
hazards are increasingly a part of the nation's political consciousness. After more than 
four decades of turbulent social critique, agriculture in particular has become an area in 
which many of the political concerns facing Britons are being expressed and made 
apparent. The debate over GM crops and foods is, in this regard, linked to a wider 
debate over the application of science and technology in agricultural development. The 
controversy over new agricultural technologies can be seen in relation to those 
surrounding the application of chemical inputs in crop management, the monocultures 
of the green revolution and the recent outbreaks ofBSE and FMD in Britain. Each case 
has raised questions about the relationship between the modernization of the agricultural 
industry, the welfare of the environment and the well-being of society. This research 
project has thus sought to address the particularities of the controversy over agricultural 
biotechnology, while also linking the issues raised in this case to a wider social and 
political context. 
Conceptual Overview 
In regard to this project, the analysis presented in this thesis has addressed the 
following research objectives. Overall, it has endeavoured to provide an understanding 
of the politics of new agricultural technologies, and how these politics are discussed and 
fought over. Guided by sociological research in the field, as well as by the empirical 
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data, these political struggles have been revealed in tenns of debates over risk, science 
and governance. Through a series of in-depth interviews, and assisted by documentary 
data, a sample of the heterogeneity of voices and opinions involved in the debate over 
GM crops and foods has been conveyed by this project. In part, participants' 
descriptions of the political issues presented contrasting views of the benefits and risks 
of GM crops and foods. In some cases these explanations involved debates over the 
consequences of GM crops and foods on human health, or as was more often the case, 
on environmental welfare. Moreover, participants made these arguments in relationship 
to a series of normative contestations about the social relationships, values and 
institutions shaping agriculture, and British society more generally. Participants, in 
other words, were engaged in a politics characterized by a convergence of uncertainties. 
These related to anxieties about the immediate consequences of the technologies 
themselves, but also pertained to concerns about the social networks and nonnative 
contexts in which GM crops and foods are being constructed and governed. 
The relationship between agricultural biotechnology and the life-industry proved 
to be one particularly striking feature of the politics of new agricultural technologies. 
The ways in which participants identified the risks and benefits of GM crops and foods 
related to their valuations of the role of industry and corporate capitalism in shaping 
agricultural development. More broadly, the delineation of risk further related to 
perceptions of the life-industry's actions in engendering either social progress, or 
regress, depending on one's position in the debate. Arguments such as these were made 
across a variety of situations. These included, for example, debates over the risks and 
benefits afforded to Western consumers by nutriceuticals and functional foods, as well 
as contestations over the capacity of GM crops to provide for the security and welfare of 
the developing world. Furthermore, participant accounts revealed debates over risk in 
relation to differing perceptions of the progressive role of the life-industry in society, as 
related to cultural ideals of democracy. In particular, the data suggests that participants' 
perceptions of risk are closely tied to beliefs about the life-industry's role in either 
promoting, or denying, consumers' rights of choice and control over the products they 
consume. 
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The role of science in society, and in agricultural development in particular, also 
emerged as a central feature of the political controversy over new agricultural 
technologies. Although participants from both sides of the debate saw science to be 
suffering from a loss in credibility and public trust, it is significant to note that no 
participant dismissed the progressive potential of science altogether. Rather. the 
partIcipants described the controversy over GM crops and foods in relation to 
contestations over the types of science directing agricultural development and the social 
values underpinning these processes. Stated differently, these politics reflected 
concerns over what Nowotny et al. (2001) refer to as the social robustness of science _ 
the ability of science to meet the social needs and normative expectations of the public. 
In part, these contestations appertained to how participants saw agricultural 
development in regards to differing perceptions of what constituted appropriate 
relationships between society and the natural world. GM crops and foods, for example, 
were deemed risky, or beneficial, depending on how they were perceived in relation to 
opposing visions of sustainability. Likewise, contestations over scientific robustness 
were made in relation to the ability of science to manage and protect society from the 
potential dangers of agricultural biotechnology. For example, whether agricultural 
genetics was deemed a risk to health or the environment, related to perceptions of the 
corporate control of genetic research and agricultural development. 
The governance of agricultural technology, and the evaluation and control of 
risks in particular, comprised a further theme in this thesis. This topic has been 
approached analytically from two different directions. Firstly, the way in which 
participants spoke about and debated the hazards and advantages of GM crops and foods 
related to their confidence in the ability of governments to effectively manage risk. This 
included concerns about the ability of governments to protect the health of citizens and 
the integrity of the environment, but also pertained to a lack of faith in governments to 
make decisions which reflected the best interests of society as a whole. Linked with 
debates over the role of science in society, these uncertainties in the institutions of 
government identified risks in relation to contested perceptions of the factuality and 
authority of scientific knowledge in decision-making. Stated differently, debates over 
risk involved conflict over what are sometimes referred to as technocratic forms of 
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governance. 
Secondly, the final three chapters of this thesis have described part of a history 
which has seen issues of risk and the governance of agricultural biotechnology come to 
occupy an important place in the official discourse and practice of the Government. In 
part, this is a consequence of the need for the Government to come to an eventual 
decision about the commercial regulation of first generation GM crops in accordance 
with its commitments to the EU. However, the high profile gained by these issues is 
also the consequence of past failures by governments to contend with risk issues in 
agriculture. Most-significantly, the BSE case and Lord Phillips' report from the BSE 
Inquiry, have been documented as placing considerable pressures on Government to 
rethink its approach to risk, expertise and the governance of agricultural development. 
Following on from Lord Phillips' report, this thesis has observed this pressure being 
sustained through the establishment of the ABBC and its publication of the Crops on 
Trial report, up until the creation of the forthcoming public debate on the 
commercialisation of GM crops. 
Thus, along with an analysis of the politics of new agricultural technologies, an 
attempt to document the capacity of the initiatives mentioned above to promote change 
in government practice has also been undertaken by this thesis. It has addressed the 
ways in which the types of social and normative politics participants described by 
participants can be acknowledged in the practices of governance. This analysis has not 
attempted to cast a final judgement on the success of these events in affecting the 
Government's approach to the regulation of new agricultural technologies. Nor, does it 
prejudge the Government's actions in this regards. Rather it has identified some critical 
issues relating to how successful these efforts may be in building an open, inclusive and 
meaningful process of understanding and governing risk. 
Foremost, the Phillips Report, the ABBC and the 'GM Nation?' debate each 
contribute towards challenging government's assumptions about the factuality and 
authority of scientific knowledge. However, further persistence is required as it has 
been shown that these assumptions are deeply rooted in decision making practices. The 
challenge involves influencing both how governments and experts think about risk, and 
also how these assumptions are structured into the regulatory process. 
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Furthermore, this critique has implied the need to approach scientific expertise 
in relation to other forms of experiential knowledge, such as voiced by many of the 
participants in this project. Although the Phillips report is limited in this sense, both the 
ABBe and 'GM Nation?' have, to an extent attempted to overcome the didactic 
relationship between scientific expertise and other forms of knowledge. If the AEBC 
and the 'GM Nation?' debate can influence the Government into moving away from 
these perspectives, both stand a chance of engendering more democratic and politically 
accountable processes of decision making. Moreover, the analysis of this thesis 
suggests that opening the decision making process in this way could_ allow a wider 
number of perspectives to make a knowledgeable contribution, and a more robust 
evaluation of the risks of GM crops and foods. 
Finally, in a political context in which 'openness' and 'transparency' have 
become key concepts shaping the Government's approach to risk. However, how far 
the Government is willing to take these ideas in regUlating new agricultural technologies 
is a question being contested in the GM case. If these concepts are allowed only to refer 
to ameliorated processes of communication whereby the Government attempts to better 
inform the public about risks and about its actions in this regards, this will comprise 
only one step towards democratizing governance. If, however, ideas of transparency 
and openness are applied to allow the politics described by participants in this thesis to 
become acknowledged and considered aspects of governance, then significant progress 
will be made. Here it is worth noting that many of the participants who have given their 
time to this project are involved at various levels of the debate and in the governance 
process. Thus, t~is thesis does not necessarily propose the need for a construction of a 
radically new form of governance. However, by allo",,:ing social and normative aspects 
of the debate over new agricultural technologies to become an acknowledged aspect of 
governance, decisions about the future of GM crops and foods might be made in a more 
open and accountable manner. This would further enable democracy by allowing 
members of the public outside of 'expert' communities to engage and potentially even 
participate in the governance of risk and agricultural development. 
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Reflections on the Data 
It was mentioned above that the analysis of the controversy over GM crops and 
foods presented in this thesis was motivated by both sociological research in the field. 
as well as by the interview data. It is the contribution of the latter which has generated 
many surprises over the course of this project and been responsible for reshaping not 
only the analysis of this thesis, but its conceptual approach as well. 
In particular previous research I had conducted in Canada (Jones, 2000), and 
supported by a significant body of sociological research (ex. Levidow, 1996; 1991; 
Macnaghten & Urry, 1998; 1995; and Franklin: 2002), suggested that controversies over 
risk and biotechnology were shaped by social contestations over moral valuations of 
nature. Public attitude research in the UK also provided support for the idea that the 
controversy of agricultural biotechnology related to perceptions that genetic 
modification constituted meddling with natural systems (Grove-White et aL, 1997; 
Marris et aL, 2001). However, although one participant (Participant L) voiced in-depth 
concerns about biotechnology and the transgression of natural boundaries, her / his 
comments stood out in their isolation. In many more cases, participants rebuked lines of 
questioning which raised these sorts of issues. For example, one participant argued that 
such perceptions were "elitist" and in her/his experience limited to only a few 
organisations with a religious focus. Most people, s/he suggested were interested in the 
more tangible issues (Participant C). Another participant, a campaigner opposing the 
development of the technology, argued that these arguments were only a peripheral part 
of her/his political engagement with GM. S/he further chided colleagues that had 
"staked their claims" to the "immorality of biotechnology," and failed to broach the 
broader issues shaping the technology (Participant Q). 
I do not wish to suggest that debates over GM crops and nature are not important 
factors in the controversy. Indeed, at places in this thesis have shown up in less direct 
ways. For example, how participants identified the role of science in promoting 
sustainability was closely linked to what they saw as appropriate society-environment 
relations. However, for most participants natural transgressions were not the motivating 
factors influencing their political approach to the controversy. 
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Alternatively, an unexpected emphasis on risks and social institutions in 
framing the way in which participants described the debate over agricultural 
biotechnology emerged in the data. Contestations over the life-industry, scientific 
expertise were repeating themes expressed by participants from all sides of the debate. 
The surprise was not that such concerns existed, but the degree and consistency with 
which they surfaced in the data, as well as the emphasis participants placed on them. 
Likewise, governance, as a factor influencing perceptions of risk and as a location in 
which the controversy was taking place, gained increasing prominence as both this 
thesis and the debate progressed. It is these factors which-have shaped the empirical 
approach of this thesis and guided its conceptual approach, particularly in terms of the 
application of social theories of risk. In hindsight, -a useful area of further research 
would be to address why moral issues pertaining to nature were not more prevalent in 
the arguments made by participants in this proj ect, where they have been shown to be in 
the past. 
Furthermore it is important to note that it has not been possible for this thesis to 
encapsulate the entire range of debates and concerns raised by participants. In this 
sense, some material has been passed over in favour of engaging with what I have 
interpreted as the most relevant features of the debate raised by participants. However, 
many other issues were raised which might very well have fit in with the research aims 
posed by this thesis and the approach it has taken to responding to these questions. In 
particular, the reform of the agricultural and food production systems was a further issue 
raised by several participants over the course of the study. In this regard, matters 
pertaining to the profitability of farming and the struggles farmers face in creating a 
livelihood on the farm were important issues raised by some participants. These issues 
will clearly gain even more relevance as the system of agricultural subsidies is due to be 
overhauled as part of the upcoming reforms of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP). Likewise, these debates were also tied to questions about the potential of an 
organic farming industry to provide an economically and productively viable alternative 
to industrial models. An analysis of these aspects of the data would, in the future, 
provide a useful extension to the understandings of risk, science and governance 
presented in this thesis. 
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Conclusion 
To conclude, the comments of one participant are helpful in drawing out the 
contribution of this thesis and the sociological approach it has adopted to the 
understanding of the debate over new agricultural technologies. At the close of an 
interview where the participant had offered many useful insights about the debate, s/he 
raised some critical questions about the capacity of sociology to impact on the debate, as 
opposed to describing it in hindsight. The participant states the following critical 
challenge to sociology: 
"With all due respect, sociologists do tend to study things after the event. 
There will be all sorts of people studying . nanotechnology in the social 
sciences in twenty years time, like its fashionable to look at GM now where , 
it wasn't very popular to look at it in the 1980s... I think that social 
scientists need to engage with policy processes and civil society, but really 
ought to move into effecting trajectories more." (Participant 0) 
On the one hand, I would have to agree with the participant. Sociology has more 
to offer than an understanding, or accounting, of debates over risk and science. In this 
regard, this thesis has thus sought to provide an analysis which might prove useful for 
actors involved in the debate, including the Government, to understand the variety of 
issues, and opinions at stake. The aim of which has been to provoke a more open and 
honest discussion of ideas of risk and agricultural biotechnology. 
However, on the other hand, I would also have to disagree with the participant's 
valuations of the contribution of a sociology of GM crops and foods. This thesis has 
demonstrated that the issues at stake extend beyond the debates over these technologies 
themselves. Rather, this thesis has outlined several more persistent debates about the 
cultural values and relationships shaping not only agriculture, but British Society as 
well. The aim of sociology, as I see it, is thus to seek to engage with trajectories which 
go beyond the debate over the construction and governance of agricultural 
biotechnology. This thesis has hoped to shed light on those aspects of risk, science and 
governance which may also persist through debates over future innovations. Moreover, 
it has sought to do so in a way which might promote values of democracy, inclusion and 
equality in these debates, and as relate to knowledge specifically. 
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Appendix A - Time-line of Selected Events 
Date 
1973-1985 
1985 
1987 
1987 
Feb. 1996 
March 1996 
Oct.. 1996 
1998 
Nov. 1998 
Feb. 1999 
Feb. 1999 
May 1999 
Nov. 1999 
Oct. 2000 
Dec. 2000 
Sept. 2001 
Nov. 2001 
April 2002 
July 2002 
Spring 2003 
Spring 2003 
Summer 2003 
Event 
Early Development of agricultural biotechnology. 
First case of mad-cow disease (BSE) identified in Kent, England. 
First GM field trial takes place (herbicide tolerant rape seed). 
Jeremy Rifkin tour of the UK, sponsored by the Green Alliance. 
GM tomato paste hits the shelves of Sainsbury's and Safeway. 
_Link established between BSE and vCJD in humans. 
Importation of unsegregated soy products gains media attention and angers 
elements of the British public. 
Supermarkets (beginning with Iceland) move to remove GM ingredients from 
their own-label products. 
English Nature calls for a Moratorium on GM foods and agriculture. 
GM Foods, and the call for a commercial moratorium on GM crops, become 
part of the opposition platform of the Conservative Party in the House of 
Commons. 
Initial comments concerning Pusztai's study of the health risks associated 
with GM potatoes are released through the media and taken up by the 
environmental lobby. 
Losey et al. Publish initial comments from their study on the effect of 
transgenic crops on the welfare of the monarch butterfly species. 
Government and SCIMAC agree to a voluntary moratorium on the 
commercial growing of GM in order to conduct the FSEs. 
Publication of Lord Phillips' Report from the BSE Inquiry 
Monsanto merges with Pharmica and Upjohn to form Pharmacia. This 
represents a major step back for the life-industry. 
AEBC publishes "Crops on Trial" report. 
Chapella and Quist publish findings of their research suggesting occurrences 
of horizontal gene transference in maize species in Mexico. 
AEBC calls for a public debate on GM. 
Government establishes the national debate on GM - GM Nation. 
National Debate on GM - GM Nation 
Final harvest of FSE crops. 
First ofFSE results expected. Further results expected in through 2004. 
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Appendix B - Biotechnology Generations (refer to RAFI, 2000) 
Generation 1 - refers primarily to crops which have been genetically engineered to be 
either resistant to herbicides or to express insecticide genes. Critics of generation one 
agriculture biotechnology argue that they have been designed to perpetuate herbicide 
and pesticide usage by linking new crop types to specific chemical inputs. Proponents 
argue that generation one biotechnology enhances current pest and weed control 
methods, with the potential for decreasing the impact of agriculture on the environment. 
Generation 2 - biotechnology refers to attempts to genetically modify the output traits 
of plants. Examples of generation two technologies include the genetic modification of 
fruits, such as the tomato and papaya, to retard their ripening, or the modification of 
crops for increased oil, protein or starch contents. Proponents of generation two 
technologies argue that they offer benefit by allowing industry to tailor crops to the 
specific requirements of the processor or the consumer. For example, slow ripening 
fruits have increased shelf lives, are easier to transport, have lower levels of wastage and 
require less inputs in processing. Critics of generation two biotechnology say that the 
benefits offered to consumers are minimal at best and potentially create environmental 
or food safety risks (RAFI, 2000). 
Generation 3 - technologies designed specifically to offer consumers tangible benefits. 
These include products, such as functional foods, which are genetically engineered to 
offer either increased nutrition or other more specific health benefits. Examples include 
edible vaccines, cancer preventing vegetables, cholesterol reducing grains and foods 
with increased vitamin and nutritional qualities. The most publicized generation three 
product is Syngenta's golden rice which has been genetically modified to provide a high 
source of beta-carotene. The benefits of which, industry argue, are greatest for 
populations in the developing world where Vitamin A deficiencies and subsequent 
blindness are chronic problems. Critics, although able to see the potential of generation 
three technology, argue that the vast majority of products will directed towards 
consumer populations in the north with the goal of increasing corporate profits, thus 
detracting from their potential. 
-268-
Appendix C - Participant Overview 
In order to protect the confidentiality of research participants, their names along with 
the specific organizations they are associated have been omitted. For the same reasons 
biographical information has been kept to a minimum. Throughout the thesis 
participants will be referred to by a letter of the alphabet. 
Participant Description 
A • Senior research scientist working for non-profit collective 
- which offers farmers innovations in crop protection and crop 
breeding. 
• Not involved in the innovation of biotechnology, focussing 
more on traditional breeding methods. 
• Has 30 years experience as an agricultural researcher. 
B • Senior manager of an industry association traditionally 
focussed on agricultural chemicals, but now with a mandate to 
represent industry interests in biotechnology. 
C • A lobbyist working for a campaign which has called for a 
temporary moratorium on the commercial growth and 
development of GM agriculture. 
• Has a long interest in social and environmental issues, and has 
become more politically active recently around the GM debate. 
D • Senior member of a consumer organization in the UK. 
• Has a twenty year history as a food policy expert in a variety of 
consumer groups. 
• Interests cut across the whole spectrum of food policy issues. 
E • Member of Parliament for the Labour Party. 
• Active in Government on issues of agriculture, biotechnology 
and governance. 
F • Senior member of a non-profit collective working to offer 
farmers innovations in crop protection and crop breeding. 
• Has a background in agricultural science. 
• Not involved directly in working with agricultural 
biotechnology. 
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G • ~ember of a group of scientists who support agricultural 
blOtechnology and who are vocal in bringing this message to 
the pUblic. 
• Research scientist working the area of genomics in agriculture. 
• University based, but with links to industry and holds industry 
funding. 
H • Associated with a small non-profit organization representing 
the small and family owned farms in Britain. 
• Has primary interests in the relationship between agriculture 
and the public and in promoting sustainable agriculture. 
• First generation farmer with a small dairy herd. 
I • An active campaigner against GM technologies and the life-
industry. 
• Involved as a "crop de-contaminator" in several high profile 
cases of GM crop picking. 
• Arrested and convicted on various charges related to the 
destruction of GM crop trials in the UK. 
J • Senior member of an environmental NGO looking at 
environmental issues and government regulation. 
• Member of the Government's Agriculture, Environment and 
Biotechnology Commission. 
K • Policy officer of an organization which promotes 
environmental sustainability and social welfare in food and 
agricultural policy. 
• Involved in environmental organizations around a variety of 
Issues. 
• Has an educational background in science and pest 
management. 
L • Member of Parliament for the Conservative Party. 
• Formerly an Agriculture Minister and still involved in issues of 
agriculture and governance. 
• Has a background in business and the food industry in 
particular. 
M • Former GM campaigner involved in crop-picking activities. 
• Has a history of involvement in the environmental movement 
as a local campaigner. 
• Motivated to join the GM campaign by the local trialing of GM 
crops. 
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N • Currently associated with a NGO concerned with genetic 
controversies in Britain. 
• Also, a member of the Government's Agriculture, Environment 
and Biotechnology Commission (AEBC) 
• Has a background in genetic science and activism. 
0 • Research scientist and spokesperson for a large agrochemical 
and biotechnology corporation. 
• Has a scientific background in agronomy research, applied 
science and field development. 
• Involved in industry field trials of GM crops since the early 
1990s. 
p • Member of an organization representing the Interests of farmers 
in Britain. 
• Has responsibilities directly related to the development of 
agricultural biotechnology. 
• Owner / operator of a large farm in the United Kingdom. 
Q • Associated with a civil society organization dedicated to 
addressing issues involving biodiversity, sustainable 
agriculture and development. 
• Has been involved in food and agricultural issues in the 
developing world since the mid-1960s. 
• Became involved in the GM debate in the early 1980s. 
R • Senior scientists involved in the Farm Scale Evaluation. 
• Has had considerable involvement with a variety of 
Government appointed committees involving agriculture, 
science and technology. 
• Has a background in biology, although not in direct 
relationship to biotechnology. 
S • Member of a group of scientists who support agricultural 
biotechnology and who are vocal in bringing this message to 
the public. 
• An ecologist by training with further interests in chemistry and 
molecular biology. Specifically involved in the risk 
assessment of transgenic plants. 
• University based. 
T • A senior campaigner on GM for a large environmental NGO. 
• Motivated by an interest in natural history and environmental 
well-being. 
• 
Has been an environmental activist involved in a diversity of 
campaigns going back to the 1970s. 
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u • Research scientist employed by a large agricultural 
biotechnology corporation. 
• Working on the genetic modification of bananas. 
• Educated in biology and plant biotechnology. 
V • Senior bureaucrat in the Food Standards Agency since the 
establishment of the agency in 2000. 
• Has background in hands-on farming, previously owning and 
operating a dairy and arable crop farm. 
• Left farming due to downturn in farm profits and a lack of 
stability in the agricultural economy. 
W • Research scientist and spokesperson for a large chemical and 
-
agricultural biotechnology corporation. 
• Has a background in crop protection and has been working 
with crop protection chemistry for twenty years. 
X • Senior bureaucrat within the Department of Environment, 
Farming and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). 
• Working in the regulation, control and policy on release of 
genetically modified organisms. 
• Has been involved in the regulation of biotechnology since the 
early 1980s. 
y • Public Relations Officer of a large agricultural biotechnology 
corporation. 
• Has background in communications consultancy. 
• Educated as a scientist. 
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"Finally: It was stated at the outset, that this system would not be here, and 
at once, perfected. You cannot but plainly see that I have kept my word. 
But I now leave my cetelogical System standing thus unfinished, even as the 
great Cathedral of Cologne was left, with the crane still standing upon the 
top of the uncompleted tower. For small erections may be finished by their 
first architects; grand ones, true one, ever leave the copestone to posterity. 
God keep me from ever completing anything. This whole book is but a 
draught - nay, but the draught of a draught. Oh, Time, Strength, Cash and 
Patience!" 
- Hennan Melville, Moby-Dick; or the Whale (1856) 
